The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

2. Introduction Saving STRANGERS 11 Someone who you do not know. Mysteries, riddles and unknown things or people: mystery, riddle, uncertainty, puzzle, enigma, perplexity, secret, thing, unknown quantity... 2 Someone who does not know a place well. Someone who arrives: arrival, comer, newcomer, latecomer, stranger, blow-in...

3. Introduction Rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening countries. It does effectively operate to trump sovereignty. 2 The right to intervene The responsibility to protect Responsibility to prevent, react, rebuild.3 The need for either prior revenitive effort or subsequent follow-up assistance.4

4. History of the Bosnia Conflict:Situation before the War • Falling apart of Yugoslavia • Independence of Slovenia former member of Yugoslavia • War in Croatia which result in UN Resolution 743 • Many Troops of the former Yugoslavian federal Army stationed in Bosnia • 44% Bosniaks 32% Serbs 17% Croats

6. Year 1991: Beforethe War • 25.09 Resolution 713 Arms Embargo • 15.10 Memorandum of Independence • 24.10 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established • 18.11 Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was proclaimed • Carrington Cutileiro Plan

7. Year 1992: Start of the War • April 1992 Declaration of Independence • Army of the Republic of Serpska and the Croatian defense council were formed. • Many paramilitary groups were formed and foreigners volunteer groups too

8. 1992: Sequel • Serbs had upper hand due to heavy weapons • Start of the Siege of Sarajevo • June 1992: Resolution 770 United Nation Protection Force’s mandate was extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina • Bosnian-Croat troops started to attack the Bosniaks (Graz Agreement)

9. 1993 • Serbs killed the Deputy prime Minister HakijaTurajlic • 1993 was dominated by the Croat-Bosniak War • 22.02 Resolution 808 was passed to establish an international tribunal for war crimes • Vance-Owen plan failed • April: Security Council issued Resolution 816 in order to establish a Non-Fly-Zone • 25.05 Resolution 827 formally established the tribunal.

11. 1993: Sequel • Many Bosniaks were imprisoned in concentration camps by Croats especially in Herzegovina. • 04.06 Resolution 824 extend the role of UN troops to protect save havens • 15.06 Resolution 836 allows UN troops to use force

12. 1994 • Start of Air strikes by NATO in February • 23.02 Washington agreement end of Croat-Bosniak war • Because of this air strikes Serb forces frequently captured UN forces and other foreigners to use them as human shields • November 11-12 USA lifted the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina

13. 1995: End of the Bosnian War • July: Massacre of Srebrenica • Croat-Bosnian alliance gained to upper hand in the conflict, Serbs were loosing territories and needed to evacuate their population • Many major massacre committed by the Serbs in 1995 • 12.10: 60 days case fire • November first: peace talks began in Dayton Ohio • Dayton peace agreement signed 25.11 (final version 14.01.1996) • Official end of the war 29.02.1996

16. Effects of the War • 100’000-200’000 casualties (60% soldiers) • A large part of Bosnia and Herzegovina is up to today full of mines • 75% loss of economic power • Damages of 20 Billion $ • Many war crimes committed (more than 75% by Serbs)

17. 3Points 4 Security Council Resolutions. • Media and Domestic Politics. • Cost and Benefit of Humanitarian Intervention.

18. Security Council Resolutions Resolution 7704 Demands that unimpeded and continuous access to all camps, prisons and detention centers be granted immediately to the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant humanitarian organizations and that all detainees therein receive humane treatment, including adequate food, shelter and medical care;

19. Resolution 816 5 Demands that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act; Requests the Secretary-General, with a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings; … Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by threat or use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", is unlawful and unacceptable.

20. Resolution 824 6 Declares that …, Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, …, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas … … authorizes the strengthening of UNPROFOR by an additional 50 United Nations military observers, … Declares its readiness, … , to consider immediately the adoption of any additional measures necessary with a view to its full implementation

21. Resolution 8367 Decides to extend to that end the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas …, to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, … Authorizes UNPROFOR, …, acting in self-defense, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas … Decides that, …, Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

22. R836 Level Level of Humanitarian intervention • Refusal to Vance-Owen plan Mass murder Continuing plight of civilian population Ethnic cleansing • TOO MUCH Impediment • TOO LITTLE R824 R819 R770 Level of Serbian Aggression Time

23. Media and Domestic Politics A theoretical background 8

24. Phase1 :Mobilization / More supportive "Mr. President," he said, "I have been in the former Yugoslavia last fall. I cannot sleep since what I have seen. We must do something to stop the bloodshed." Wiesel almost pleaded: "Something, anything, must be done.”9 Media and Domestic Politics self-analysis Phase2 : Watchdog /Much criticism What a mess in Washington too. From the outset, Bill Clinton's Bosnia policy has been equal parts wishful thinking, domestic politics and bluff; now it has virtually disintegrated under the pressure of the Bosnian Serbs and quarreling presidential advisers.10 Phase3 : Cheerleading Watchdog / Comprehensive America searches to create a policy for putting its troops in harm‘s way even when the country is not directly threatened…11 In Sarajevo, where Bosnian Serb forces blocked U.N.-escorted convoys and protesters took to the streets, the strain of holding the peace is already showing in the Balkans. "The Bosnian Serbs have lost the peace," says TIME's Marguerite Michaels. "They will yell and they will scream, and then they will move on.”12

25. TIME COVER Phase1 Up 92. 8.17. 13 Phase2 Down 93. 5.17. 14 Phase3 Up 95. 6. 19. 15 Down 95.11.27. 16

26. Costs and Benefits of Humanitarian Intervention • Security and World Order17 • Explicit international conflict • Stronger International Organization, • Glory and reputation for intervening countries • Economic • Favorable relations with the intervened country and future economic cooperation • Arms, costs for deployment, • costs for possible human lost, • Support of food, housing, resources. • Humanitarian • Losing Strangers, • grievance for sacrifice • Saving Strangers, • moral satisfaction • Domestic politics • Domestic struggles • against other politicians and media • National integration, • An opportunity for showing leadership

27. Explicit international conflict Mr. Rifkind said American politicians who singled out Britain as blocking decisive action by the North Atlantic alliance in Bosnia were "behaving disgracefully," given that Britain has 3,500 troops serving in the United Nations peacekeeping force there while the United States has not sent any. 18 • Glory and reputation France has been heavily involved in UN peacekeeping in order to justify her permanent membership of the Security Council. However, sending blue helmets by itself appears not to be sufficient for a great power. Thus,France is trying to take the lead in humanitarian affairs. 19 • Domestic struggles • against other politicians and media Clinton, clearly frustrated, fired off a letter to Senate Republicans warning of a potential U.S. quagmire: "Unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility," he wrote. "Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there.“ 20 • Moral satisfaction Destroy NATO for what? Certainly not to save Bosnia. That they admit is beyond doing. No : for the simple satisfaction of pretending to save Bosnia; for the warm, smug feeling that comes from lifting a finger21

28. Evaluation Supreme Humanitarian Emergency 5 Last Resort 4 Proportionality 2 Belief in Positive Humanitarian Outcome 3 Humanitarian Motives 3 Humanitarian Justifications 4 Legality 5 Selectivity 4

29. Supreme Humanitarian Emergency • a. When the only hope of saving lives depends on outsiders coming to the rescue. • Yes. Fearing the worst, 50,000-100,000 people marched through Sarajevo on 5 April to demand a resignation of the Bosnian government and the imposition of an international protectorate to prevent the slide into war. 23 • b. They shock the conscience of humanity. • Yes. The toll is terrible: more than 12,000 people dead, tens of thousands missing and wounded, 1.5 million men, women and children forced to flee their homes. Those numbers only begin to hint at the horror, 24 • c. Genocide, state-sponsored mass murder, mass population expulsions by force, state breakdown. • Yes. Resolution 819 : Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by threat or use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", is unlawful and unacceptable; 25

30. Last Resort • Strong condition • Nothing short of the application of armed force would be sufficient to stop the human rights violations in question… unless the case can be made that delay would result in irreparable harm, this requires that states exhaust all peaceful remedies. • Mostly satisfied. R819 R824 R836 • - Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, … should be treated as safe areas 27 • - … strengthening of UNPROFOR by an additional 50 United Nations military observers 28 • - in the safe areas …, to deter attacks against the safe areas acting in self-defense, to take • the necessary measures, including the use of force 29 • Weak condition • They are confident that they have explored all avenues that are likely to prove successful in stopping the violence. • Satisfied. • - If European peacekeepers withdraw, however, McCurry said, • "it may well be that lifting the arms embargo proves unavoidable as a last resort.“ 30 • Richard Holbrooke, …, describes the two weeks of bombing by NATO aircraft in September • 1995 as making a huge difference to the negotiations. 31

31. Proportionality • The gravity and extent of the violations (should) be on a level commensurate with the reasonably calculable lose of life, destruction of property and expenditure of resources. 32 • a. The question of the methods used in such interventions • disproportionate • 1. … the preventative deployment of forces could have averted the worst of the calamities that befell the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.(look at the graph) 33 • 2. The UN`s promise to protect civilians was revealed to be a hollow one, as the UN security council failed to muster the 30,000 troops… 34 • 3. Russia argued that the scale of these strikes exceeded the authority that the Security Council had given member states in June 1993. 35 • b. What counts as a legitimate military target • almost proportionate • 1. R836 Authorizes UNPROFOR, …, acting in self-defense, to take the necessary measures, • including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas … 36 • 2. NATO and UNPROFOR launched massive air and artillery strikes … against Serb heavy • weapons on Mt. Igman. This was followed by … massive NATO air strikes against Serb • ammunition dumps, command and control, armament factories, and fuel supplies. 37

32. Believe in Positive Humanitarian Outcome • a. Decision-makers must believe the use of force will produce a humanitarian outcome. Yes. The belief that Milosevic would back down in the face of a credible threat became the article of faith…39 • b. RESCUE in short term : Whether the intervention has rescued the victims of oppression • Mostly succeeded to rescue. • 1. ... NATO`s air attacks against Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde in April 1994 halted the offensive and brought an important measure of relief to the civilian population.40 • 2. One immediate consequence of NATO air strikes was to confirm British and French fears that the Serbs would respond to such attacks by hostage taking.41 • c. PROTECTION in long term : The withdrawal of the intervening force does not lead to a resumption of the killing and brutality. • Failed to protect.However, in a story that was to be repeated in Kosovo four years later, NATO`s degrading of Serb military capability from the air did nothing to save those civilians trapped in the safe areas.42

33. Humanitarian Motive • a. Strong condition : The primacy of humanitarian motives. • More or less. • Both government were determined to avoid deploying ground troops in a combat role, but at the same time neither felt that it could be seen to be doing nothing in the face of the worst abuses of human rights in Europe…44 • b. Weak condition : The motives, and the means employed, do not undermine a positive humanitarian outcome. • More or less. • …the best strategy for protecting the safe areas was to deploy ground troops to protect these. However, Clinton ruled out from the beginning the deployment of US troops into a combat environment, believing that the risks of open-ended commitment were too high…45

34. Humanitarian Justification • a. Only if the non-humanitarian motives behind an intervention undermine its stated humanitarian purposes. • No. It is hard to argue that there was explicit non-humanitarian motives and it undermined humanitarian purposes. • b. The possibility that justification might correspond with motivation, and that state leaders might recognize a moral responsibility to defend human rights. • Yes.Both government were determined to avoid deploying ground troops in a combat role, but at the same time neither felt that it could be seen to be doing nothing in the face of the worst abuses of human rights in Europe…47 • c. How far actors become entangled in their justifications. • Entangled enough. • 1. …it was the first time that states had been authorized by the Council to use force to deliver humanitarian aid and it marked the beginning of a greater engagement by the Security Council with the suffering of civilians in Bosnia.48 • 2. They become entangled in Kosovo case too.

35. Legality • The Security Council has the legal authority … to authorize military enforcement action, … only if it determines that there is a threat to international peace and security. 49 • Legal. • …it was the first time that states had been authorized by the Council to use force to deliver humanitarian aid and it marked the beginning of a greater engagement by the Security Council with the suffering of civilians in Bosnia.50 • b. The legality of humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization has become a subject of considerable normative debate since NATO`s action in Kosovo.51 • Legal. • In other words, there was no considerable normative debate before NATO`s action.

36. Selectivity • Instrumental prudence : Actions that are selective because states privilege selfish interests over the defence of human rights. • Selective. • 1. "Consequently, at the least," Clinton wrote, "unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out and pulls the U.S. in.“ 53 • 2. Moral satisfaction can be regarded as one of the selfish interests. • b. Normative or other-regarding prudence : Those that are selective because of prudential concerns. • More or less. • 1. "Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there." 54 • c. Morally permitted versus Morally required. • It was highly selective in both criteria, yet this cannot be the reason for assertion that humanitarian intervention in Bosnia should not have been done.

37. Questions ?

38. Reference 1. http://www.macmillandictionary.com/thesaurus/british/stranger#stranger_4 2. The responsibility to protect, Synopsis p.11 3. The responsibility to protect, 2.28, p.16 4. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u920813a.htm 5. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930331a.htm 6. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930506a.htm 7. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930604a.htm 8. Media and Conflict, An exploratory model of media-government relations in international crises : U.S. involvement in Bosnia 1992-1995, Yaeli Bloch and Sam Lehman-Wilzig, p.158 9. Do Something . . . Anything,Bruce W. Nelan, May 03, 1993, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,978373,00.html#ixzz2Awmpnnu1 10.Who Can Tell What Washington Wants?, J.F.O. Mcallister, Dec 12, 1994, TIME 11.AMERICA: WHAT PRICE GLORY?, Bruce W. Nelan, Nov 27, 1995, TIME 12. KEEPING THE PEACE, Dec 07, 1995, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,5278,00.html#ixzz2AwsfWR6b 13. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601920817,00.html 14. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601920817,00.html 15. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601950619,00.html 16. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601951127,00.html 17. Media and Conflict, An exploratory model of media-government relations in international crises : U.S. involvement in Bosnia 1992-1995, Yaeli Bloch and Sam Lehman-Wilzig, p.162 18. Britain and France Criticize U.S. on Bosnia Positions, RICHARD W. STEVENSON, Nov 29, 1994, TIME 19. France, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention, PHILIPPE GUILLOT, International Peacekeeping Volume 1, Issue 1, 1994 p. 40 20. SENATE, CLINTON CLASH ON BOSNIA, July 25, 1995, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,4438,00.html#ixzz2AwhIY2lS 21. Bob Dole's Bosnia Folly, Charles Krauthammer Monday, Dec 12, 1994, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,981966,00.html#ixzz2Awj0HwJC 22. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 34 23. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 249 24. Land of Slaughter, Jill Smolowe, Jun 08, 1992, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,975708,00.html#ixzz2AwjjQjpP 25. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930331a.htm 26. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 35 27. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930331a.htm 28. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930506a.htm 29. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930604a.htm 30. CLINTON WON'T LIFT BOSNIA EMBARGO, Jun 09, 1995, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,4052,00.html#ixzz2AwiHwbzR 31. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 256 32. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 35-36

39. Reference 33. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 282 34. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 282 35. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 256 36. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930604a.htm 37. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 255 38. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 37 39. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 242 40. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 255 41. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 255 42. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 255 43. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 37-38 44. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 251 45. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 253 46. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 39 47. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 251 48. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 252 49. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 41 50. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 252 51. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 40 52. Saving Strangers, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Oxford university press, p. 48 53. SENATE, CLINTON CLASH ON BOSNIA, Jul 25, 1995, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,4438,00.html#ixzz2AwhIY2lS 54. SENATE, CLINTON CLASH ON BOSNIA, Jul 25, 1995, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,4438,00.html#ixzz2AwhIY2lS