Anonymity (Privacy)

1. anonymizing proxy clear SSL Anonymity (Privacy) • Suppose you are surfing the Web. • You don’t want Web site to know your IP address • And you don’t want your ISP to sniff your traffic. • Possible solution: use anonymizing proxy Introduction

2. Proxify.com • Just go to a website and enter URL. • No software to install. • Script on page causes browser to create SSL session between browser and proxify. • Anonymous browsing is free • To post, must pay fee • Problem: Proxify.com still knows which IP addresses are visiting which sites. Introduction

3. Tor: Chaining proxies • Features: • Proxy servers are chained, making it more difficult to trace which IPs visited which servers • Anyone can contribute a proxy server (P2P) • Open-source, cannot have any backdoors • Uses SOCKS for proxy protocol: can be used with all application layer protocols. • Brief History: • Originally supported by the Navy, later also by Electronic Frontier Foundation. • In 2002 the code was given to Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson, two Boston-based programmers Introduction

4. How it works • Basic Principles: • List of servers is obtained from directory server • Data is sent through 3 randomly chosen servers • Encryption is applied in a layered manner, each of the servers peels off a layer (like in an onion). • The path changes every minute. Introduction

5. Layered encryption: Overview Suppose Alice wants to communicate with Bob (Web server), via two servers. • Establishing keys and circuit: • Alice has certificates for both servers. • Alice first does a D-H exchange with Server 1, establishing a session key KA1. • She then does a D-H exchange with Server 2, via Server 1, establishing a session key KA2. • “Circuit” is now established between Alice and Server 2. • Sending message m to Bob • Alice encrypts twice: KA1(KA2(m)), sends to Server 1. • Server 1 decrypts, obtains KA2(m), sends to Server 2 • Server 2 decrypts, sends m to Bob. Introduction

6. Diffie-Hellman exchange between Alice and first server • RSA, hashing and handshaking is used to prevent man-in-middle attack and provide perfect “forward secrecy” • So Alice knows she’s talking with server and not with Trudy • So if someone obtains K1-in the future, will not get gxy x c = K1+(gx) gy, H( gxy ) y First server in chain with keys K1+ and K1- They now both have KA1 = gxy Alice Introduction

7. What can woman-in-middle do? • Can Trudy pretend to Alice that she is first server? • If Trudy records all messages and in future obtains K1-,will she be able to decrypt? Introduction

8. Tor protocol: Two onion-ring proxies One layer of encryption has been removed Note the double braces, encryption has been applied twice Introduction

9. What do the servers know? Server 1 knows: • AliceIP wants to communicate with some dest IP; but doesn’t learn the dest IP. • Server 1 never gets Alice’s certificate, so only knows of AliceIP and not Alice. • Doesn’t see m. Server 2 knows: • Some IP address wants to communicate with Bob, but doesn’t see the IP address. • Sees m. • Since Bob doesn’t use encryption, last server necessarily sees m Introduction

10. Anonymity: Summary • Proxy server + encryption can provide a degree of anonymity • But what if you can’t trust the proxy server? • Chaining proxy servers provide more protection. • As long as the server don’t collude Introduction