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The middle years

End of 216 – end of 206 BC. The middle years. The 2 nd Phase of the War (216 – 206 BC). Carthaginian & roman strategies compared. Strategy, Operational Plans and Tactical Approach. Hannibal during the first phase. The Carthaginian Strategic Plan after 216 BC. Bolster Armies in Spain

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The middle years

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  1. End of 216 – end of 206 BC The middle years

  2. The 2nd Phase of the War (216 – 206 BC) Carthaginian & roman strategies compared

  3. Strategy, Operational Plans and Tactical Approach Hannibal during the first phase

  4. The Carthaginian Strategic Plan after 216 BC Bolster Armies in Spain Hence Mago being sent there rather than back to Italy. With 3 armies in Spain surely they were undefeatable. Hold onto Spain and Carthage had the resources to continue the war Sign a Treaty with Philip, the ambitious King of Macedonia Not only could be supply fresh troops and money but a new theatre of war in Illyria would drain Rome further of men, resources and support She would be much weaker to fight Hannibal in Italy and Carthage in Spain as a result Re-invade Sardinia With Sardinia re-conquered Roman waters and territory itself could be threatened and raided, plus support sent to the Gallic tribes to rebel once and for all Support Sicilian Uprising Support for Syracuse would mean Carthage once again controlled the entrance to the Western Med and the shipping lanes to Italy Syracuse would also become a major ally in the war

  5. Bolster Armies in Spain 3 armies in Spain failed to co-ordinate operations together and thus fought independently. None of Carthaginian generals had skill Hannibal did Scipio proved an excellent general and took the initiative from the outset Fighting each army separately he was a match and destroyed each in turn Support Sicilian Uprising Whilst it took 3 years and a lot of resources, Marcellus crushed the pro-Carthaginian Sicilians brutally. Syracuse was besieged and eventually stormed and destroyed as a power. Carthaginian commanders (especially Hamlicar and Bomlicar) proved inadequate and poor, failing to take initiative and exploiting situation Demonstrated weakness Why did it fail? Sign a Treaty with Philip, the ambitious King of Macedonia Roman’s incited rebellion amongst various of Philip’s subjects, so he spent most of his time crossing Balkans and suppressing them Thus only a small Roman force of a few thousand men was needed to contain Philip and he was unable to send Carthage support Re-invade Sardinia Invasion of 215 ended in abject failure Romans sent a sizable force to crush Sardinian uprising and troops Carthaginians sent proved insufficient to continue to the struggle.

  6. The Roman Strategy Divided before 216 BC • Different elements in Senate held opposing views • Mixture of aristocratic consuls and new men shows division on who should conduct war • Fabius’ period as dictator shows ‘hawk’ and ‘young turk’ factions demanding a traditional ‘Roman approach’ to defeating Hannibal Agreed and maintained after disaster of Cannae Bagnall: ‘Fabian’ strategy of attrition aimed to achieve 3 things; • 1) Maintain Italian Confederation at all costs • 2) Break Carthaginian attempt at overseas encirclement • 3) Nullify Hannibal by starving him of battle

  7. The significance of the war in Italy (216-206 BC)

  8. Roman Reforms – Consular Experience & The FabianStrategy The acceptance that a war of attrition would have to be fought plus Rome’s decision to operate multiple smaller armies meant Hannibal was constantly harassed and on the move, moving from one threat to another and whilst he did, more Roman armies would raid captured lands to his rear, weakening him and his new allies further.

  9. Strategic Defeat - Hannibal marches on Rome, too late in the War When Hannibal threatened Rome itself during the siege of Capua it became apparent that he had lost his chance to destroy the city itself and in turn Rome’s continued survival meant the continuation of the war. Plus the failure of the Carthaginian encirclement strategy by 211 meant Hannibal was left isolated in Italy, increasingly away from the centre of the war (Spain). Attempts by his brothers Hasdrubal and Mago to reinforce him failed

  10. Nola, Capua & Tarentum – Hannibal’s failure to secure these strategic cities completely & gain a permanent deep water port meant he was cut off from continued resupply in Italy and wouldn’t gain the resources he needed to defeat Rome from the Italian cities who did join. He failed in his main strategic objective as the Italian Confederation held Impact on his army of continually garrisoning cities that moved over to him and their desire to operate only close to home Plus the inferior quality of the troops the Italian cities supplied him with meant the steady loss of his experienced Spanish/African troops made Hannibal weaker

  11. Plutarch: Fabius’ policy was why Rome emerged victorious …the Romans called Marcellus their sword, and Fabius their shield; and that the vigor of the one, mixed with the steadiness of the other, made a happy combination that proved the salvation of Rome. So that Hannibal found by experience that, encountering the one, he met with a rapid, impetuous river, which drove him back, and still made some breach upon him; and by the other, though silently and quietly passing by him, he was insensibly washed away and consumed; and, at last, was brought to this, that he dreaded Marcellus when he was in motion, and Fabius when he sat still. During the whole course of this war, he had still to do with one or both of these generals; for each of them was five times consul, and, as praetors or proconsuls or consuls, they had always a part in the government of the army, till, at last, Marcellus fell into the trap which Hannibal had laid for him, and was killed in his fifth consulship. But all his craft and subtlety were unsuccessful upon Fabius,

  12. What major criticism can be levelled at Fabius and his policy of attrition?

  13. Death of Marcellus • 208 bc in reconnainsence skirmish in southern italy • 5 times consul • Winner of spoila optima • 214 – 211 – Regained Sicily for Rome after Syracuse rebelled • Plutarch’s ‘Sword’

  14. Livy • Roman victory due to 2 things; • The work of the Scipio’s in Spain to cut off Hannibal’s reinforcements and weaken Carthage • The impact of Hannibal’s new Italian allies and the effect garrison duty had on his army

  15. Is Livy’s assessment a fairer one than Plutarch?

  16. What do you think were the key turning points in the war? What do you think were the most important events in the war up to 206 BC?

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