Epistemic Reasons: Their Structure & Nature

1. Epistemic Reasons: Their Structure & Nature Kareem Khalifa Department of Philosophy Middlebury College

2. Overview • Justification • Agrippa’s Trilemma • Three Theories of Justification • Epistemic Rationality • Internalism vs. Externalism

3. I. Justification: Reminders • A theory of justification should provide a general recipe for answering the following question: • How do you know? • Gettier cases show that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge • However, perhaps justified true belief is still necessary for knowledge

4. II. Agrippa’s Trilemma • No Free Lunch • The Set-Up • The Three Horns

5. II.A. If q is S’s justification for believing that p, then S must be justified in believing that q.

6. II.B. Setting up the Trilemma • Suppose that you claim to know that p • How do you know that p? • If q is your justification, then you should answer, “Because q” • However, because there are no free lunches, we must be able to answer the question, “How do you that q?”

7. II.C. The Three Horns • This line of questioning has only three possible outcomes: • An infinite regress: I know that p because of q, I know that q because of r… • A vicious circle: I know that p because of q, I know that q because of p • An arbitrary stopping point: I know that p because of q, and I know that q just because. • But we don’t possess infinite reasons, and neither viciously circular reasoning nor arbitrary stopping points seem to provide justification. • Hence we aren’t justified in believing in anything!!

8. III. Three Theories of Justification • Infinitism • Coherentism • Foundationalism

9. A. Infinitism • S is justified in believing that p if and only if S possesses an infinite, non-repeating chain of reasons for believing that p • Objection: • Nobody possesses an infinite, non-repeating chain of reasons for her beliefs. • So, if infinitism is true, then nobody is justified in any of her beliefs. • Somebody is justified in some of her beliefs. • So infinitism is not true.

10. B. Coherentism • S is justified in believing that p if and only if S possesses a finite, repeating chain of reasons for believing that p • No single proposition q justifies p; rather p is justified by its fit with one’s overall system of beliefs.

11. C. Foundationalism • S is justified in believing that p if and only if S possesses a finite, non-repeating chain of reasons for believing that p. • Some beliefs are justified in themselves. • Called “self-justifying,” “basic,” or “foundational” beliefs. • Problem: • Hard to to have a criterion of self-justification that is: (a) defensible, and (b) rich enough to justify the remaining, non-basic beliefs.

12. IV. Epistemic Rationality • What is epistemic rationality? • Different epistemic goals • Pointless truths

13. A. What is Epistemic Rationality? • Rationality aimed at gaining true belief. • Other kinds of rationality are aimed at achieving other goals.

14. B. Different epistemic goals • We should maximize our true beliefs. • Problem: gullibility • We should minimize our false beliefs. • Problem: Stingy belief • We should provide the best balance of seeking true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. • Problem: what’s the right balance?

15. C. Pointless truths • Suppose that I come to have many true beliefs about insignificant things. • I seem to have met some epistemic goal, but I don’t seem very epistemically rational. • 1st Response: You are epistemically rational, but perhaps non-epistemically irrational. • Problem: this trivializes epistemic rationality • 2nd Response: You are epistemically irrational, since pointless truths will not help you find other truths and avoid other falsehoods.

16. V. Internalism vs. Externalism • Rationality & responsibility • Two conceptions of rationality

17. A. Rationality & responsibility • The R&R thesis: S is epistemically rational in believing that p if and only if S is intellectually responsible in believing that p.

18. B. Problems with the R&R Thesis • Control Objection • Bad Norm Objection

19. 1. Control Objection • If S is responsible for doing X, then S has some voluntary control over X. • We lack voluntary control over some of our beliefs. • So we are not responsible for some of our rational beliefs. • So epistemic rationality  intellectual responsibility

20. 2. Bad Norm Objection • If S doesn’t know better than to accept a bad epistemic norm N, then : • S is epistemically irrational; • S can’t be blamed for any belief p licensed by N. • If S can’t be blamed for doing X, then S is being responsible in doing X. • So, epistemic rationality  intellectual responsibility.

21. C. Two conceptions of rationality • Internalism(deontic, egocentric) • Externalism (non-deontic, non-egocentric)

22. 1. Internalism • S is internally justified in believing that p if and only if, from S’s perspective, it is intellectually responsible to believe that p. • 1st Objection: Appears insufficient as a theory of justification, since one can be internally justified on the basis of bad epistemic norms. • 2nd Objection: Appears unnecessary as a theory of justification, since babies & animals form their beliefs in the right way though without being responsible.

23. 2. Externalism • S is externally justified in believing that p if and only if S’s belief that p was formed in a truth-conducive manner. • Objection: severs the connection between epistemic rationality and intellectual responsibility

24. Recap • Agrippa’s Trilemma forces a choice between infinitism, coherentism, and foundationalism. • Although epistemic rationality and justification seem as if they should be closely entwined, they also differ in important ways. • Internalists try to minimize these differences; externalists embrace them.