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How Asymmetric Information Explains Banking Regulation. 1. Government Safety Net and Deposit Insurance A. Prevents bank runs due to asymmetric information: depositors can’t tell good from bad banks B. Creates moral hazard incentives for banks to take on too much risk

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how asymmetric information explains banking regulation
How Asymmetric InformationExplains Banking Regulation

1. Government Safety Net and Deposit Insurance

A. Prevents bank runs due to asymmetric information: depositors can’t tell good from bad banks

B. Creates moral hazard incentives for banks to take on too much risk

C. Creates adverse selection problem of crooks and risk-takers wanting to control banks

D. Too-Big-to-Fail increases moral hazard incentives for big banks

2. Restrictions on Asset Holdings

A. Reduces moral hazard of too much risk taking

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

how asymmetric information explains banking regulation2
How Asymmetric InformationExplains Banking Regulation

3. Bank Capital Requirements

A. Reduces moral hazard: banks have more to lose when have higher capital

B. Higher capital means more collateral for FDIC

4. Bank Supervision: Chartering and Examination

A. Reduces adverse selection problem of risk takers or crooks owning banks

B. Reduces moral hazard by preventing risky activities

5. New Trend: Assessment of Risk Management

6. Disclosure Requirements

A. Better information reduces asymmetric information problem

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

how asymmetric information explains banking regulation3
How Asymmetric InformationExplains Banking Regulation

7. Consumer Protection

A. Standardized interest rates (APR)

B. Prevent discrimination

8. Restrictions on Competition to Reduce Risk-Taking

A. Branching restrictions

B. Separation of banking and securities industries in the past: Glass-Steagall

International Banking Regulation

1. Bank regulation abroad similar to ours

2. Particular problem of regulating international banking

e.g., BCCI scandal

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

major banking legislation in u s
Major Banking Legislation in U.S.

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

bank failures
Bank Failures

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

why a banking crisis in 1980s
Why a Banking Crisis in 1980s?

Early Stages

1. Decreasing profitability: banks take risk to keep profits up

2. Deregulation in 1980 and 1982, more opportunities for risk taking

4. i, net worth of S&Ls 

A. Insolvencies 

B. Incentives for risk taking 

Result:Failures  and risky loans 

Later Stages: Regulatory Forbearance (FSLIC – loan insurance)

1. Regulators allow insolvent S&Ls to operate because

A. Insufficient funds to close and provide insurance payoff

C. FHLBB cozy with S&Ls (established to foster growth of S&Ls)

2. Huge increase in moral hazard for zombie S&Ls: now have incentive to “bet the bank”

3. Zombies hurt healthy S&Ls

A. Raise cost of funds

B. Lower loan rates

4. Outcome: Huge losses

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

political economy of s l crisis
Political Economy of S&L Crisis

Explanation: Principal-Agent Problem

1. Politicians influenced by S&L lobbyists rather than public

A. Deny funds to close S&Ls

B. Legislation to relax restrictions on S&Ls

C. Competitive Bank Equality Act (CEBA) of 1987 had inadequate amount for bailout

2. Regulators influenced by politicians and desire to avoid blame

A. Loosened capital requirements

B. Regulatory forbearance

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act firrea of 1989
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989

1. New regulatory structure: Office of Thrift Supervision as new regulator, FDIC takes over FSLIC fund

2. Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) created and given funds to close insolvent S&Ls: cost of $100-$200 billion

3. Core capital requirement  from 3% to 8%

4. Reregulation: Asset restrictions like before 1982

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

federal deposit insurance corporation improvement act fdicia of 1991
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991

1. FDIC recapitalized with loans and higher premiums

2. Reduce scope of deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail

3. Prompt corrective action provisions

4. Risk-based premiums

5. Annual examinations and stricter reporting

6. Enhances Fed powers to regulate international banking

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

cost of banking crises in other countries
Cost of Banking Crises in Other Countries

© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved