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International Railway Safety Conference 2008 Denver, Colorado. Development and Application of Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment Models for the Korea Railway. October 5-10, 2008. Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi. About KRRI : Korea Railroad Research Institute.

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slide1

International Railway Safety Conference 2008

Denver, Colorado

Development and Application of Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment Models for the Korea Railway

October 5-10, 2008

Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi

about krri korea railroad research institute3
About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute
  • Founded in 1996, financed by Korean government
  • 254 individuals works for railway R&D division and national project division
  • Key research area
  • - Rolling stock, track & civil engineering, signaling & electrical engineering,
  • railway policy & operation
  • National projects
  • High speed train development , upgrading conventional railway,
  • design urban rail transit system, transportation technology, trans-Korean railway construction
  • National safety R&D program from 2004
  • Homepage : www.krri.re.kr
slide4

Contents

I

Introduction

II

Risk Assessment Procedure

III

Hazard Identification

IV

Risk Assessment Model Development

V

Conclusion

slide5

1. Introduction

Background

  • Cyclic occurrence of major train accidents
  • - 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities
  • - 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities
  • - 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities
  • Environmental changes in Korea
  • - KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at 2004
  • - Structural reform of railroad industries
  • - Electrification of conventional lines
  • - Preparation of TCR & TSR
  • “Railway Safety Act” announced in 2004
  • - Focused on the risk-based safety management
  • - Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations
  • - Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control
slide6

1. Introduction

Research Objective

Since Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed

the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models

for the Korea Railway.

Research Objective is to introduce

- Developing procedure of the risk models

- Application of the developed model to the Korea railway.

slide7

2. Risk Assessment Procedure

Common Approach Risk Management

Risk Management Process

System

Definition

Railway System

Risk

Analysis

Context

Modification

Risk

Definition

Organization

Demolition

Exploitation

Concept

Construction

Design

Risk

Evaluation

Operation

System Life Cycle

Maintenance

Risk

Reduction

Techniques/

Technology

Risk

Management

slide8

2. Risk Assessment Procedure

Production

SE Management

Concept Design

Design

Operation

Evaluation

Hazard

Analysis

National Safety

Management

System

Safety

Control

Measures

Construction

of Safety

Infrastructure

Safety

Management

Safety

Evaluation

1. National Safety

Policies (NSP)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSP

Establishment of

plan for NSP

Construction of

Basis for NSP

NSP Management

NSP

Evaluation

2. National Safety

Objectives (NSO)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSO

Establishment Of National Safety Objectives

Resource Construction & Distribution

Resource Management

NSO Evaluation

3. National Safety

Organization (NSOR)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSOR

NSOR Design

NSOR Construction

NSOR Management

NSO Evaluation

4. National Safety

Integrated Plan (NSP)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSP

NSP Establishment

Construction of

Operation Basis for NSP

NSP Operation Management

NSP Evaluation

5. National Safety

Information Sys. (NSI)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSI

NSI Design

NSI Construction

NSI Evaluation

NSI Management

6. Nation Risk

Assessment Sys. (NRA)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NRA

NRA Establishment

NRA Operation & Management

NRA Construction

NRA

Utility Evaluation

7.National Education

& Training Sys, (NET)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NET

NET Establishment

NET Construction

NET Operation & Management

NET

Utility Evaluation

NAI Establishment

NAI Construction

NAI Operation & Management

NAI

Utility Evaluation

8. National Accident

Investigation Sys, (NAI)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NAT

9. Training & Supply

for Safety Specialist (TS)

TS Establishment

TS Construction

TS Operation & Management

Establishment of

Basis Direction for TS

TS

Utility Evaluation

10. Safety P.R. Sys.

(SPR)

Establishment of

Basis Direction for SPR

SPR Establishment

SPR Operation

SPR Construction

SPR Appropriateness

Evaluation

11. Infrastructure

Safety Inspection (ISI)

ISI Plan Establishment

ISI Sys.

Modernization

ISI Sys.

Operation

Analysis of ISI Problems

ISI Sys.

Appropriateness Evaluation

12. Infrastructure

Safety (IS)

IS Safety Certification System Operation

Construction of IS

Safety Certification System

IS Safety Performance

Evaluation

IS Hazard Analysis

Establishment of IS Safety Design Requirements

13. Railway Rolling

Stock Safety (RS)

RS

Hazard Analysis

IS Safety Performance

Evaluation Operation

RS Safety Certification System Operation

Establishment of RS Safety Design Requirements

Construction of RS

Safety Certification System

TR&TP Safety Performance

Evaluation Operation

TR&TP Safety Certification System Operation

Establishment of TR&TP Safety Design Requirements

14. Train Operation Safety

& Train Protection (TR&TP)

TR&TP Hazard Analysis

- Terror, illegality

Construction of TR&TP

Safety Certification System

National Railway Risk Management

System Architecture

slide9

2. Risk Assessment Procedure

Railway Risk Assessment Procedure

Hazard Identification

Defining the Initiating Hazardous Events

Development of Accident Scenarios

Casual

Analysis

Consequence

Analysis

Railway Accident

Progress Scenarios

Railway Accident

Appearance Scenarios

Hazardous

Events

FTA Model

ETA Model

Risk Evaluation & Reduction

slide10

3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Hazard Identification Procedure

Setting up objective of hazard identification &

its boundary

System definition and boundary setting

Including the definition of measures

which stops the increases of accident

Identifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriers

Defining relationships among hazardous events, hazards and barriers.

Developing accident appearance scenarios

Considering the relevant key influential factors.

Developing accident progress scenarios

Drawing up hazard log.

Accident scenario management

slide11

3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

System & Boundary Definition

Typical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project

  • According to the accident classification of “Railway Accident Report Regulation”,
  • The scenarios were divided into the five main areas
    • 1) Train collision accident,
    • 2) Train derailment accident,
    • 3) Train fire accident,
    • 4) Level crossing accident,
    • 5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident.
slide13

3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Railway Accident AppearanceScenario

Built up by classifying properly the immediate causes and underlying causes.

•Immediate Causes: conditions which immediately cause hazardous events

- Substandard Act: Substandard acts/behavior of who can cause hazardous events

- Substandard Conditions: Physical conditions which can cause hazardous events

•Underlying Causes: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions

- Human Management Factors

- Technological Factors

- External Factors

slide14

3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Underlying Causes

Immediate Causes

Hazardous Event

Railway Accident AppearanceScenario

slide15

3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Railway Accident Scenario

Critical factors influencing accident severity

were identified in the accident progress scenarios”

Example of the Accident Progress Scenarios

slide16

4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Risk Measure Method

Risk assessment model

: the form of a cause and consequence analysis

: using fault trees and event trees.

Collective Risk

(Average Number of FWI/year)

=

Frequency

(Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs)

X

Consequences

(the number of FWI/scenario sequence)

1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries

slide17

4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Data Population

  • Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database.
  • Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills
  • Many thousands of recordsare reviewed and classified
  • Where data was not available,
  • Use was made of:
  • - Human error probability assessments
  • : using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART)
  • - Safety expert judgment from in-house expertise within Korea railway.
  • - Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions.
slide18

4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Accident

Analysis

Risk

Analysis

Safety Requirement

Verification

Management

System

Management

Safety Requirement

Management

Event Tree Analysis

User Management

Accident Search

Railway System

Management

Fault Tree Analysis

Code Management

Environment

Analysis

Risk Evaluation

Safety Requirement

Change

Management

Classification

Management

Hazard Analysis

Human Factor

Analysis

Damage Analysis

Requirement

Traceability

Management

Options Analysis

Railway Risk Assessment &Information

Management System (RAIMS)

RAIMS

slide19

4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Web-Based Accident Analysis Subsystem

  • Application running on the web
  • One purpose is to provide
  • - Fundamental information for an in-depth risk assessment of railway accidents
  • - Information on railway safety performance levels to both assessors and the public
  • This system is composed of three modules
    • 1) Accident input module.
    • 2) Accident analysis & statistics module
    • 3) Hazard management module.

Environment Analysis

Accident Analysis

Accident Statistic Analysis

slide20

4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Risk Analysis Subsystem

  • Windows-based application
  • Dedicated railway risk assessment software package
  • - Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Human Factor Analysis
  • The risk of the railway systems can be assessed by the ET/FT linking approach
  • - Accident progress scenarios: defined as event trees, using an event tree editor.
  • - Each branch of the accident progress sequences requires one or more supplementary fault trees,
  • which can be developed by a fault tree editor.
  • - Sum of the frequency of each sequence becomes the total frequency of the accident of concern.

Event Tree Editor View

ET/FT Linking approach

Fault Tree Editor View

slide21

4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Railway Human Reliability Analysis (R-HRA)Module

  • Supporting the analysts in analyzing potential human errors
  • Used under the railway risk assessment framework
  • Computer software developed for aiding the R-HRA process.
  • Revised R-HRA method supplementing the original R-HRA method developed by RSSB
  • Providing a specific task analysis guideline and a classification of performance shaping
  • factors (PSFs)

General Information Input

Error Analysis & Quantification

Reporting Results

slide22

4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Railway Accident Risk Assessment Results

  • Railway accident data until 2005 year on the main line of South Korea
  • Train operation on the main line fully carried out by Korea Railroad Corp..
  • The total risk: 217 FWI per year
  • The overall risk made up from different profiles of frequency and consequences.
  • Railway casualty accident
  • : Tend to consist of high frequency low consequence type events (slips, trips and falls)
  • Train accidents
  • : Tend to have a risk contribution from the low frequency high consequence type events
  • : Increase the risk contribution for the hazardous events above the level seen in practice.
slide23

4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Future Development of the Risk Model

The model is being prepared currently and will include:

• Feasibility and uncertainty test in the results of the developed model

• Improved level of human factors modeling

• Use of more sophisticated statistical analysis techniques

slide24

5. Conclusion

  • This study has proposed
    • Developing procedure of the risk models for the Korea railway
    • Application of their application to the Korea railway
  • The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway
  • Which will
    • Increase the industry’s knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance
    • Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls
    • Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction
    • Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes