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Commentary on Lau

Commentary on Lau. David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back. David Chalmers. Or: The New York Chainsaw Massacre. Four Distinctions. Access Consciousness Phenomenal consciousness Attention Visibility

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Commentary on Lau

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  1. Commentary on Lau • David Chalmers

  2. Halloween 2009:HOT Strikes Back • David Chalmers

  3. Or:The New York Chainsaw Massacre

  4. Four Distinctions • Access Consciousness Phenomenal consciousness • Attention Visibility • D’ (Discrimination) Perceptual Certainty • First-Order Representation Higher-Order Representation

  5. Access Consciousness • Access consciousness = discrimination or attention? • Many degrees of access: • accessed vs accessible • accessible to what? • accessible for what?

  6. Phenomenal Consciousness • Phenomenal consciousness = visibility or • perceptual certainty? • Visibility = discrimination: objective threshold • Perceptual certainty = confidence: subjective threshold? • Cf. unconscious perception literature: subjective threshold a better criterion for consciousness

  7. What is Perceptual Certainty? • Perceptual certainty: perceptual representation with high probability • p(red object there) > 0.95: conscious • p(red object there) < 0.95: unconscious

  8. Perceptual Certainty and Consciousness • But: perceptual representation can be certain without being conscious • Unconscious representation [e.g. in dorsal stream] may have p(red object there) > 0.95

  9. Perceptual Certainty and HOT • Also: perceptual certainty dissociates from HOT • Certainty without HOT: Unconscious representations, weather-forecasting systems, animals. • HOT without perceptual certainty: I have a perceptual representation of red object there with p = 0.6

  10. Certain HOTs? • Alternative: HOT about perceptual certainty • I’m perceptually representing with 0.96 confidence that there’s a red object? • Or: a certain HOT about perception • I’m 0.96 confident that I’m perceptually representing a red object.

  11. Introspective Confidence • Construed the last way, what matters isn’t perceptual confidence but introspective confidence. • Introspective confidence is the standard guide to phenomenal consciousness • But doesn’t entail HOT: just requires reliable introspective access to conscious states.

  12. Models of Phenomenal Consciousness • What distinguishes (phenomenally) conscious vs unconscious representation in the brain? • First-order vs higher-order? • Two streams? • Two substrates? • My view: Accessibility/availability

  13. Access Consciousness • What of the phenomenal vs access consciousness distinction? • The conceptual distinction remains • But phenomenology may correlate with a certain sort of access/accessibility? • Which sort?

  14. Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness? • Low-capacity system (prefrontal): access, attention • High-capacity system (occipital): accessibility, availability to attention • Which correlates with phenomenal consciousness? • My view: the latter.

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