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Negotiating EU-Australian Engagement: the 1994 and 2008 Wine Trade Agreements. Lachlan McKenzie PhD Candidate School of Social and Political Sciences The University of Melbourne . The 1994 and 2008 Wine Trade Agreements. 1994 and 2008, two agreements, one process.
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Negotiating EU-Australian Engagement: the 1994 and 2008 Wine Trade Agreements Lachlan McKenzie PhD Candidate School of Social and Political Sciences The University of Melbourne
The 1994 and 2008 Wine Trade Agreements • 1994 and 2008, two agreements, one process. • Concerning geographical indicators (GIs), traditional expressions (TEs) and winemaking practices and labelling. • Driven by bargaining leverage and respective relationship to industry.
Getting to the negotiation table • No domestic (Australian) legal recourse for the French industry. • The EU was compelled to negotiate an agreement to protect wine GIs and set a precedent. • EU share of global wine exports was 58% in the early 1990s • An industry of significant cultural and economic importance to many member states. • Europe's strong and coordinated wine lobbies perceived protection of their GIs and TEs as essential to their success.
Objectives and concessions “The French were so offended with us using Champagne, and the denigration of their brand, that it would have overcome any reservations they would have had.” – Australian negotiator
1. Constraints on bargaining: the EU, a hard bargainer • “the Europeans were the slow ones to come to the table, because they had sixteen people (member states) they had to get to the table”. – Australian negotiator • Another Australian negotiator described the negotiations as “pedantic, we couldn’t get anything through, the negotiations were very difficult”.
2. Constraints on bargaining:explaining the EU’s diminished inflexibility • “their (the EU’s) links back to industry were different to Australia’s … the wine industry is controlled much more than in Australia so it was more the case for the industry to accept the laws of the EU” – Australian negotiator • Conversely Australians had to sell agreements to industry, which “was a real constraint for negotiators” – Australian negotiator
Number of Australian uses of the GI Champagne 87 90 93 94 96 98 99 03 Source: Steven Stern, Corrs Chambers Westgarth.
Figure 2: Number of Australian uses of the GI Red-Burgundy 87 90 93 94 95 96 98 99 Source: Steven Stern, Corrs Chambers Westgarth.
Figure 3: Number of Australian uses of the GI Chablis 87 90 93 94 95 96 98 99 Source: Steven Stern, Corrs Chambers Westgarth.
Concessions • The EU conceded access for Australian wine to its market. • This included access to the UK market, one of the largest wine importers globally. • Australian conceded use of European GIs and TEs, with the ‘best endeavours clause’. • EU negotiators “would have played a bit harder had they known how well Australian wine would penetrate the UK market” – Australian negotiator
The outcome Gains and Concessions
Australian Wine Exports to Europe In 2009-10, Australia exported 382 million litres of wine to the EU worth $863 million. (DAFF) Australian Wine Exports to the UK Source: Stephen Stern, Coors Chambers Westgarth.
Conclusion • The negotiations demonstrate • The potential benefit of negotiating with the EU in areas of common interests, as opposed to issues like agricultural protectionism. • The importance of understanding EU policy processes. • The impact that domestic institutions and structures can have on bargaining behaviour.
