110 likes | 210 Views
This document outlines the role of various documents related to EAP keying, discusses issues, and suggests next steps for development. It covers key management, existing EAP keying usage, extensions, and unresolved issues.
E N D
EAP Keying Framework Joe, Jari, Pasi, Bernard IETF-63 in Paris, France Tuesday, August 2nd, 2005
Outline • Role of the different documents • Issues • Next steps
Role of the Documents • Draft-housley-aaa-key-mgt • Describes the requirements for AAA key management • Intended for eventual publication as a BCP • Draft-ietf-eap-keying • Describes existing EAP key management usage • Analyzes existing usage against the requirements in draft-housley • Is reference to draft-housley normative? • EAP key management extensions • Describes extensions to EAP key management model • Analyzes new usage against the draft-housley requirements • Early version available here: • http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/draft-aboba-eap-keying-extns-00.txt
Issues (1/2) Already closed: • 300 - Terminology for port • 305 - Appendix cleanup Discussed in next presentation • 306 - Channel bindings
Issues (2/2) Discussed today: • 294 - Analysis of existing EAP usage • 299 - Key caching • 302 - Domino effect clarifications • 307 – Deletion of the security reqts. section • 279 - Additional keying protocol reqts
294 - Analysis of existing EAP usage • Analyze what? • 802.1x, PPP, 802.11i • Analyze against • Housley criteria document (may incorporate a version of these principles in the document) • Actual Analysis • Issue 294
299 - Key caching • Keys internal to EAP methods may be cached (fast reconnect etc) • AAA-Key and TSK caching, if any, happens in the lower layer currently • Keeps different lower layers separated • We may need to better define “lower layer” • Does this mean key naming for these keys at EAP/AAA layer is not needed? • EMSK and AMSK caching is a possible future extension • Could define uses where keys derived from the EMSK are cached outside of EAP • But not in this document!
302 - Domino effect clarifications • Ongoing discussion on the list • Original requirement unclear • What is compromised? • Not just authenticator, but AAA and end nodes as well • What is compromised as a result? • Nodes, keys, authentication server, authenticator, ability to spoof one authenticator as another, … • But still need to stay within the scope of our “system” – not include, e.g., compromises of other nodes due to passwords sent in an e-mail over the compromised data channel
307 – Deletion of the security reqts. section • Mostly editorial • Consolidation of Section 7 requirements (AAA, EAP, SAP) into Section 4 • Removal of other sections redundant with RFC 3748, Section 4 or Section 6
279 - Additional keying protocol reqts • #307 may already remove the need for this • Need to watch for not going beyond the scope of the document • go through the document and make sure we cover these already.
Next Steps • Focus on the main document • Please review -08! • Resolve existing issues • Produce a -09 version in ~ 6 weeks • WGLC for -09 • Revised final draft for IETF-64 • Review of draft-housley • Need to review, resolve issues • Continue with extensions in IETF-64 and beyond