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BRAZIL

BRAZIL. FROM MILITARY AUTHORITARIANISM TO THE NEW DEMOCRACY (1964-89) . Unsuccessful Reform Under Castelo Branco: 1964 – 1966. Constitutional Act? “Soft” demobilization of the most militant Vargas forces Elections of 1966 Pro-Vargas forces victorious Results not allowed to stand .

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BRAZIL

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  1. BRAZIL FROM MILITARY AUTHORITARIANISM TO THE NEW DEMOCRACY (1964-89)

  2. Unsuccessful Reform Under Castelo Branco: 1964 – 1966 • Constitutional Act? • “Soft” demobilization of the most militant Vargas forces • Elections of 1966 • Pro-Vargas forces victorious • Results not allowed to stand

  3. Political Parties and Controlled Election Dynamics • Controlled two-party system (Constitution of 1966) • ARENA • PMDB • After 1979 the “controlled two party system” begins to favor the opposition • Legalization of additional political parties • Electoral laws discriminate against large cities

  4. Arturo Costa e Silva (1966-69) Initially straddling the middle Removal following a stroke Emilio Garrastazú Medici (1969-74) Nationalism Economic growth OBAN – Dark Side Military Regime and its Governments (Round One)

  5. Military Regime and its Governments (Round 2) • Ernesto Geisel (1974-79) • Economic growth slows • Assertion of government control over shadowy terror apparatus • João Figueiredo (1979-85) • Dividing of the opposition • More economic difficulties • Designing an exit strategy

  6. Brazilian Military Presidents Castelo Branco (1964 – 1967) Costa e Silva (1967 – 1969) João Baptista Figueiredo (1979 - 1985) Emílio Médici (1969 – 1974) Ernesto Geisel (1974 - 1979)

  7. Why an Exit Strategy? • International investors felt insecure/feared blowup Catholic Church and the base communities • Modernized sectors lost faith in capability of the military to develop the country • Neighborhood organizations in the favelas of the large cities • Women as opponents of the military government

  8. On the other hand! • Rural Northeast remained a stronghold of anti-democratic forces

  9. Rural Northeast Remains a Stronghold of Traditionalist Interests • Large land-owners control the countryside • Politicians allied with military control state governments • Violence against lower classes more prevalent than in rest of the country

  10. The Transition Begins (1985) • Short-lived triumph of Trancredo Neves • Split between Northeast traditionalists and business community of São Paulo • Military fearful of domestic insurgency • José Sarney: a second accidental presidency • Led ARENA political party in the senate during military regime • “Political Godfather” of the Northeast

  11. The Transition (1986 – 1990) • José Sarney: a second accidental presidency • Transitory economic recovery • Economic downturn of 1986/87 • Writing a new constitution (1987-88) • Constitutional convention dominated by traditional political class • Two rounds of voting for president if no candidate has first round majority • Senate & Chamber of deputies favors traditional areas of the country

  12. Presidential Election of 1989: First Round • Fragmented left coalesces • Brizola’s geographically constrained base • Lula and the PT make strides toward creating a truly national political party • The Right hangs on • GLOBO & Fernando Collor • Regional leaders in control of congress

  13. Presidential Election of 1989: Second Round • Fernando Collor (53%) • Luis Ignacio “LULA” de Silva (47%)

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