The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

1. The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 PO 326: American Foreign Policy

2. The Cuban Missile Crisis • Closest the two superpowers came to a nuclear exchange during the Cold War • Resulted when USSR secretly placed medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads in Cuba • Crisis intimately linked to other strategic situations between the superpowers (e.g., US missiles in Eastern Hemisphere, Berlin situation) • Most regularly examined crisis by analysts of foreign policy decision-making (well-documented, unimaginable consequences)

3. The Progression of the Crisis • 1. USSR secretly places missiles in Cuba (6 September) • Hidden in cargo ships • Buildup of Soviet forces to construct/operate missiles, repel US invasion • Done in wake of Soviet assertions that no offensive weapons would be placed in Cuba • 2. American U-2 reconnaissance plane discovers Soviet missiles (14 October) • Complete surprise to US officials • U-2 not fired upon by SAMs, though they were operational

4. The Progression of the Crisis • 3. American foreign policy chiefs debate the US’s course of action (beginning 14 October) • Formation of ExComm (SecState, SecDef, NSA, VP, AG, CIA chief, Stevenson, Acheson, Deputies, Experts) • Linkage to situation in Berlin • Diplomatic track, trade essentially eliminated as options at early points • Three main options settled upon as menu of choice: • Surgical air strike • Large air strike followed by invasion • “Quarantine” (blockade) • Blockade chosen

5. The Progression of the Crisis • 4. President Kennedy addresses nation concerning crisis (22 October); initiation of public confrontation • Demands withdrawal of missiles • Announces quarantine order • Place US strategic forces on full alert • Warns USSR that any missile launched from Cuba will be regarded as a Soviet missile, requiring a full retaliatory response by the US against the USSR

6. The Progression of the Crisis • 5. Khrushchev orders Soviet forces to full alert, threatens retaliation against US ships if boarding attempted (24 October) • Soviet ships head toward quarantine line; most turn back, and only one ship boarded • Missile readiness program sped up by Soviets • 6. Khrushchev offers withdrawal of missiles in exchange for non-invasion pledge in letter to Kennedy (26 October) • Conciliatory, emotional response • Recognition of crisis as potentially uncontrollable

7. The Progression of the Crisis • 7. Khrushchev sends second letter demanding US withdraw missiles in Turkey in exchange for Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba (27 October) • Letter likely the product of hard-line Politburo revision • US Jupiter missiles in Turkey obsolete, but outright trade would be victory for USSR • SAMs open fire on US planes; U-2 shot down

8. The Progression of the Crisis • 8. US responds favorably to first letter, but warns of imminent air strike or invasion if missiles not withdrawn by 28 October (27 October) • Both countries prepare for nuclear war, as per likely courses of action (US attack, USSR attacks Jupiters and Berlin, US retaliates and resists in Berlin, full nuclear exchange) • RFK meets with Dobrynin; modified trade • 9. Khrushchev announces withdrawal of missiles (28 October)

9. Reflections on the Crisis • Any of a number of small changes in this process could have led to MAD • In the first part of the course, we will seek to address some important puzzles of the crisis, both to provide answers and to illustrate the explanatory applicability of several general, analytical approaches to foreign policy decision-making

10. Reflections on the Crisis • Given that doing so would likely bring the world to the brink of destruction, why did the USSR put missiles in Cuba in the first place? • Given that a blockade did not remove the missiles and allowed those in place to be readied, how and why did the US settle upon the “quarantine” as its chosen response? • Given that nuclear war would hurt the US as much as the USSR, why did the USSR choose to remove the missiles?

11. General Questions Concerning American Foreign Policy • Who are the key players in American foreign policy decision-making? • How are American foreign policy decisions arrived at by these key players? • Are theoretical frameworks useful to analysts seeking to answer these questions?