Political Importance and Arm Imports Anirudha Vaddadi & Josi Sinagoga Armed & Dangerous
Introduction • Inspiration • Literature • Kuziemko, Illyana, and Erik Werker. “How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations”. Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5 (October 2006): 905-930 • Dreher, Axel., Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. “Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council”. European Economic Review 53, no. 7 (October 2009): 742-757
Research Question • Variables • Independent: UNSC non-permanent membership (dichotomous) • Dependent: volume of arms imports, measured by Trend-Indicator Value (TIV) • The Question: • Does political importance increase arms imports to a given country? • Our Hypothesis: • Positive relationship between arms imports and political importance.
Methodology • Data • Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) • World Bank • Vreeland, James Raymond, and Axel Dreher. Money and Politics on the International Stage: The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence. New York, NY: Cambridge UP, 2014. Print. • World Data vs. Top Exporter Data • Regressions • Linear • Country-fixed Effects
Results • Confounding Variables: • Population • GDP • GDP per capita • War • Origin-specific Results • Germany • UK
Conclusion (if we have one) • Story for the Results • The Take-Away