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INPO Engineering – Configuration Management Activities. Carl Faller Assistant Department Manager, Engineering-CM. Bob Gambrill Department Manager, Engineering-CM. Presentation to CMBG June 20-22, 2011. Topics. Consequences of Fukushima
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INPO Engineering – Configuration Management Activities Carl Faller Assistant Department Manager, Engineering-CM Bob Gambrill Department Manager, Engineering-CM Presentation to CMBG June 20-22, 2011
Topics • Consequences of Fukushima • Industry Performance (EN & CM Evaluation Results) • Margin Management • Engineering Product Quality • Digital Systems • Technical Conscience • Other Emerging Issues
IER Level 1 11-1 Overview • Issued March 15 (rev March 18) • Focus is to provide near-term assurance of high state of readiness to respond to both design basis and beyond design basis events • Frequently asked questions—clarified intent of recommended actions • Walk down and inspection guidelines • Industry drafted, endorsed following INPO review and comment
IER 11-1 General Trends / Themes • SAMG programs / processes have not been updated to reflect changes to plant configuration • Required equipment no longer exists • Procedure execution weaknesses • Contract elapsed / no longer valid • Required tools / equipment not staged • Material not properly maintained • Design vulnerabilities exist
IER 11-2, Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Cooling and Makeup • Issued April 26 • Increase sensitivity to SFP storage event response • Verify shutdown safety provisions applied to SFP during outage • Apply increased protection for SFPduring operating modes while heat load remains high • Provide time to saturation conditions to control room and emergency response staff • Abnormal operating procedures address loss of cooling and makeup • Emergency procedures contain precaution for monitoring SFP level and temperature
Fukushima - Next Steps • Review and consider EAG Working Group recommendations • Detailed Fukushima event timeline and causes • Industry lessons learned working meetings • New IERs to address other Fukushima lessons learned • SBO / focus on AC power
Industry Performance (CM & EN Evaluation Results)Categories of AFIs (through end of 1st Qtr 2011) Number of AFIs Performance Categories
Margin Management • Ongoing department focus area • Most stations have performed gap analysis to INPO 09-003, Excellence in the Management of Design and Operating Margins, and addressed identified gaps. • Examples of Performance Gaps: … issues that could adversely affect margin not consistently identified and prioritized as margin issues and integrated with the priority of other station issues ... … several margin issues not identified and adequately evaluated for resolution ...
Margin Management Contributors: …. lack of process / expectation guidance to review SSC deficiencies for potential impact on operating margin … insufficient management oversight to ensure margin issues are identified, tracked, and resolved; insufficient procedural guidance contributes ... … site personnel have insufficient understanding of program requirements / expectations
Engineering Product Quality • Focus is on the quality of the modification (produced in-house or by engineering service provider) when released by Engineering • Typically 10 AFIs / year (1/3 vendor, 2/3 in house) • Examples of Performance Gaps: … key design inputs not sufficient to assess the affect the modification will have on plant equipment … … validation and testing of modifications not adequate to ensure the modifications performed intended functions .. … (vendor associated) undetected errors in engineering products provided by vendors …
Engineering Product Quality Contributors … not being thorough with assumptions (e.g. not recognizing an assumption was made, not verifying) … cross cutting weak human performance … … weak failure modes affects … … (for vendors) inadequate engineering oversight and review of vendor supplied products .. … (for vendors) insufficient specification, missed verification of design requirements during owner acceptance reviews, compressed project schedules, lack of intrusive oversight of vendor activities …
Product Quality – Industry Aggregate Engineering Fundamentals Performance(Product Quality) Knowledge Worker Process Challenge Boards, Design Review Boards HU Tools Tools & Techniques Performance Indicators Observations Technical Risk Assessment Tools Training (to Improve Performance) Monitoring Performance(Product Quality) Employee Development Post Product Critique Quality Review Teams
Digital Systems • Digital system issues continue to result in consequential events, some resulting in plant scrams (six scrams in past two years linked with digital). • Evaluation findings (2009 and 2010) • 6 AFIs and 3 PDs • causes / contributors: • missed design attributes and failure modes • insufficient review / validation of vendor-supplied firmware • weaknesses in control of vendor software and testing • modifications not adequately specified on drawings • specifications not adequately reviewed and tested
Digital Systems • 3 Strengths • Project Management • Thoroughness of pre-installation testing • Process controls & guidance, early procurement of hardware, and diversified testing methods • INPO actions • Annual digital upgrade working meetings • Improve reporting of industry OE • Involvement with EPRI and ISA working groups • Good Practice: Improving Engineering Quality in Digital System Projects – Issued October 2010 to identify lessons learned and recommended practices in key areas Debbie Williams
Digital Systems • INPO actions Related to Cyber Security • EPIX trend codes developed to collect digital issues; includes codes for cyber . • Developing training modules for cyber assessment teams and general awareness (June /July 2011) and technical training (November 2011). • Developing a web page on INPO member site to share information related to cyber security. • Reviewing INPO documents and evaluation process for inclusion of cyber security attributes. (1st quarter 2012).
Technical Conscience Frequently Asked Questions
What are INPO’s expectations for use of the preliminary document ? • Incorporate the principles into ongoing organizational activities used to reinforce and anchor nuclear safety culture and professionalism of nuclear personnel. • INPO evaluation teams will use the principles documents to help identify and communicate causes and contributors to weak performance. • Sites are expected to provide feedback to INPO based on experiences with use of the preliminary documents. • We do not expect anyone to create an indicator to monitor TC or OF performance.
What is the relationship between the TC principles document and other INPO documents ? • Other principles documents • Performance Objectives and Criteria • SOER 10-02, “Engaged, Thinking Organizations”
How is the industry using the TC principles document to enhance performance? • Performing a gap analysis of performance in comparison to the principles documents • Reinforcing the principles during department and station meetings • Training • Familiarization/Reinforcement • Case Studies – reviewing the principles to discuss how they were (or should have been) applied during plant activities
Technical Conscience INPO Engr-CM perspective: • Overall, well received • Helping to frame staff’s thinking and communications • Based on feedback, do not anticipate any major changes to the finalized document • Many sites in the process of training (approach varies) • Detailed Training w/ DLA & modules tailored to: • Sr Leadership (all) • Engr Leadership • Individual Contributors Basic Power Point Overview Increasing Effectiveness
Emerging Industry Issues • Refocus on fundamentals and thinking vs. high reliance on process • Time critical operator actions • Consequences from Fukushima (to unfold over several years) Next Presentation