Heiner Meulemann Forschungsinstitut für Soziologie, Universität zu Köln

1. Heiner MeulemannForschungsinstitut für Soziologie, Universität zu Köln Greinstraße 2, D50939 KölnTel. 0221 - 470 5658, Fax 0221 - 470 5169e-mail: meulemann@wiso.uni-koeln.de Perspectives on Social Capital Lecture at the Ph-D Conference of the Nijmegen Institute for Social and Cultural Research (NISCR) on October 18, 2007

2. Three topics 1 How is social capital (SC) best defined? According to this definition: 2 Which questions on SC should be reserarched first? And which have? First priority: Transfer hypothesis 3 An example of transfer hypothesis

3. 1 Defining SC1.1 Criteria • Putnam: SC “refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks” • combines a vague reference to some social process – “organization” – with an explicit enumeration – “such as”. • I will analyze what is “social” of “features of organization” in order to understand the enumeration

4. „Features of social organization“ = collective good of organizations. Organizations can be distinguished by their SC – just as by constitution, function, size. Grammatical singular “organization” accidental. Yet: singular meaningful: “organization” = process sustained by persons. Members of a group interact, “organize themselves”, so that collective products result Question: what “collective goods” or products?

5. Productivity of network, climate of trust, validity of a norm = results of interaction of persons productivity of a network: from flow of exchanges between persons with positions and intentions climate of trust: sufficient number reciprocate benevolent actions; if number goes down, trust risky, vicious circle: climate of distrust. validity of norm: sufficient number follow norm and sanction violations; if number goes down, vicious circle of deviance and tolerance, norm breaks down In each case, “collective good” from interaction of members. “Features of organization” established bottom up Therefore, genus proximum of definition not organizations, but persons. New definition 1: SC = any property of a group member, which contributes to group outputs.

6. Problem of new definition 1: too broad, „social“ lost Contribution of persons also result from human or cultural capital Restriction to outputs resulting from group membership. In pursuing common interest, members form social relations, interactions more densely knit amongst members than with non-members. Only attributes of group membership develop SC. Somewhat narrower definition 2: SC = sum of social relations a person holds in groups

7. Problem of new definition 2: still too broad, includes intimate relationships Intimate = sexual and generational relations. Rest on biology, only a few; everybody can, and most will enter into them. Practiced in “private living arrangements”. “Private” = “particularistic” (Parsons): person essential for the relation. (no choice amongst mothers) SC consists of “universalistic” relations in “public” realms, persist with interchangeable persons New and final definition 3: SC = sum of social relations a person holds in groups beyond intimate living arrangements

8. Uses of SC in social contexts SC does not “capitalize” by itself. In order to not decay, it must be utilized. What can actors gain from SC? Due to its relational nature, SC more useful when more relations in group. Therefore, distinction of contexts of use:

9. 1.2 Relational capital and system capital: Concept and measurement “Relational SC” of persons - “system SC” of their group System SC: conceived of independently of persons as sum of relations. While a person may aim to manipulate and to improve their relational SC, system SC of a group exists independently of each member Emerging quality in two ways • network of all relations knitted between members in pursuance of the group goal = social structure of the group. • Some relations bundled in civic associations. Then the system capital is the sum of civic associations acting within the group. Measured in population surveys simply by aggregation Two problems:

10. Measurement problem 1: interdependency, solitary decisions In social reality interdependency: some are eager to and some detest emulating other people. Measurement should, in principle, follow up over time this interdependency until SC is established. Practice of population surveys: neglect interdependency and time, compute means within groups at a single point in time. Justification: Practical short-cut? Yes, but not alone. Substantive reasons: some decisions made without looking at others (join a tennis club). If this holds: measure of system SC as group mean of relational SC also theoretically justified

11. Measurement problem 2: circularity, random sampling Danger of circularity: identifying system SC with relational SC. Sum of relations of all persons does not necessarily amount to system SC of group. Example 1: Two persons related = only one relation, counting two relations not correct. However, random samplings: improbable that two persons with relation are drawn. Total as system SC feasible Example 2: Two persons join same association = one, not two association. Again, random sampling. Furthermore: multiple memberships reflect size of association. Again, total as system SC feasible

12. Summary so far SC consists of relations of persons, basically relational Relations add up within a group to system SC: (a) network, social structure, (b) civic associations Although system SC conceived of as independent of relational SC, measurement of system SC through mean of relational SC can be justified. Mean of relational SC = indicator of system SC. Question: Which properties of system SC fruitful for group member in pursuance of goals?

13. 1.3. Three Properties of System SC From (1) density of social relations to (2) social trust and (3) validity of norms • fundamental, (2) and (3) derived This to be shown in following

14. (1) Density of social relations Network of high mean personal relationships eases moves, each partner has more relations. That is: value of relational SC increases with system SC Quantity of relations increases the number of ways to attain goals Quality of relations affects probability of attainment on these ways. In particular: “Niceness” eases goal attainment. “Nice” people start interactions with a cooperative move, and end up with a higher common product than people starting with a non-cooperative move (Axelrod 1984: 33-54) “Nice” relations result from two “nice” tendencies of partners • to trust each other, leads to 2nd property • to endorse norms of cooperation, leads to 3rd property

15. (2) Climate of trust Social trust = overrides suspicion that partner will not give back. The more members of the group think likewise, the longer the chain of reciprocation, the stronger the climate of trust in the group Learned in “particularistic” relations of family, reinforced reciprocally in “universalistic” interactions beyond family. I trust in others who have repeatedly not disappointed me, and others trust in me if I have repeatedly not disappointed them. My trust in others indicates the trust others have in me. Social trust not personal attitude alone, but indicator of trustful relations. If social trust is understood as an indicator of the “niceness” of relations, a climate of social trust can be seen as a system SC useful for persons

16. (3) Validity of norms of cooperation Norms of cooperation (proscription “not to”), justified by the norm of reciprocity alone. Norms of institutions (marital fidelity), additionally justified by values the person beliefs in ( “the family” or “life”) Endorsement of norms of cooperation, more or less strongly reciprocated: • Behavior: If enough people follow norms of cooperation and enough people sanction their violation, the norm becomes valid. • Attitude: If enough people endorse a norm, it becomes valid Consequently, the more a norm is held among someone’s interaction partners, the more one can uphold this norm oneself. Endorsement of norms = indicator of “nice” relations Validity of norms of cooperation = system SC

17. In sum: Triad of system SC, but only „relations“ relational SC Distinction between density and “niceness” of social relations justifies to classify system SC into Putnam’s triad: “networks, trust, and norms” (order changed!). Yet: density of networks only justified directly as a system SC, further arguments required to classify a climate of trust and the validity of norms of cooperation as dimensions of system SC: in how far indicators for “niceness” of social relations, not measured directly with reference to relations, but indirectly as mean of attitudes. Test: switch back from system SC to relational SC: - Just as density of relations = system SC, so relations of person = “relational” capital. - However, while climate of trust and validity of norms = system SC, trust or norm endorsement not = SC of person.

18. 1.4 System SC as context: Social order and opportunity structure Which kinds of groups bearer of system SC? Any aggregation level or “context”. Trivial question? No. To explain system SC, reference to analytical properties of groups. Question changes: Which kinds of analytical properties of which groups define their system SC? Two: • Contexts: name and a border, constitution and laws, folklore and customs. Become “social facts” = social order. • Contexts: resources of action: money, educational degrees, power. Circulate among citizens and make up different “life chances” = opportunity structure.

19. Context 1: Social Order Consists of norms directly guiding actions. Valid because • most people endorse them • in large parts, written down in legal form: constitution. Example: equality defined in constitutions, achievement (equality’s twin value) only in peoples’ minds Typical variables: federal or unitary constitution, percentage of Protestants (tradition of self-determination) Guides actions in same way as personal endorsement of norm – only difference: binds every citizen Must be symbolically identified: kings or presidents, laws and customs, flags and hymns, border stones and national football teams. Higher aggregation level = more important. Nation state has a social order, city precinct not

20. Context 2: Opportunity Strucuture Sets de facto range of options for every citizen, beyond personal resources, indirectly affects actions. Results from actions of all citizens and all organizations of country. Examples: Social inequality, reduces trust. Democracy since long, facilitates associations. Options and restrictions in same way as opportunity profile of person (combination of resources) - only difference: for every citizen alike Need not be symbolically identified Lower aggregation level = more important level. Public swimming pool in neighborhood, not in city.

21. Cross-Classification with societal domains

22. 2 Classifying and evaluating research questions on SC “Capital” theoretical term: two general qualities • every capital = means for ends to be attained in purposive action • every capital “capitalizes” = pays off in same kind These two qualities = dimensions to classify research questions

23. Quality 1: means to ends in purposive action Money = exchange against goods and services. Prestige = used to attain goods and services from others. Social relations = channels to goods and services. Each: A means to “success”. Yet difference: Money buys everything of its worth; “success” no problem. Prestige and social relations be worked upon at least a little bit in order to be a successful means for some end. Search for an occupation fitting to one’s education. Talk to people one knows in order to profit from their knowledge. “Success” problem, not granted. Nevertheless: If SC contributes to success, consequences should be researched before causes. If not, reduced importance of causes. SC research agenda: 1 consequences - 2 causes Money “success” for everyone who holds it, first: know, how got it; second: know, what done with it. Money research agenda: 1 causes - 2 consequences

24. Quality 2: Capitalization Money = interest. Prestige of educational degrees = prestige of occupations attained. SC = consists of social relations, which pay off in social relations. That is: Relational SC the more useful, the more embedded in network of relations, the more system SC. A’s relation to B = limited value if B knows nobody else, yet = highly valuable if B is located at core of dense network. Due to relational nature of SC, capitalization depends on context Research agenda: priority of effects of system SC: 1 on a means end chain of some action (“slopes”) 2 on ends themselves (“intercepts”)

25. Figure 1: Causes versus consequences, processes versus outputs in social capital research

26. Agenda followed by research up to now? Yes, but only implicitly Research was not interested in SC per se or causes, but in consequences for social integration, mostly understood as the democratic stability of a nation state. At heart of SC research: transfer hypothesis. “Good government is a by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs” (Putnam). Abstractly: citizens’ involvement grants social integration. Transfer hypothesis: on consequences, implicitly priority of consequences over causes. But apart from that, not clear. . Meaning specified: using right half of figure 1.

27. Transfer hypothesis, specified Country level correlation. Coleman’s bath tube: go to person level: Corresponding person level effect: The more citizens in associations, the more they articulate their interests effectively in democratic decision making. Learning transfer from civic life to organized social life. = Figure 1: SC as a means > action success Then two Problems: (1) Articulation of interests not yet social integration. Further causal link from successes of persons to integration of groups, testifies the ultimate impact of social capital research. Beyond figure 1 to the left. Mostly, taken for granted on theoretical grounds and not researched empirically. (2) Reference also to embeddedness in macro conditions. Thus, “the singing groups and soccer clubs” = cipher for system SC. But its effects on micro relation not specified. Therefore: both effects of figure 1

28. Transfer hypothesis, summarized Comprises right half of figure 1 as a whole and transgresses it to the left. To be tested, its four elements must be specified • Micro relation, essential. Two top down elements may be added: • An effect hypothesis on the capitalization of system SC • A mean hypothesis on the output of system SC. A new bottom up element may be added: • From action success to social integration

29. 3 Example: Transfer of transfer hypothesis - from politics to labor relations system From politics The more someone is involved in private associations, the more.. - able to assert political interests To labor relations system - attain empowerment at the workplace

30. Controls to examine transfer hypothesis of labor relations On the level of persons • Human capital, union membership, workplace On the level of countries - Institutions and opportunity structures of labour relations system

31. 3.1 Research Design: Influences on empowerment 5 Collective: work placesector, size of firm ? 4 Collective: strategyunion membership, ? + + + Empowerment:discretion at work 1 Civic Involvementsocial capital (+) 2 Human Capital in FirmPeople supervised, Prestige of occupation + + (+) - + (+) 3 Human Capital, personpolitical efficacy, education, Exit options Labour relations system: Favourable to unions

32. Dependent Variable: Five item Inventory and a single Question Inventory: “Please say how much the management at your work allows you: - to be FLEXIBLE in your working hours, - to DECIDE how your own daily work is organised, - to influence your work ENVIRONMENT, - to influence decisions about the general DIRECTION of your work, - to CHANGE your work tasks if you wish to?” “0 I have no influence” - “10 I have complete control” Single question: “To what extent can you ORGANIZE your own work, to a large extent (4), to some extent (3), very little (2) or not at all (1)?” – reversed for analysis Additive score, sample: ESS employed population

33. Figure 1. Mean empowerment, one standard deviation above and below the means

34. 3.2 Hypotheses and measurements: Level of persons (1) Civic Involvement: + (2) Human capital: Person: + Political efficacy, education, exit options (3) Human capital: Firm specific: + People supervised, prestige of occupation (4) Union membership: + (5) Work Place Size, sector of firm (6) Control variables: Age and Gender

35. (1) Civic Involvement “For each of the (11) voluntary associations, tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months - A member of such an organization - Participated in an activity arranged by such an organization - Donated money to such an organization - Done voluntary (unpaid) work for such an organization.” Membership + participation = belonging Donation of money + voluntary = engagement In 5 private associations: • sports clubs • consumer associations • scientific/educational/teachers’ associations • social clubs • cultural associations

36. (3) Exit options - Index of (1) “How difficult or easy would it be for you to get a similar or better job with another employer?” and (2) “... and to start your own business?”, scale 0 to 10: + - partner employed: +

37. 3.3 Hypotheses and measurements: Level of countries Mean hypothesis Effect hypothesis

38. Mean effect Rules of Labor relation system (LRS) cross-classified in two dimensions (1) Relations between collectivities (state, trade unions, and employer associations) or individuals (employer and employee) (2) Regulation through normative SOCIAL ORDER) or factual OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE more or less favorable to the unions. Collective relations • Normatively: range covered by bargaining process • Factually: a high degree of organization and public support Individual relations • normatively: favor employment and restrict dismissal • Factually: a labor market situation with high employment and many secure work contracts, may favor unions. Union efficiency hypothesis: The more collective or individual labor relations of a country favor normatively, or strengthen factually, the unions, the higher mean empowerment.

39. Table 1 Variables of the labor relation system

40. Effect hypothesis LRS = rule set and power structure, which exonerate workers from personal endeavor to attain empowerment; if unions successful = Workers less dependent on their own initiative Substitution hypothesis: The more the labor relation system of a country favors unions, the less important individual strategies become for the worker in order to attain empowerment. Negative cross-level interaction effect between LRS favorable to unions and individual endeavor to attain empowerment, in particular: human capital

41. 3.4 Results Mean Union membership: • .359 mean of 19 countries • Range .146 Portugal - .844 Denmark

42. Table 3 Multi-Level-Regression of Empowerment on Person and Country Variables: Raw Coefficients

43. Table 3 Multi-Level-Regression of Empowerment on Person and Country Variables: Raw Coefficients

44. Quantity of intercept and slope effects Mean:country 25 percentage points above grand mean > predicted intercept of 5.472 + 0.019*25=5.947, half a point on 11 point scale of empowerment. Slope: country 25 percentage points above mean > predicted slope for • people sv.: .456 + (-.00298*25) = .382 • exit option: .216 + (-.00174*25) = .172.

45. 3.5 Conclusion:Hypotheses confirmed? Transfer hypothesis: confirmed. Effects stronger than many effects of the more immediate personal factors - Belonging to and engagement in private associations stronger than belonging to trade unions. Articulation of one’s interest in private realm more easily transformed into empowerment at the workplace than in public realm. - More distant = more effective route. Longer distances needed to acquire general capacities of self-assertion, while focusing on the very arena of interest narrows down opportunities to learn general capacities. Longer distances = more challenges to generalize.