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Security: Integrity, Authentication, Non-repudiation

Security: Integrity, Authentication, Non-repudiation. CS 352, Lecture 20 http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/~sn624/352-S19 Srinivas Narayana (heavily adapted from slides by Prof. Badri Nath and the textbook authors). Today. Last two lectures: cryptography for confidentiality

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Security: Integrity, Authentication, Non-repudiation

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  1. Security: Integrity, Authentication, Non-repudiation CS 352, Lecture 20 http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/~sn624/352-S19 Srinivas Narayana (heavily adapted from slides by Prof. Badri Nath and the textbook authors)

  2. Today • Last two lectures: cryptography for confidentiality • Today: Message digests (integrity) • Digital signatures (non-repudiation, integrity) • Certificate authorities (authentication) • Using these techniques to secure a specific application (email)

  3. Message Digests Integrity: Did my message get across without tampering?

  4. Can we ensure that a receiver can detect message tampering? Idea: fixed-length, easy- to-compute digital “fingerprint” of a message apply hash function H to m, get fixed size message digest, H(m). Cryptographic hash function properties: Easy to calculate Produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint) Hard to reverse: given msg digest x, computationally infeasible to find m such that x = H(m) Or another m’ such that H(m) = H(m’) Message digests large message m H: Hash Function H(m) 4

  5. Internet checksum: a poor crypto hash function Internet checksum has some properties of hash function: • produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message • Is easy to compute But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find another message with same hash value: ASCII format message ASCII format message I O U 9 0 0 . 1 9 B O B 49 4F 55 39 30 30 2E 31 39 42 D2 42 I O U 1 0 0 . 9 9 B O B 49 4F 55 31 30 30 2E 39 39 42 D2 42 B2 C1 D2 AC B2 C1 D2 AC different messages but identical checksums! 5

  6. MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321) computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process. arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to construct msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x SHA-1 is also used US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1] 160-bit message digest Hash function algorithms 6

  7. Basic idea of crypto hash function • Use a message as key and transform a constant string of length N repeatedly into another string of length N which is the digest • Simple example: XOR the constant string with the message bytes • In practice, use a set of Boolean operations

  8. s = shared secret s s message message message H( ) H( ) compare Message Authentication Code (MAC) • Authenticates sender • Verifies message integrity • No encryption! • Also called “keyed hash” • Notation: MDm = H(s || m) ; send m || MDm Internet

  9. HMAC • popular MAC standard • addresses some subtle security flaws • operation: • concatenates secret to front of message. • hashes concatenated message • concatenates secret to front of digest • hashes combination again

  10. Digital Signatures Non-repudiation and integrity

  11. cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures: sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator. verifiable, nonforgeable:recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document Digital signatures 11

  12. simple digital signature for message m: Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key KB, creating “signed” message, KB(m) - K B Digital signatures - - - Bob’s private key Bob’s message, m (m) m,K B Dear Alice Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! …(blah blah blah) Bob Bob’s message, m, signed (encrypted) with his private key Public key encryption algorithm 12

  13. Alice thus verifies that: Bob signed m no one else signed m Bob signed m and not m‘ non-repudiation: Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court and prove that Bob signed m Digital signatures - • suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: m, KB(m) • Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s public key KB to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m. • If KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used Bob’s private key. + + - - - + - One problem: we need to encrypt (large) messages using public key crypto! 13

  14. H: Hash function H: Hash function large message m large message m + - digital signature (encrypt) digital signature (decrypt) K K B B encrypted msg digest encrypted msg digest + - - KB(H(m)) KB(H(m)) H(m) H(m) Digital signature = encrypted message digest Bob sends digitally signed message: Alice verifies signature, integrity of digitally signed message: H(m) Bob’s private key Bob’s public key equal ? 14

  15. Authentication & Key Certification Hello… is it me you’re looking for?

  16. Recall: Implement authentication using crypto Login: Alice “Password please” + Nonce EK(Alice’s password, Nonce) Bob Alice • Use a nonce to prevent replay attacks • Communicate using a shared secret K

  17. - K (R) A + + K K A A - - + (K (R)) = R K (K (R)) = R A A A Authentication Previous proposal requires shared symmetric key • Can we authenticate using public key techniques? Sure! use nonce and public key cryptography “I am Alice” Bob computes R and knows only Alice could have the private key, that encrypted R such that “send me your public key” 17

  18. - - K (R) K (R) A T + + K K A T - - + + m = K (K (m)) m = K (K (m)) + + A T A T K (m) K (m) A T Security hole: if you ask for public keys! man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice) I am Alice I am Alice R R Send me your public key Send me your public key Trudy gets sends m to Alice encrypted with Alice’s public key 18

  19. Security hole: if you ask for public keys! man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice) difficult to detect: • Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and recall conversation!) • problem is that Trudy receives all (plaintext) messages as well! 19

  20. Key certification: Motivation • Is there a way to ensure we can reliably know the public key of a communicating entity? • Trust someone else (namely: a centralized authority)to check this for us • On the Internet, trust is transitive: • We trust X (Ex: Alice trusts a certification authority) • X trusts Y (Ex: CA attests to Bob’s public key) • Hence, we can trust Y (Ex: Alice can trust Bob’s public key)

  21. + + digital signature (encrypt) K K B B K CA Certification authorities • certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E. • E (person, router) registers its public key with CA. • E provides “proof of identity” to CA. • CA creates certificate binding E to its public key. • certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA – CA says “this is E’s public key” Bob’s public key CA private key certificate for Bob’s public key, signed by CA - Bob’s identifying information 21

  22. + + digital signature (decrypt) K K B B K CA Certification authorities • when Alice wants Bob’s public key: • gets Bob’s certificate (from Bob or elsewhere). • apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get Bob’s public key Bob’s public key CA public key + 22

  23. PGP: E-mail Security An application of security principles to application-layer security

  24. . . KS( ) KS( ) + + + - KB(KS ) KB(KS ) KB KB - + KS KS(m ) KS(m ) m m KS Internet KS . . + - KB( ) KB( ) Secure e-mail Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob. • Alice: • generates random symmetric private key, KS • encrypts message with KS (for efficiency) • also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key • sends both KS(m) and KB(KS) to Bob 24

  25. . . KS( ) KS( ) + + + - KB(KS ) KB(KS ) KB KB - + KS KS(m ) KS(m ) m m KS Internet KS . . + - KB( ) KB( ) Secure e-mail Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob. • Bob: • uses his private key to decrypt and recover KS • uses KS to decrypt KS(m) to recover m 25

  26. + - KA KA - + . . + - KA( ) KA( ) . . - - KA(H(m)) KA(H(m)) H(m ) m H( ) H( ) compare Internet m H(m ) m Secure e-mail (continued) Alice wants to provide sender authentication and message integrity • Alice digitally signs message • sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature 26

  27. . KS( ) + - + KB(KS ) KB KA + + KS m . - KA( ) . - KA(H(m)) H( ) m Internet KS . + KB( ) Secure e-mail (continued) Alice wants to provide confidentiality, sender authentication, and message integrity. Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s public key, newly created symmetric key 27

  28. PGP: Pretty Good Privacy • Security implemented at the application level • Allows all of the communication modes described earlier • Uses a “web of trust” for key exchange • Key signing: any party X can “sign” that they trust the public key of Y using their private keys • Propagate trust: If Z trusts X, Z can now trust Y

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