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The implementation of EU trade agreements, particularly Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), is crucial for their effectiveness. PTAs are seen as "living agreements" meant to impact labor and environmental standards, but research suggests challenges in achieving this goal. The EU focuses on market access disputes and enforcement mechanisms, such as the creation of a Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. Emphasis is placed on rules and the use of the WTO for dispute resolution. The approach leans towards neoliberal market opening, with a need for more data and contrast with the Single Entry Point mechanism.
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Innovations in the Implementation of EU Trade Agreements?
Trade Policy Review- An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy (2021) & PTAs • Why do PTAs matter? • Create rules, ‘constitutionalisation’ (Stephen Gill) • European Commisison (2022, 2) points out the ‘impact [of its PTA network] depends on those agreements – alongside international trade rules – being properly implemented and enforced.’ PTAs are often characterized as ‘living agreements’ • Meant to impact labour and environmental standards • Although research on this suggests significant problems in achieving this (Marx and Brando 2016, Orbie et al. 2017, Van Roozendaal 2017) • Open, Sustainable, Assertive Trade Policy • ‘geopoliticisation’ of EU trade and investment policy (Meunier & Nicolaidis 2019) • E.g. Investment screening, due diligence, anti-coercion instrument • Focus on implementation of PTAs and TSDCs in PTAs • Also 2027-2018 TSDC Review and 15-Point Plan • Creation of Chief Trade Enforcement Officer & Single Entry Point
Expectations and Methods • Expectation would be that disputes around implementation increase • Analysis of Commission PTA Implementation Reports • Available since 2017 • 2022 one includes brief comments on SEP, but SEP caseload not available • Reports focus on PTAs, exclude Trade Remedies, GSP reporting
Findings • Prioritisation of trade-related matters in implementation • SPS • GIs • TBT • Spirit/Wine taxes – regulations that impact exports • Usually after discussions over 2-3 years improvements and legal changes • Shift towards initiating disputes under PTAs from 2019 • EU has initiated 8 disputes within PTAs • 5 related to market access for goods (Colombia, SACU, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt) • 1 related to supplies (Ukraine) • 1 related to access for services and investment (UK) • 1to TSD chapters (South Korea).
Disputes • Market access disputes • Goods • Colombia spirits tax law (WTO Panel) • Restrictions on frozen potatoes exports from Germany, Belgium, Netherlands to Colombia (WTO Panel) • SACU safeguards on frozen poultry imports (dispute within SACU EPA) • Consultations with Algeria over import ban on cars and tariffs (PTA consultations) • Complaint launched against Egypt new import registration requirements (WTO) • Turkey pharmaceutical localisation requirements (WTO Panel) • Services • Consultations with UK under TCA over scheme for wind power (resolved in consultations)
Disputes • Ukraine ban on unprocessed wood exports (Panel under DCFTA) • Implementation suspended due to war • ‘Extractivism’ (Crochet 2022)
TSDC Dispute • South Korea • Lengthy process • Consultations start 2018 • When more pro-labour government under Moon stalls labour reforms due to opposition pressure • Eu focuses on industries where Korea was more willing to make reforms (Nissen 2022) • Shows willingness & Panel of Experts established that ILO obligations in PTAs are genuine commitments and need not be linked to trade and investment • Also challenges in other partners and annual discussions have not led to disputes
Preliminary conclusions and next steps • Prioritisation of market access issues (even if relative economic importance not that great) • emphasis on ‘rules’ (especially since Trump’s Presidency) • use of WTO • Less emphasis on TSDC • Tendency to emphasise neoliberal market opening aspect of trade rather than inclusive and responsible trade • Need to gather more data from FoI request • Contrast with SEP • Trace influences to determine when to proceed to dispute
References • Crochet, V. (2022). Trade Defence Instruments: A New Tool for the European Union’s Extractivism, European Journal of International Law, 33(2), 381–410, • Marx, A., & Brando, N. (2016). The protection of labour rights in trade agreements: the case of the EU- Colombia agreement. Journal of world trade, 50(4). • Meunier, S., & Nicolaidis, K. (2019). The geopoliticization of European trade and investment policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 57, 103. • Nissen, A. (2022). Not That Assertive: The EU’s Take on Enforcement of Labour Obligations in Its Free Trade Agreement with South Korea. European Journal of International Law, 33(2), 607-630. • Orbie, J. & Van der Putte, L. (2016) Labour Rights in Peru and EU Trade Agreement. OSFE Working Paper 58 • Orbie, J., Martens, D. & Van der Putte, L (2016). “Civil Society Meetings in EU Trade Agreements” CLEER Papers 3 • Orbie, J., Van den Putte, L., & Martens, D. (2017). The impact of labour rights commitments in EU trade agreements: The case of Peru. Politics and Governance, 5(4), 6-18. • Van Roozendaal, G. (2017). Where symbolism prospers: Impact on evolving rights of labour provisions in FTAs with the Republic of Korea. Politics and Governance,5(4), 19–29