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Motivation. YBSG has been asked for additional guidance, for instance:Louise Raggett at YBUG 4: the identification and reduction of Human Factors risksJohn Corrie at YBUG 4: systems issuesKeith Williams: independent safety assessmentSeveral at YBUG1, 2, 3: cross-acceptance and relationship with CENELEC standardsIn Nov 01 (after YBUG4), YBSG responded with following strategy:Still too early to make plans to issue YB4. A correction sheet should be published A series of brief application no288
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1. Overview of the Application Notes YBUG5, 26th February 2003Bruce Elliott, Chief Engineer
3. What is an application note? Supplementary advice to YB3
But later integration is not precluded
Not a standard
Advice from the industry to the industry
All sectors of the industry
Currently published on www.yellowbook-rail.org.uk
But could be published on paper later
Part of a continuing initiative
4. How are they produced? Yellow Book Steering Group (YBSG) agrees remit
YBSG invites members to join editorial committee (YBEC)
Praxis Critical Systems drafts note under YBEC supervision
When YBEC are satisfied, note goes to YBSG for endorsement
YBSG may take advice from an independent reviewer
Note is published
Note is revised in response to industry feedback
The same process as the Yellow Book
5. Editorial Committees YBEC-SW
Paul Cheeseman, Lloyds Register-MHA
Trevor Cockram, Praxis Critical Systems
John Corrie, Mott MacDonald
Peter Duggan, Invensys
Bruce Elliott, Atkins Rail
Simon Errington, Lloyd's Register MHA
Richard Imhoff, Alstom
Iain Johnston, CSE International
Ian Shannon, Atkins Rail
Chris Shepperd, Siemens
Jeremy Whitley, Bombardier Transportation
Author
Paul Leader, Praxis Critical Systems
Independent Reviewer
Jeff Allan, Railway Safety YBEC-RL
Richard Allan, Network Rail
Andy Bourne, London Underground Limited
Bob Brewer, Praxis Critical Systems Limited
John Corrie, Mott MacDonald
Paul Cheeseman, Lloyds Register MHA Limited
Stephen Denniss, Bechtel
Bruce Elliott, Praxis Critical Systems Limited
Ali Hessami, WS Atkins Rail Limited
Author
Paul Leader, Praxis Critical Systems
Independent Reviewer
David Waboso, Nichols
6. Status Railway-Level Issues ISSUED
Kick off meeting Mar 02
Published Jan 02
Software & EN50128 ISSUED
Kick off meeting Apr 02
Published Feb 03
Human Error - UNDERWAY
See later
Independent Safety Assessment UNDERWAY
See later
7. Railway-Level Issues - Motivation Rail shares the following curse with many other industries:
When you connect together several systems to accomplish one objective it is unfortunately the case that the ensemble does not always do what you want, even though each system was built correctly, as far you could tell. As systems become more and more complicated, the likelihood of nasty surprises increases, unless you do something about it.
But in rail this problem is flavoured by:
Some difficulties in specifying what is wanted
A tendency to rely on unwritten custom and practice
The fact that the railway is designed so that systems mitigate each others hazards
8. Railway-Level Issues Assumptions, Dependencies and Caveats Assumptions
made about the rest of the world, including people and organisations as well as the physical railway.
for instance tolerances on the supply voltage
someone will have to check that they hold when the system goes into service and continue to hold for the rest of its life (or deal with the situation if they do not).
Dependencies
agreements that people will act before a system can safely be put into service
for example, upgrades to air conditioning before a computerised signalling system is installed
Caveats
agreements that people must respect after a system is put into operation for it to remain safe
for instance, a certain inspection regime
9. Railway-Level Issues - Content Guidance on some aspects of ensuring that railway systems work together to control risk
or on avoiding some common problems in this area
Primarily for people introducing new systems or co-ordinating ESM activities at the railway level
but also for independent safety assessors and safety authorities
Contents
Specification Issues
The Problem
Guidance
Assumptions, Dependencies and Caveats
Introduction
Identifying ADCs that you will place on others
Identifying ADCs that others will place on you
Documenting ADCs
Resolving ADCs
Failure Detection and Modelling
Introduction
Failure detection
Modelling failure and its detection
Estimation of time at risk
Appendix: Example Specification Topics
13 pages (excluding wrapping)
10. Software and EN50128 - Motivation YB3 provides little guidance on software; Section 9.8 of volume 2 refers to EN 50128, but
EN 50128 is being revised
EN 50128 does not always provide enough guidance to deal with the problems that practitioners face:
It assumes a procedural programming language, for example
There is more that can usefully be said about configuring software, specifying software and using COTS
There are some inconsistencies between YB3 and the CENELEC standards
Although EN 50128:2003 is expected to remove some of these
There are some technical problems with software SILs
EN 50128 promotes a qualitative approach to software integrity but the issue of whether software failure can be modelled probabilistically is an issue of contention.
11. Software and EN50128 - Content
Guidance on some aspects of managing the development and use of software
and avoiding some common problems
Written for those involved in planning a safety argument for software; specifying, delivering or configuring software
but also for independent safety assessors and safety authorities
Written to complement, not compete with EN 50128