Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)

1. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)

2. Overview • Purpose, Components, and Organization of MPICE • Application to Governance Innovation in Security and Development • Possible Next Steps

3. Purpose of MPICE: Measuring Conflict Transformation • Conflict Drivers Motivations and means for violent conflict • Institutional Performance • Capacity of indigenous institutions to • overcome conflict peacefully • Adopted by US Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and the Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureau

4. Components of MPICE • A generic metrics framework • http://www.usip.org/files/resources/MPICE_final_complete%20book%20%282%29.pdf • Procedures to select and “tailor” the metrics to a specific conflict environment • A users manual that provides guidelines for each data collection method • A computer-based “tool” to archive, analyze, and visualize collected data • (US Army Corps of Engineers)

5. Organization of MPICE MPICE is divided into five sectors or end states: • Safe and Secure Environment • Political Moderation & Stable Governance • Rule of Law • Sustainable Economy • Social Well Being

6. Organization of MPICE • Goal: A higher-order objective that an intervention is intended to achieve. • Indicator: Variable that provides a valid means to determine whether the goal is being met. • Measure: Empirical data (quantitative or qualitative) that provide a reliable method of assessing the extent to which an indicator is present or absent.

7. Rule of Law Sector End State Impunity, injustice, and criminalization of state institutions have been diminished to the point that the domestic justice system, supportedby a sustainable level of essential international involvement, maintains public order and safety, brings perpetrators of major crimes to justice, holds governing authorities accountable through an independent judiciary, protects fundamental human rights, and applies the law equally, in increasing compliance with international norms and standards.

8. Rule of Law Goals • Drivers of Conflict • Impunity Diminished • Injustice Diminished • Criminalization of State Institutions Diminished

9. Rule of Law Indicator • Impunity • Can politically motivated crimes (e.g. Inter-group murder, political violence, terrorism) be resolved by the criminal justice system?

10. Rule of Law Indicator and Measures • Impunity • Can politically motivated crimes (e.g. Inter-group murder, political violence, terrorism) be resolved by the criminal justice system? • Ratio of incidence of inter-group murder, political violence, and terrorism to investigations, prosecutions, and convictions for these crimes • Perceptions of law enforcement officials and victims of the crimes cited above that suspects involved are untouchable and that cases are abandoned for this reason

11. Data Collection Methodologies • Methodologies are selected because they are best suited to collect the data required for a given measure • Data are collected using one of four methodologies: • Content Analysis (CA) • Quantitative Data (QD) • Survey and Polling Data (S/PD) • Expert Knowledge (EK)

12. Application to GISD • Concentrate on Drivers of Conflict • The Most Salient Driver is Illicit Power Structures: An underground political-economy where ill-gotten wealth determines who governs and/or fuels insurgents (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia, DRC, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Sierra Leone) • To measure the informal structures and underground transactions involved requires metrics from more than the “Political Moderation and Stable Democracy” sector. • Safe and Secure Environment, Rule of Law, and Sustainable Economy must also be included.

13. Application to GISD • Safe and Secure Environment • Criminalization of Security Forces • Rule of Law • Impunity • Criminalization of State Institutions • Sustainable Economy • Political Impact of Illicit Wealth • Economic Incentives for Conflict • Political Moderation and Stable Democracy - Competition for Absolute Power

14. Possible Next Steps • Consider whether the Civil Affairs community can collect relevant metrics using observation of Quantifiable Data, Survey/Polling Data, and Expert Knowledge • Work with PKSOI to adapt the MPICE catalogue of metrics to the requirements of the 38G MOS • Engage Tom Bozada, USACE Program Manager for Monitoring, Planning, Analysis, and Evaluation (thomas.a.bozada@usace.army.mil) • Engage Jason Ladnier, Learning and Training Director for State Dept Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureau (ladnierjm@state.gov)

15. QUESTIONS?

16. Challenges • Politicization: Will you be allowed to report disappointing results? • Wrong Objectives: Does the mandate or policy goal actually confront the essence of the conflict? • Attribution: Did your strategy cause the outcome? • Timeframes: What is the lag time between project completion and effect on outcomes? • Role of Locals: Should locals (politicians, masses) determine strategic goals and how to measure them? • Theory of Change: Is it necessary to have one to measure progress?

17. Selection Process • Match your strategic goals to generic MPICE goals • Select indicators that are valid representations of the goals • Identify measures that tap the essence of the indicator in your context • Can the data required actually be collected? • If not, use a different methodology

18. Tailoring Process • Word the measures you have selected to match the context • In Haiti “violent armed groups” equate to gangs • Identify the level at which the data should be collected (e.g. national, regional, provincial) • Determine how often the data should be collected (monthly, quarterly, annually)

19. Conflict Transformation in Afghanistan “The right question at this stage of the war in order to determine a more accurate set of metrics should be… ‘Have the governance and economic systems reached sufficient capability to withstand public or insurgent opposition without collapse?’ We must build as solid a foundation as practical with the requisite security capabilities and sufficient institutional capacity allowing Afghanistan to take care of itself with some outside assistance(international and otherwise).” Major General Michael Flynn, ISAF J-2 (July 16, 2010)