THE UK DEFENCE REVIEW AND THE ROYAL NAVY: IMPLICATIONS FOR COALITION OPERATIONS

1. THE UK DEFENCE REVIEW AND THE ROYAL NAVY: IMPLICATIONS FOR COALITION OPERATIONS Dr Lee Willett Head of Military Capabilities Programme Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) London, UK Precision Strike Technology Symposium Kossiakoff Conference Center The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 12-14 October 2004

2. THE UK DEFENCE REVIEW PROCESS • Strategic Defence Review (SDR) – 1998 • SDR New Chapter – 2002 • Defence White Paper (`Delivering Security in a Changing World’) - 11 December 2003 • Defence Command Paper - 22 July 2004)

3. UK PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS: AN ANALYSIS • SDR (1998) • Europe, area of (then) NATO interest, Out Of Area Operations including Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf • SSNs cut from 12 to 10 • Escorts cut from 35 to 31 • 1998-2004 • Increase in commitments and Op Tempo – Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Sierra Leone, 9/11, War on Terrorism • DEFENCE WHITE PAPER (2003/2004) • Broader areas of interest -Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia • SSNs cut from 10 to 8 • Escorts cut from 31 to 25

4. THE ROYAL NAVY’S RESPONSE `If you’ve got limited resources then you have to make judgements about what are the most important things. … Within defence broadly, one of the most important things was to re-adjust the Army because of its need to lose its Cold War hangovers and become better oriented for expeditionary operations. … A lot of the debate on SSN numbers related to ASW. But that’s quite dangerous, because they have far wider utility in land attack, covert intelligence gathering and special forces operations, not to mention their tremendous capacity for sea denial. … People should be under no illusions that with only 25 destroyers and frigates were will be very close to the cusp.’ Admiral Sir Alan West, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff

5. THE BACKBONE OF THE FUTURE ROYAL NAVY • Future Carrier (CVF) • Astute-Class SSN • Daring-Class Type 45 Destroyer

6. COALITION OPERATIONS `strategic concepts of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility will continue to govern our efforts to fulfil [our] responsibilities and meet the challenges of the future.’ Joint Vision 2020

7. THE ROYAL NAVY IN COALITION OPERATIONS `our emphasis in the maritime environment is increasingly on delivering effect from the sea onto the land, supporting forces ashore and on securing access to the theatre of operation.’ UK Secretary of State for Defence Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP

8. THE ROYAL NAVY IN COALITION OPERATIONS • The Future Navy • The Future Maritime Operational Concept • BR1806: British Maritime Doctrine

9. THE ROYAL NAVY AND NETWORK ENABLED CAPABILITY • NETWORK ENABLED CAPABILITY (NEC) • Sensors • Network • Strike Assets • NEC CORE REQUIREMENTS • Collate and disseminate critical information • Use knowledge gained to deliver right effect at right place/time • CORE ROYAL NAVY NEC POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES • JSF • TacTom

10. THE ROYAL NAVY: LESSONS IDENTIFIED IN COALITION OPERATIONS • BROAD LESSONS • Access into theatre from sovereign platforms with no HNS • Access onto target – power projection from international waters • Early effect – political effect and/or shaping the battlespace • SPECIFIC LESSONS • Carriers – re-roling as helicopter platforms • SSNs – all power projection with no HNS, but limited platforms/rounds • Amphibious operations – spearhead forces • Escort ships – C4ISTAR, air defence/ASW, Naval Fire Support – but no long range power projection capability

11. TOMAHAWK: A JOINT ASSET • TOMAHAWK • Long range, stand-off, all weather capability, with no HNS • Early use to degrade air defences and shape battlespace, with no risk to aircraft/aircrew • Access onto target – power projection from international waters • Faster onto target than aircraft • Early effect – political effect and/or shaping the battlespace • AIRCRAFT/STORM SHADOW • Weight of fire, sortie generation • COMPLIMENTARITY • Different target sets • Complimentary capabilities and roles • Left jab/right hook – but a stronger left jab will make right hook more effective

12. FUTURE CARRIER • HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Prince of Wales – ISDs 2012 and 2015. £GBP 3bn cost • Maritime Airborne Surveillance & Control (MASC) and troop insertion capabilities • Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA), F35 JSF - step change in ability to project air power from the sea. ISD 2012 • Programme in extended assessment phase: no confirmation of size and cost of hull and airwing before 2005

13. ASTUTE-CLASS SSN • First three of class ordered and in build. ISD 2008 • Deterrent support, ASW/ASuW, ISR, TG Ops • Significant new emphasis on SOF (Dry Deck Shelter) and power projection (TacTom) • TacTom – keep UK at leading edge of technology • Flexible design will support technology insertion • Future options for VLS system? • Future role of SSN assured • Decision still open on how many more in class

14. DARING-CLASS TYPE 45 DESTROYER • First six of eight on order. First two in build. ISDs from 2007 • Presence – political and military significance of escort ships for `Tomahawk Diplomacy’ • Type 45 – AAW destroyer • Numbers cut from 12 to 8 • Land attack would significantly enhance capability of less platforms and would keep UK at technology leading, while enhancing VFM • However, no formal requirement for a long-range land attack capability and no decision in White Paper

15. DARING-CLASS TYPE 45 DESTROYER • `the principal role of the Type 45 Destroyers will be Anti-Air Warfare. However, these ships are being designed and built with significant space and weight margins to enable incremental acquisition should an emerging requirement necessitate a different equipment fit. Our requirements are being kept under review, and the design could be modified to incorporate improved land attack capabilities, including a cruise missile system such as Tomahawk.’ - Adam Ingram, UK Minister for the Armed Forces • `I think the case is very compelling. To put Tactical Tomahawk in a Type 45 destroyer requires a relatively insignificant amount of money, and exploits the virtues of a platform you have already paid for. The problem is that there is no money. I had hoped we might have a nod in that direction. But we haven’t and it will have to fight its way through the equipment programme in the normal way.’ - First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Alan West

16. TYPE 45 DESTROYER: LAND ATTACK OPTIONS • A70/Scalp Naval • Systems still in development • Predicted ISDs 2010 (A70) and 2011 (Scalp Naval) • Capabilities and costs unknown • Mk41/TacTom • Mk41 and Tomahawk combat proven and available • Mk41 Baseline 7 in development, TacTom (Block IV) eight tests out of eight, with IOC May 2004 • Flexibility of Mk41 • Window of Opportunity • MoD studies have concluded that a TacTom fit for Type 45 should be a priority • Space and weight design provision for insertion of additional launcher • Ship 4 is option – fit for, if not (yet) with • Window for decision remains very tight

17. FUTURE SURFACE COMBATANT • Little yet known of potential capabilities • Predicted ISD end of the next decade • Emphasis on flexibility, adaptability and affordability • Perhaps different models of ship within class • Perhaps class will be a Batch 2 Type 45

18. AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS • Brigade-sized specialized force – 3 Cdo Bde (40, 42 and 45 Cdo Batallions) • HMS Ocean LPH • HMS Albion, HMS Bulwark LPDs • 2 x LSLs, 4 x Ro-Ros • A step change in UK amphibious capability, • and vital support to USMC • Future plans – Apache Longbows and • Chinooks based on amphibious platforms?

19. CONCLUSIONS • Balancing new technology against platform cuts to deliver capability and VFM • Core missions and unique benefits of maritime power enduring • One platform – even if networked – cannot be in two places at once • Carrier, Astute and Type 45 – critical programmes for coalition operations, but questions still hang over each • UK, and Royal Navy, add much to coalition operations – niche capabilities, political support. However, they are finding it increasingly hard to do so. • Coalitions often stronger than the sum of their parts • What do cuts say to US? How can US help?

20. QUESTIONS? Dr Lee Willett Head of Military Capabilities Programme Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET, UK Tel: 011 44 20 7747 2611 Email: dr.leewillett@rusi.org Web: www.rusi.org/militarysciences/capabilities Fax: 011 44 20 7747 2647 Pictures courtesy of BAE SYSTEMS, UK Ministry of Defence