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What’s your problem? the EU’s single European act and theories of international organization

Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon. What’s your problem? the EU’s single European act and theories of international organization. Problem structure and IOs. Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront?

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What’s your problem? the EU’s single European act and theories of international organization

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  1. Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon What’s your problem? the EU’s single European act and theories of international organization

  2. Problem structure and IOs • Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: • What problem do actors confront? • What capacities, incentives, relevant norms do they have? • From these conditions follow the shape of an international organization and its capacity to solve problems

  3. Or as Milner re-slices and dices it • “Political scientists use three factors to explain trade deals”: • Preferences: where do you sit in the economy? • In terms of “factors” (land, labor, capital) • Or sectors and “asset specificity” (mobility) • Domestic institutions: who can influence policy? • Structure of international system: who threatens whom? • Presence of “hegemon” helps cooperation

  4. The problem with problem structure? • The narrower and more technical the deal, the more it should make sense • Tuna fishing regulation? Sure. • The bigger and more politically important the deal, the less promising • Often fundamental conflict over: What is the problem?

  5. And often organizations are a separate kind of problem…. • Problem-structure view of international organizations suggests that organizational design flows from substantive policy challenges • But often people have separate concerns about organizational authority • As a precedent • Or as an issue in itself

  6. EU basics • A unique quasi-federal government over 28 countries • Capital in Brussels, Belgium

  7. A real government with big buildings…

  8. Flag, motto, holiday, anthem • All the symbols of a state: • 12-star flag • Semi-official motto: “united in diversity” • Holiday: “Europe Day,” May 9 • Anthem: Beethoven’s Ode to Joy

  9. JUDICIAL EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE European Court of Justice adjudicates disputes European Commission proposes some implementation by Commission bureaucracy European Parliament votes most implementation by national governments EU’s state-like institutions and policy process Council of Ministers votes

  10. Categories of theories of IOs • Rationalist-materialist: problem-structure approach • Institutionalist: • (beware: this word has many meanings!!) • Problem-structure approach with feedback • Have problem, build institution (=organization); it then alters your problems and possibilities thereafter • Ideational: • How people interpret problems/solutions causes more variation in the world than the “real” structure of problems • People build IOs around certain ideas/models that diagnose problems and match to solutions

  11. What problems does the EU solve?? • Cycle of war • Created to make war impossible • Temptation to protectionism • Binding countries into free-trade framework • Competition with US, others • Build more dynamic big market • Lack of influence for smallish countries • Empower collective voice in global trade, monetary affairs, foreign policy • Instability of weaker economies and polities • Imposes/supports/subsidizes reform

  12. Building the EU institutions • Origins in the 1950s: • European Coal and Steel Community, 1952 • European Economic Community, 1958 • Expansion of powers in 1980s/1990s • Single European Act, 1986 • Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 1992 • Tinkering, Enlargement, Public Relations • Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon since

  13. SEA as key episode for EU • SEA “relaunches” languishing EEC • Gives renewed authority to institutions, inaugurates 15 years of massive change • Seen as fairly modest at time, but… • Mandated hundreds of liberalizing directives • Including full capital liberalization, which led on to monetary union… • Torrent of liberalizing measures peaks early 1990s, but continues today • Also relaunch of scholarship on EU: • Main theories developed out of this case

  14. Also key for broader literature on IOs, globalization THOMAS FRIEDMAN: EU “maybe the biggest example in the world today of globalution” [sic] ANTHONY GIDDENS: EU “forging a way that could, and very likely will, be followed in other regions as well.” RUGGIE: “a lens through which to view other possible instances of international transformation today” Australian PM: Asian Century, European Model? The EU as a Model for Asia? MORAVCSIK: “a possible harbinger of future global political structures”

  15. The SEA story (NEUTRAL VERSION) • EEC in doldrums in early 1980s… • Thatcher leading moves toward liberalization • 1985: Delors Commission assembles “Single Market program” • Meanwhile Mitterrand finds Euro-topia • March 1985: • All govts endorse White Paper on Single Market • Fr/Ital/Ger/Benelux outvote UK/Den/Greece to convene talks to renegotiate treaty • Negotiations fall 1985, December deal: • Vast new liberalizing mandate • EEC reform: extension of majority voting

  16. Consider dominant views (I) • “Liberal intergovernmentalism”: (problem-structure/rationalist theory of “normal politics in a globalizing context”) • SEA: structural imperatives led govts to • “Pan-European trend” to liberalization • Seek EEC reform to commit credibly to it Bargain with other govts on policies Institution-building for credible commitments Nat’l govts aggregate prefs Interest group prefs for openness Liberalization Institutional reform Structural econ change

  17. Consider dominant views (II) • Haas-style institutionalism: • SEA: Supranat’l entrepreneurship persuaded govts of • EEC-level liberalization through “Single Market 1992” idea • And that liberalization requires EEC reform (majority voting) Create new instits with own agents Nat’l govts bargain Govts persuaded to new bargain IO agents mobilize, lead, persuade Interest group prefs for openness Nat’l govts indisposed to listen Structural econ change Interest group prefs for more openness Liberalization Institutional reform

  18. If Moravcsik were strongly right… Moravcsik logic 1981 Support for liberalization Support for EEC institutional reform

  19. Moravcsik logic 1984 Support for liberalization Support for EEC institutional reform

  20. Moravcsik logic 1985-6 SEA deal Support for liberalization Consider, bargain how to achieve liberalization Support for EEC institutional reform

  21. If Haas-style view were strongly right… Haas-style logic 1981 Support for liberalization Support for EEC institutional reform

  22. Haas-style logic 1984 Support for liberalization Support for EEC institutional reform

  23. Haas-style logic 1985-6 SEA deal Support for liberalization Commission entrepreneurship Support for EEC institutional reform

  24. Actual positions 1981 1984 Support for liberalization Support for EEC institutional reform

  25. What happens in 1985-6? [SEA deal] ??? ??? Support for liberalization Support for EEC institutional reform

  26. Brits persuaded of reform? • 1985: liberalization, no need for reform • Oppose vote to open treaty negotiations • In fall 1985, accept linkage of White Paper & majority voting • But even Moravcsik says they saw “little to lose from qualified majority voting on the internal market” • Keep fighting: in bargaining, remain until end “major obstacle to an initiative linking internal market liberalization and procedural reform…”

  27. Thatcher accepts a deal • Midnight press conference after deal : • “We could have done a great many of the things which have been done here with treaty changes, we could have done without treaty changes, had we agreed to go about it that way. Now, people very much wanted an intergovernmental conference, so they had one…I think we could have done what we have done … that we could have done by agreement without it…but if they wanted to do it this way, so be it.”

  28. French sold on something new? • Accept White Paper in 1985 with little enthusiasm • Even initial confusion in 1985 over whether EEC reform proposed as alternative… • In fall 1985 propose text that cuts back on Commission’s SMP proposals • And push monetary, social “embedding” steps • Still fighting, December 1985: • “An Anglo-German front has formed against French positions on three essential subjects: the Internal Market, monetary policies, social policies….”

  29. Mitterrand accepts a deal • 1986: “I will not hide that the transaction, which rallied general support, remained very far below what I would call the vital minimum for Europe…” • Delors “despondent” at result (said an aide) • What else did they want? • More interventionist monetary & social policies to embed, balance liberalization • Accept deal to “relaunch” institutions… • …spend next decade pursuing ways to balance a liberal Europe

  30. In sum, on the EU story: • European leaders have very different ideas about policy problems and IO solutions • Liberalization + institutional change united in politics • Neither structural imperatives nor Commission persuasion made the connection • Problems of globalization, pressure for liberalization would not have produced more powerful EU without distinct Europeanist push for institutional reform • (and vice versa)

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