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DESIGN STRATEGIES WITH RESPECT TO HAZARDOUS MATERIALS. THE NATURE OF RISK IN INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES. http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0008.pdf. FATAL WORK INJURIES. http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0008.pdf. FATAL WORK INJURIES. http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0008.pdf.

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The nature of risk in industrial facilities
THE NATURE OF RISK IN INDUSTRIALFACILITIES

http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0008.pdf


Fatal work injuries
FATAL WORK INJURIES

http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0008.pdf


Fatal work injuries1
FATAL WORK INJURIES

http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0008.pdf


The nature of risk in industrial facilities1
THE NATURE OF RISK IN INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

  • COMPARISON VALUES - DEATHS/100,000 WORKERS

    • IN 1912, 21 (18,000 - 21,000 DEATHS)

    • IN 1992, 4.2 (TRIPLE THE NUMBER OF WORKERS)


Summary of major incidents 2 3
SUMMARY OF MAJOR INCIDENTS2,3

  • FLIXBOROUGH, ENGLAND (1974) - CYCLOHEXANE MANUFACTURING AS A NYLON PRECURSOR 4,5

    • VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION

    • KILLED 28 PEOPLE

    • CAUSE APPEARED TO BE DESIGN FOR TEMPORARY PIPING SYSTEM



Summary of major incidents
SUMMARY OF MAJOR INCIDENTS

  • SEVESO, ITALY (1976) - DIOXIN6

    • TCP (2,4,5-TRICHLOROPHENOL) REACTOR EXPLODED RELEASING TCDD, (2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORODIBENZO-p-DIOXIN

    • THIS MATERIAL WAS A COMPONENT IN AGENT ORANGE


Summary of major incidents1
SUMMARY OF MAJOR INCIDENTS

  • SEVESO, ITALY (1976) - DIOXIN6

    • PLUME SPREAD OVER AN AREA THAT CONTAINED OVER 100,000 PERSONS AND IMPACTED OTHER MUNICIPALITIES WITH A POPULATION OF 17000

    • PRIMARY IMPACT WAS FEAR OF LONG-TERM EFFECTS AND OVERCOMING INITIAL TRAUMA

    • COULD BE THE SOURCE OF SARA TITLE III REQUIREMENTS


Summary of major incidents2
SUMMARY OF MAJOR INCIDENTS

  • MEXICO CITY, MEXICO (1984) - LPG (LIQUID PETROLEUM GAS) TERMINAL

    • A BLEVE (BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION) 7

    • 650 DEATHS

    • 6400 INJURIES

    • PLANT DAMAGE = $31.3 MILLION


Summary of major incidents3
SUMMARY OF MAJOR INCIDENTS

  • BHOPAL, INDIA (1984) - PESTICIDE MANUFACTURING8

    • UNEXPECTED CHEMICAL REACTION WHEN WATER ENTERED AN MIC (METHYL ISOCYANATE) STORAGE TANK

    • RELEASED ABOUT 40 TONS OF MATERIAL OVER A 2 HOUR PERIOD

    • SPREAD OVER A LOCAL POPULATION OF ABOUT 900,000

    • ESTIMATED 3800 DEAD AND 11,000 DISABLED


Summary of major incidents4
SUMMARY OF MAJOR INCIDENTS

  • BHOPAL, INDIA (1984) - PESTICIDE MANUFACTURING8

    • TRACED TO A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE SOURCES9

    • FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SAFETY SYSTEMS

    • INADEQUATE DESIGN OF SAFETY SYSTEMS

    • MIS-OPERATION OF THE FACILITY


Summary of major incidents5
SUMMARY OF MAJOR INCIDENTS

  • PASADENA, TEXAS (1989) - POLYETHYLENE MANUFACTURING

    • POLYETHYLENE REACTOR EXPLOSION

    • KILLED 23 PEOPLE AND INJURED 130

    • TRACED TO EITHER A SEAL FAILURE ON THE REACTOR AND/OR USE OF INEXPERIENCED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL


Example of incident
EXAMPLE OF INCIDENT

  • BHOPAL RELEASE

    • HOW IT OCCURRED

    • HOW IT WAS ANALYZED

    • RESULTING CHANGES


Fundamentals of processes
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCESSES

  • THERMODYNAMICS

    • CONSERVATION OF MASS AND ENERGY

      • MASS IS NEITHER CREATED OR DESTROYED

      • ENERGY IS NEITHER CREATED OR DESTROYED


Fundamentals of processes1
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCESSES

  • THERMODYNAMICS

    • PROCESSES REQUIRE CHANGING CONDITIONSSYSTEMS MOVE TOWARDS A NEW EQUILIBRIUM

      • THE RATE DEPENDS ON THE CHEMICAL AND MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF THE SYSTEM

      • WATER DOES NOT FLOW UPHILL WITHOUT A BOOST


Fundamentals of processes2
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCESSES

  • EXAMPLE OF ETHANOL DISTILLATION


Fundamentals of processes3
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCESSES

  • ENERGY/MATERIAL QUALITY CHANGES

    • ENERGY

      • MAY BE ADDED OR REMOVED TO INITIATE A SYSTEM CHANGE

      • WHEN ENERGY IS ADDED, IT FLOWS THROUGH THE SYSTEM TO BE CONSERVED, BUT IT IS DEGRADED IN QUALITY


Energy quality changes
ENERGY QUALITY CHANGES

  • EXAMPLE OF HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANT


Energy quality changes1
ENERGY QUALITY CHANGES

  • EXAMPLE OF HYDROELECTRIC POWER

  • WATER CHANGES ITS EQUILIBRIUM POSITION WITH A RESULTANT CHANGE IN POTENTIAL ENERGY AND POWER PRODUCTION

  • WATER IN THE RIVER CANNOT BE USED TO DRIVE THE TURBINE BECAUSE IT IS AT A LOWER POTENTIAL ENERGY LEVEL


Material quality changes
MATERIAL QUALITY CHANGES

  • PURE CHEMICALS THAT ARE DISPERSED IN WATER (SOLUBLE IN WATER) CANNOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL PURITY WITHOUT USING ENERGY

    • DISTILLATION - ENERGY TO VAPORIZE/CONDENSE

    • CRYSTALLIZATION - ENERGY TO FREEZE/MELT

    • ADSORPTION OR ADSORPTION -ENERGY TO REGENERATE


Reactions
REACTIONS

  • RESULTS IN FORMATION OF NEW CHEMICAL SPECIES

  • ELEMENTS ARE CONSERVED, BUT NEW MOLECULES MAY BE FORMED

  • REACTIONS CAN BE SINGLE, IN PARALLEL OR IN SERIES

  • MOLAR RELATIONSHIPS EXIST BETWEEN REACTANTS AND PRODUCTS


Reactions1
REACTIONS

  • EXAMPLE OF METHANE COMBUSTION:

    • STOCHIOMETRIC REACTION


Reactions2
REACTIONS

  • STOCHIOMETRIC REACTION WITH AIR FOR THE OXIDANT


Reactions3
REACTIONS

  • REAL REACTIONS MAY NOT GO TO COMPLETION

  • MAY REQUIRE AN EXCESS OF ONE COMPONENT TO COMPLETELY REACT THE OTHER


Reactions4
REACTIONS

  • METHANE COMBUSTION WITH 130% EXCESS AIR


Reactions5
REACTIONS

  • PARALLEL ETHANE COMBUSTION REACTIONS WITH 200% EXCESS AIR AND INCOMPLETE COMBUSTION


Reactions6
REACTIONS

  • MOST REACTIONS DO NOT GO TO COMPLETION

  • COMBUSTION CAN HAVE PRIMARY PRODUCTS OF CO2, H2O AND N2

  • BYPRODUCTS CAN INCLUDE CO, UNBURNED HYDROCARBONS, NOx, AND SO2 IN SMALLER QUANTITIES


Reactions7
REACTIONS

  • OTHER TYPES OF OXIDATION-REDUCTION REACTIONS


Reactions8
REACTIONS

  • OTHER TYPES OF NON-REDOX REACTIONS:


Separation processes
SEPARATION PROCESSES

  • PROCESSES TO SEPARATE COMPONENTS, BEFORE OR AFTER REACTIONS

  • PROCESSES TO CONCENTRATE COMPONENTS

  • THE DRIVING FORCES FOR MOST OF THESE PROCESSES ARE

    • CHEMICAL EQUILIBRIUM

    • MECHANICAL

    • RATE DEPENDENT


Separation processes1
SEPARATION PROCESSES

  • PROCESS EFFICIENCY IS RELATED TO THE DEVIATION REQUIRED FROM AMBIENT CONDITIONS

    • THE MORE CHANGE REQUIRED, THE LESS THE EFFICIENCY

    • THE LESS CHANGE REQUIRED, THE HIGHER THE EFFICIENCY

  • ALL HAVE POTENTIAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM


Transport processes
TRANSPORT PROCESSES

  • USED TO MOVE MATERIAL BETWEEN PROCESS OPERATIONS

  • PUMPS

  • TURBINES

  • CONVEYORS

  • GRAVITY

  • PNEUMATIC


Storage operations
STORAGE OPERATIONS

  • RAW MATERIALS

  • FINISHED GOODS

  • INTERMEDIATES

  • OFF-SPEC MATERIALS


Control systems
CONTROL SYSTEMS

  • PROCESSES FOR NORMAL OPERATION

    • CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

    • BATCH OPERATIONS

  • START-UP


Control systems1
CONTROL SYSTEMS

  • PROCESSES FOR NORMAL OPERATION

    • CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

    • BATCH OPERATIONS

  • START-UP

  • SHUTDOWN

    • PROCESS INTERRUPTION

    • ROUTINE SHUTDOWN

    • EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN


Control systems2
CONTROL SYSTEMS

  • SAFETY SYSTEMS

    • OUT-OF-RANGE CONDITIONS

    • INTERLOCKS BETWEEN UNITS


Inherently safe design 10 11
INHERENTLY SAFE DESIGN10,11

  • TECHNIQUES THAT REDUCE THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATIONS

  • EQUIPMENT FAILURE SHOULD NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT SAFETY, OUTPUT OR EFFICIENCY


Minimization of the intensity
MINIMIZATION OF THE INTENSITY

  • REDUCE QUANTITIES OF MATERIALS MAINTAINED IN INVENTORIES AND IN THE PROCESS

    • QUANTITIES IN INVENTORIES

      • REDUCED CAPITAL COSTS

      • REDUCED MAINTENANCE

      • LESS MATERIAL TO PARTICIPATE IN A REACTION

      • HAZARDOUS REACTANT BE MANUFACTURED ON SITE FROM LESS HAZARDOUS PRECURSORS


Reactors
REACTORS

  • SMALLER REACTORS TYPICALLY HAVE LESS MATERIAL IN PROCESS

  • HAVE BETTER CONTROL OF HEAT TRANSFER

  • AND CAN BE MORE EFFICIENT12





Comparison of reactor alternatives1
COMPARISON OF REACTOR ALTERNATIVES

  • CONTINUOUS REACTORS HAVE SMALLER INVENTORIES THAN BATCH REACTORS

  • TUBULAR REACTORS HAVE SMALLER INVENTORIES THAN TANK REACTORS

  • THIN FILM REACTORS HAVE SMALLER INVENTORIES THAN TUBULAR REACTORS

  • GAS PHASE REACTORS HAVE LESS INVENTORY THAN LIQUID PHASE REACTOR


Substitution
SUBSTITUTION

  • USE OF SAFER NON-REACTIVE CHEMICALS

  • MAY DECREASE EFFICIENCY

  • MAY ALSO DECREASE COSTS


Substitution1
SUBSTITUTION

  • HEAT TRANSFER

  • FOR HIGH TEMPERATURE HEAT TRANSFER USE WATER OR MOLTEN SALTS IN PLACE OF HYDROCARBON-BASED HEAT TRANSFER FLUIDS14,15


Substitution2
SUBSTITUTION

  • HEAT TRANSFER

  • FOR LOW TEMPERATURE HEAT TRANSFER REPLACE OZONE SCAVENGING FLUIDS (FREONS) WITH ALTERNATES (N2, PROPANE, HYDROFLUOROCARBONS)16


Substitution3
SUBSTITUTION

  • SOLVENT REPLACEMENT

    • USE WATER-BASED PAINT IN PLACE OF SOLVENT-BASED PAINTS

    • USE OF WATER-BASED SOLVENTS OR CO2 IN CHIP MANUFACTURING PROCESSES17,18 (OFTEN WITH IMPROVED PRODUCT PERFORMANCE)


Attenuation
ATTENUATION

  • MODIFY CONDITIONS TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF HAZARDOUS EVENTS19

    • ADDITION OF INERT COMPONENT TO SYSTEM CAN DILUTE THE POSSIBLE INTENSITY OF A REACTION

    • MODIFIED CATALYSTS CAN REDUCE THE TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES REQUIRED FOR THE REACTION20


Attenuation1
ATTENUATION

  • STORAGE OPTIONS

    • LIQUIFIED GASES STORED AT CRYOGENIC TEMPERATURES

      • STORED AT ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE

      • USES SMALLER VOLUMES THAT GAS STORAGE

      • TEMPERATURES ARE FREQUENTLY BELOW IGNITION TEMPERATURES IN AIR


Attenuation2
ATTENUATION

  • STORAGE OPTIONS

    • MINIMIZE STORAGE BY ON-SITE PRODUCTION

      • HYDROGEN GENERATED BY ELECTROLYSIS OR PARTIAL OXIDATION OF NATURAL GAS

      • CHLORINE GENERATION ON SITE


Attenuation3
ATTENUATION

  • STORAGE OPTIONS

    • STORAGE IN LESS NOXIOUS FORMS

      • CHLORINE FOR POOLS

      • GASEOUS STORAGE

      • LIQUID STORAGE

      • SOLID FORM (Cyranuric Acid)

      • DILUTED SOLID FORM (Cyranuric Acid WITH INERT FILLER)


Limitation of the effects
LIMITATION OF THE EFFECTS

  • OPERATE PROCESSES IN STAGES TO AVOID PROCESS CONDITIONS THAT CAN LEAD TO EVENTS

    • MULTIPLE STAGES FOR OPERATIONS21

    • CHANGING THE SEQUENCE OF REACTIONS CAN REDUCE HAZARDS

    • ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY STEPS TO SIMPLIFY THE PROCESS


Simplification
SIMPLIFICATION

  • SIMPLIFIED CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION

    • EVERY CONTROL LOOP CAN FAIL

    • ELIMINATION OF THE NEED FOR A CONTROL LOOP THROUGH EQUIPMENT DESIGN

    • ANOTHER APPROACH IS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION SENSORS ARE SEPARATE FROM ALARM INSTRUMENTATION SENSORS



Example of use of special materials of construction1
EXAMPLE OF USE OF SPECIAL MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION

  • IF THE COMPRESSOR ROTOR GOES OUT OF BALANCE, IT WILL RUB AGAINST THE STATOR AND CAUSE A FIRE

  • FIRE EMITS INTENSE THERMAL RADIATION

  • COMPRESSOR IS EQUIPPED WITH VIBRATION SENSORS

  • COMPRESSOR WAS INSTALLED IN A SEALED HOUSING

  • PARTS THAT WOULD RUB FIRST WERE FABRICATED FROM SILVER, A METAL THAT WILL MELT BEFORE IT IGNITES


Hazardous analysis studies
HAZARDOUS ANALYSIS STUDIES

  • PROCESSES DEVELOPED TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS INHERENT IN PROCESS DESIGNS.


Sequence of events for a hazops analysis
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A HAZOPS ANALYSIS

  • INTENTS

  • DEFINE PROCESS HAZARDS

    • HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS

    • SAFETY & HEALTH IMPACTS OF LOSS OF CONTROL

  • DETERMINE HISTORY OF INCIDENTS IN RELATED FACILITIES

  • CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF OPERATING, ENGINEERING AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

  • EVALUATE IMPACT OF FACILITY SITING


Analyses are now required for processes
ANALYSES ARE NOW REQUIRED FOR PROCESSES

  • SARA TITLE III - COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW AS PER EPA DEVELOPED 40CFR67, RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

  • OSHA REGULATION CFR 1910.119


Hazop hazard and operability study
HAZOP - (HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY)

  • EXAMINES CONDITIONS AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS IN THE FACILITY

  • RESULTS IN A REPORT WITH

  • LIST OF CHANGES FOR PROCESS

  • DEFINITION OF PROCESS HAZARDS

  • CLARIFICATION OF OPERATING PROCEDURES


Sequence of events for a hazops analysis1
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A HAZOPS ANALYSIS

  • ASSEMBLE ANALYSIS TEAM - WHO HAVE NECESSARY PROCESS EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE

    • DESIGN ENGINEERS

    • OPERATORS

    • MATERIALS SPECIALISTS

    • EH&S SPECIALISTS

    • MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL


Sequence of events for a hazops analysis2
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A HAZOPS ANALYSIS

  • COLLECT DATA

    • DESIGN DRAWINGS

    • EQUIPMENT DRAWINGS, CALCULATIONS AND SPECIFICATIONS

    • MAINTENANCE INFORMATION

    • MSDS

  • DEFINE PROCESS NODES

    • BREAK PROCESS INTO AREAS FOR ANALYSIS

    • LOCATE THESE ON A SET OF DRAWINGS


Sequence of events for a hazops analysis3
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A HAZOPS ANALYSIS

  • ANALYZE PARAMETERS FOR EACH NODE

    • PURPOSE OR INTENT

      • PROCESS FUNCTIONS

      • PROCESS VARIABLES

      • HUMAN INTERACTION - HOW IS THE OPERATOR INTEGRATED INTO THE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS AT EACH NODE.


Sequence of events for a hazops analysis4
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A HAZOPS ANALYSIS

  • DEFINE RISK - SEVERITY AND PROBABILITY

    • DETERMINE CAUSE

    • EQUIPMENT FAILURE

    • OPERATOR ERROR

    • ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES

    • EXTERNAL IMPACTS



Sequence of events for a hazops analysis6
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A HAZOPS ANALYSIS

  • PREDICT FREQUENCY OF EVENT


Hazards analysis hazan study
HAZARDS ANALYSIS (HAZAN) STUDY

  • STARTS WITH THE SAME INFORMATION AND TEAM AS THE HAZOPS STUDY

  • EXAMINES THE RESULT OF FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT OR CONTROLS

    • INDIVIDUAL - SINGLE JEOPARDY

    • MULTIPLE - DOUBLE JEOPARDY


Hazards analysis hazan study1
HAZARDS ANALYSIS (HAZAN) STUDY

  • CAN BE ORGANIZED WITH FAULT TREE (FTA)


Hazards analysis hazan study2
HAZARDS ANALYSIS (HAZAN) STUDY

  • FAULT TREE SYMBOLS

  • FAULT TREES USE PROGRAMMING SYMBOLS FOR EACH TYPE OF JUNCTION



Primary sources of catastrophic events
PRIMARY SOURCES OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS

  • HUMAN ERROR

  • MISLABELING

  • TRIP FAILURES

  • STATIC ELECTRICITY

  • WRONG MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION

  • FAULTY OPERATING PROCEDURES

  • UNEXPECTED REVERSE FLOW

  • COMPUTER CONTROL PROBLEMS

  • IGNORANCE


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