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Manipulators Increase Information Market Accuracy

Manipulators Increase Information Market Accuracy. Robin Hanson and Ryan Oprea George Mason University. PAM Concerns.

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Manipulators Increase Information Market Accuracy

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  1. Manipulators Increase Information Market Accuracy Robin Hanson and Ryan Oprea George Mason University

  2. PAM Concerns Terrorists themselves could drive up the market for an event they are planning and profit from an attack, or even make false bets to mislead intelligence authorities. U.S. Senators Wyden and Dorgan, Press Release, July 28, 2003. Would-be assassins and terrorists could easily use disinformation and clever trading strategies to profit from their planned misdeeds while distracting attention from their real target. Steven Pearlstein, Washington Post, July 30, 2003. Trading . . . could be subject to manipulation, particularly if the market has few participants – providing a false sense of security or . . . alarm. . . . the lack of intellectual foundation or a firm grasp of economic principles - or the pursuit of other agendas - has led to a proposal that almost seems a mockery of itself. Joseph Stiglitz, Los Angeles Times, July 31, 2003.

  3. Manipulation Fears (PAM) • Bad guys gain $ by giving info, changing acts • More plausible if bet on specific details, thick market • PAM not on specifics, max gain/trade < $100 • A good deal for us if give few $, gain much info • Terror & corporate sabotage now effect big markets • Bad guys lose $ to obscure market info • If slow adjust to track record, worst case is no info • $1M PAM worth it if 0.1% chance gain 0.1% of $400B/yr • We see little effect in lab, field experiments • If small, “noise traders” attract others, net add info

  4. Market Microstructure Theory • Example – Kyle ’85 • X - Informed trader(s) – risk averse • Y - Noise trader – fool or liquidity pref • Market makers – no info, deep pockets • If many compete, set Price = E[value|x+y] • Info markets – use risk-neutral limit • If Y larger, X larger to compensate, and more info gathered, so more accuracy! • Trading on any consideration other than asset value is noise trading!

  5. The Game Traders pick Manipulator sees Traders see Traders, Manipulator pick Market Maker sees Market Maker picks All get payoffs Time Effort Bias Clues Quantity Total Price

  6. Normality Gives Linearity

  7. Theorems

  8. Ave Harm Not = Ave Error? • Imagine manipulator raised accuracy when it matters, lowered otherwise • Example: estimate of chance of terror attack, but not size of attack • Fix: Make market price more linear in harm are concerned about

  9. Conclusion • Standard models include noise trades • Accuracy improves with more noise • Manipulators are noise traders • Worry if ave harm not = ave error?

  10. Price Manipulation Model Market maker Manipulator Informed trader Noise trader Equilibrium

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