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CONTENTS

XXIV MEETING OF THE LATIN AMERICAN NETWORK OF CENTRAL BANKS AND FINANCE MINISTRIES IAB Research Department – Regional Policy Dialogue FISCAL POLICY THROUGH THE CYCLE: THE COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE Ignacio Lozano and Jorge Toro Banco de la República, Colombia October 19/20, Washington, D.C. CONTENTS.

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  1. XXIV MEETING OF THE LATIN AMERICAN NETWORK OF CENTRAL BANKS AND FINANCE MINISTRIESIAB Research Department – Regional Policy DialogueFISCAL POLICY THROUGH THE CYCLE: THE COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCEIgnacio Lozano and Jorge ToroBanco de la República, ColombiaOctober 19/20, Washington, D.C.

  2. CONTENTS 1. Business cycle and public finances in Colombia: An historical review2. Trends and Cycles in Colombian Fiscal Accounts2.1 Methodology 2.2 Results 3. The Colombian fiscal stance through the real cycle4. Current fiscal stance and prospects

  3. Real Business Cycles (RBC) in Colombia • The Colombian economy has exhibited at least two large RBC during the last thirty years • The 1st cycle started in 1978 with a boom-phase which lasted about 4 yearsThat economic expansion was closely related to high external coffee prices • Subsequently, the economy entered a low-growth-phase between 1982 and 1985 (common for all LAC). It was related to a decline of external commodities prices, the slowdown of world demand and the debt crises in LAC • The 2th cycle began at the late 80´s The boom-phase spanned from the late 80´s to the mid 90´s (more irregular). Capital Inflows stimulated by structural reforms and an expansionary fiscal policy played a key role. • The last and deepest crises took place by the end of the 90´s (growth rate of -4,2% in 1999). After a lengthy recovery, the economy is currently expanding again at a rapid rate. • Fiscal balance has been closely related to GDP performance

  4. 1. Business cycle in Colombia: 1977-2005 1st Crisis 2th Crisis

  5. The Fiscal balance is closely associated to GDP performance GAP (Above) and Fiscal Balance (Below) 1st Crisis 2th Crisis

  6. And the fiscal balance is directly related to the Debt Ratio Fiscal Balance (Above) and Debt Ratio (Below) 1st Crisis 2th Crisis

  7. Comments • 1st Crisis-Phase: The deficit of the Non-financial public sector (NFPS) reached 7,6% of GDP in 1982-83. Half of this deficit was explained by the Central Government. Three years later, the deficit was adjusted thanks to an effective economic program. By 1986 the public deficit was only 1,2% of GDP and Government debt reached 18,4% of GDP • 2th Crisis-Phase: The NFPS reached a deficit of 6,4% of the GDP in 1999, due entirely to imbalance of the central government. Government debt attained a critical level of 54% of GDP in 2002. The government is currently facing additional challenges because of the narrow margins of its expenditure policy. • Even though the balance of the NFPS improved markedly in the last two years, the central government fiscal position is still highly imbalanced.

  8. 2. Trends and Cycles in Fiscal Accounts: Methodology (Traditional Approach) Tax Revenue: For t, the actual-tax-revenue (Ta ) has two components: structural (Ts) and cyclical (Tc). Hence, The structural-component could be estimated using actual (Ya) and Potential output (Yp) represents output-tax-elasticity. According to Blanchard & Perotti (1999), the output-tax-elasticity could be calculated as: where = elasticity of taxes of type i to their tax base; = elasticity of the tax base to GDP, and . Trade taxes are adjusted for an exchange factor.

  9. Oil Revenue: Profits obtained by Ecopetrol in t are transferred in t+1 to central government. One fraction of actual profits arise from domestic sales of gasoline ( ), and the other one from external sales of petroleum ( ). Structural component is achieved using potential output while is attained with a long term external price of oil. • Expenditures (two items are adjusted): • Regional Transfers (Between 1994-2001, Law 60/93) • Interests Payments ( Domestic and External)

  10. Outcomes-Elasticities

  11. Comments • Relatively high responses of tax revenues to output. In a range from 1,18 for income-tax to 2,06 for value added-tax. • The aggregate tax elasticity with respect to output amounts to 1,47 • The parameters are similar to those found in international evidence: The income tax to GDP elasticity is, on average, 1,3 for OECD; 1,5 for the Euro area and 1,1 for new EU members (Girouard and André 2005). • For domestic tax components: tax-revenues response to their bases are more sensitive than its corresponding tax-base response to GDP, and conversely for external taxes. • Using these elasticities, we find the cyclical and structural components of revenues and expenditures. Subsequently, we also find the cyclically adjusted balance.

  12. Cyclical and Structural Components of Revenues (Percentage of GDP)

  13. Cyclical and Structural Components of the Expenditures (Percentage of GDP)

  14. Cyclically-adjusted budget balance Central Government –Percentage of GDP (a) Total Balance (b) Primary Balance

  15. Comments • The evidence shows that the deficit of the central government in Colombia basically has a structural character. • In times of the deepest recession (1998-1999), the cyclical deficit amounted to -1% of the GDP, equivalent to 15% of the actual deficit (-6,7% of the GDP). • Recently (2005), when the economy returned to historical growth rates (5%), the cyclical component amounted to +0,8% of the GDP, which corresponds to 15% of the actual fiscal disequilibrium (- 5,3% of the GDP). • The structural nature of the government fiscal deficit had been widely recognized by analysts and policymakers. This feature of the government finances has motivated a set of fiscal reforms, in particular since the end of the nineties: tax-reforms; regional-transfers-reform; pension-reforms; State-reforms; etc

  16. 3. Colombia´s fiscal stance through the cycle: Methodology Estimating Fiscal Policy Reaction in Colombia (Traditional approach: Manesse, IMFWP- 2006; Alesina & Tabellini BU-WP 2005; Alfonso ECB-WP-2005, etc) S = Primary (or total) surplus, in percent of GDP Gap = output gap Debt = debt-GDP ratio a1<0is evidence of pro-cyclical policy. Primary balance-to-GDP ratio falls when the output increases relatively to potential output If a2> 0, government tries to increase its primary balance as a reaction to the existing stock of public debt and then comply with the budget constraint. It could be seen as a sign of a Ricardian-fiscal-regime

  17. Estimating Fiscal Policy Reaction, 1960-2005

  18. Comments • The coefficient a1, is significant and negative implying that fiscal policy in Colombia has been pro-cyclical for the last 45 years or so, with the primary surplus falling (and the deficit rising) by approximately 1/5th of a percentage point when the output gap improved by one percentage point • Coefficient a1falls from 1/5 (for primary balance equation) to 1/10 (for total balance equation), which means that interest payment “smooth out” or “compensate” the pro-cyclicality policy stance. • The interest payments role is not surprising because in bad times, when financial markets are more restricted, the indebtedness cost rise increasing public spending (via higher spreads on public bonds, depreciation of exchange-rate and so on). In good times, the opposite takes place.

  19. Comments • Regardinga2, they are significant and negative in both cases. When a2 >0, government tries to increase its primary balance in order to react to the existing stock of public debt and comply with the budget constraint. We don´t find evidence to support this behavior for C-Government in Colombia. • Our fiscal pro-cyclicality results confirm the findings of other studies in Colombia. Using various fiscal impulses definitions, Lozano and Aristizabal (2003) found that fiscal policy was pro-cyclical between1991 and 2002. For a longer period (1881-2005) and using also fiscal impulses technique, Cárdenas et. al. (2006) found the same pro-cyclical results

  20. 4. Current fiscal stance and prospects

  21. Comments • As a result of economic recovery, high international oil prices, tax reforms and fiscal tightening at local and regional levels, the NFPS deficit narrowed to 0,4% of GDP in 2005 (0% including quasi-fiscal operations) • This fiscal outcome in 2005 was much better than expected and than the results in 2004 and 2003 ( 2,1% and 3,6%, respectively). The C-Government deficit widened to 5.1% of GDP and this was offset by a surplus in the decentralized sector • The current administration has made progress on structural reforms and fiscal adjustment. However, 2005 fiscal outcome was influenced by exceptional factors • The government has made a preliminary commitment to narrow the fiscal deficit to 2% of GDP in 2006 (for NFPS). However, for 2007, the budget includes an spending plan of Col$117,6 billons, a 7% increase in real terms compared to 2006, and targets a NFPS deficit of up to 2,3% of GDP.

  22. Understanding Fiscal Balance in 2005:

  23. Comments • Official preliminary predictions pointed out to a consolidated fiscal deficit of 2,4% of GDP in 2005 (including quasi-fiscal operations). The actual result was a fiscal equilibrium. • This outcome was influenced by exceptional factors, such as higher than expected world oil prices and the accounting treatment of interest government expenses • In addition, economic growth –above expectations– together with favorable external conditions also helped to obtain a fiscal equilibrium. • We quantify each of these factors. Notice that better than expected GDP growth rate increased tax revenue in 0,7% of GDP. This outcome is roughly consistent with what we showed in section 2 (cyclical budget in 2005)

  24. Conclusions • Like in other economies, fiscal balance in Colombia has been closely related to GDP performance • We found relatively high responses of tax revenues to output. The aggregate-tax- elasticity with respect to output is 1,47 (similar value to those found in international evidence) • The evidence shows that the deficit of the central government in Colombia basically has a structural character (the cyclical component amounted 15% of the actual deficit) • Fiscal policy in Colombia has been pro-cyclical in the last four decades, with the primary surplus falling (and the deficit rising) by approximately 1/5th of a percentage point when the output gap improved by one percentage point. • The fiscal outcome in 2005 was much better than expected and the outcomes in 2004 and 2003 ( 2,1% and 3,6%, respectively). However, that was influenced by exceptional factors

  25. Conclusions • The higher than expected world oil prices; the accounting treatment of interest government expenses; economic performance –which surpassed expectations– as well as a favorable macroeconomic environment; helped to obtain equilibrium in public finances • The government has made a preliminary commitment to narrow the fiscal deficit to 2% of GDP in 2006 (for NFPS). Nonetheless, for 2007, the budget entails spending plans of Col$117,6 billons, a 7% real rise compared to the 2006 budget, and targets a NFPS deficit of 2,3% of GDP

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