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Faith and evidence. Philosophy of Religion 2008 Lecture 7. Today. Evidence, evidentialism and the nature of belief Pascal’s Wager What are religious claims? Hume and Clifford … William James. Hiddenness. An evidential problem: should we believe in God if we have little experience of Him?
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Faith and evidence Philosophy of Religion 2008 Lecture 7
Today • Evidence, evidentialism and the nature of belief • Pascal’s Wager • What are religious claims? • Hume and Clifford … • William James
Hiddenness • An evidential problem: should we believe in God if we have little experience of Him? • How important is evidence ? We believe in things of which we have limited evidence – we trust in testimony • But (Schellenberg) claims about the nature of God mean we should expect him to be more obvious • Contra Schellenberg: no, what we know about the nature of God/humanity should lead us to expect hiddenness
Acceptance and belief • Belief is not something we can will • Perhaps if sincere seekers cannot believe in God, they should have the attitude of acceptance (Howard-Snyder) • … assert belief, act as believers, without the conviction of believers? • Compare Pascal’s Wager ...
Pascal’s Wager • If there is a God, he is infinitely beyond our comprehension … we are therefore incapable of knowing either what he is, or whether he is … • God either is, or he is not. But towards which side will we lean? Reason cannot decide this question … • How will you wager? Reason cannot make you choose either; reason cannot prove either wrong (Pensees, §418)
Pascal’s Wager • Let us weigh up the gain and loss involved in calling heads that God exists … • If you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing … • You want to find faith, and you do not know the road … • … they behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said etc. That will make you believe quite naturally, and will make you more docile (Pensees, §418)
Pascal’s thinking … • The evidence is not decisive – and can never be • Belief cannot be a matter of epistemic reason (but it can be a matter of prudential reason …) • Belief in itself is worthwhile – if God exists, it will lead to salvation • Is relationship with God assured just by belief? • And are prudential reasons for belief acceptable? • Can God expect us to believe, if we cannot sincerely do so ? How can we believe at will? • Can we do so by acting as a believer? • But … which God?
Pascal’s thinking … We have little to lose if we are wrong (finite wasted time), much to gain if we are right (eternity with God)
The Wager • Important questions about evidence, the value of belief, voluntarism, bringing about belief • Fideism – adopting a faith is not a matter of (epistemic) reason, but of choice and commitment • Cf Kierkegaard: ‘ … demonstrating that this unknown something (God) exists could scarcely suggest itself to the Reason. For if God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it, and if he does exist it would be folly to attempt it … I always reason from existence, not toward existence’ (Kierkegaard, in Hick p164)
Responding to ‘God talk’ • So what sort of claims are claims about God? • Fundamentally meaningless? • Since they can neither be verified or falsified by experience … • But they are clearly not strictly meaningless, even if non-verifiable • And there may be evidence … • But are these really empirical claims? May be closer to attitudes towards the world: ‘… to see the world as God’s creation is to see meaning in life…’ (DZ Phillips, The Concept of Prayer)
Evidentialism • Can this be true for all religious claims? • If not, perhaps the reasonableness of religious beliefs depends on the evidence for them • Is this what epistemic rationality means? • Flew: ‘ thorough and systematic inquiry must start from a position of negative atheism [i.e. not-theism] and … the burden of proof lies on the theist … if it is to be established that here is a God, then we have to have good grounds for believing this is indeed so’ ‘The presumption of atheism’
Hume • What ought we to believe? • ‘A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence … He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability’ (ECHU §X)
Belief proportioned to evidence • So belief should be exactly proportional to evidence? • E.g. on miracles: • Human testimony is a valuable source of evidence • But having never experienced a miracle ourselves • We properly judge on the basis of what we know • And so it is always more likely that the testimony is false than that a miracle occurred
Belief proportioned to evidence • Testimony is not always reliable: • We must weigh it against our experience of the world, and of the witnesses. Consider: contrary testimony, character of the witnesses, manner in which they testify. • The ‘Indian Prince’ is justified in disbelieving stories of frost, though he was wrong (experience can be limited, or mislead) • And with miracles, the testimony is all we have, and the circumstances so contrary to experience, that we should give it little weight. • Is Hume right to rule out reasonable belief? Miracles are by their nature unusual …
Clifford’s evidentialism • ‘It is wrong always, everywhere and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’ • So belief should only follow sufficient evidence • And Clifford motivates this with some examples: • The ship-owner • The wrongful prosecution
The ship owner • A ship owner suppresses worries about the safety of his ‘old, not over-well built’ ship • He sends it to sea, and all are drowned • ‘He had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him’ • What if they hadn’t drowned? • He is still guilty: ‘The man would not have been innocent; he would only have been not found out…’
The unjust prosecution • Rumours of child indoctrination .. • ‘A certain number of men formed themselves into a society for the purpose of agitating the public about this matter’ • But on investigation there is no truth to the rumours • But if it had been true…? • ‘The question is not whether their belief was true or false, but whether they entertained it on the wrong grounds …they would not thereby become honourable men’
Ethics of belief? • We have a general responsibility to ‘create the world [of belief] in which posterity will live’ • Avoiding credulity is a moral responsibility to ourselves and to others … • Is this true in every case, or only cases that matter? Note Clifford’s emotive cases and language • Does he only show that false belief is instrumentally wrong? Is it also intrinsically wrong? • He is not writing specifically about religious belief (but see p 34).
Ethics of belief? • Clifford claims that properly formulating our beliefs is a moral duty. Does he show this is true in every case? • Is it possible to refrain from belief, in the way that we can refrain from action? Belief is not voluntary … • Can we, in practice, deliberate on all our beliefs? • Important beliefs (religious beliefs?) maybe • Perhaps we should be selective …
Ethics and evidence • And what is sufficient evidence? • How much do we need? • Believing that something constitutes evidence is itself founded on certain beliefs • How far back must we go? • Does Clifford require too high a standard? • This does seem to have implications for wager-style arguments • But these apply in cases where evidence is unavailable, or finely balanced …
James: the will to believe • ‘… a defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced’ • Some decisions are legitimately ‘passional and volitional’ – we can follow our inclination • These are where the choices are: • Between live options • Momentous • Forced ‘no standing place outside of the alternative’
James: the will to believe • ‘” do not decide, but leave the question open” is itself a passional decision … and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth’ • Everyone makes a passional judgement about the ‘living options’ that are worth pursuing … • ‘Avoiding falsehood’ may be right in cases not momentous or forced … but there are cases where evidence is limited: • Moral (questions involving value) • Relationships, which depend on our action, a decision to place trust in others (the train/highwaymen) • Religious questions: risk of losing a good, high stakes, entitled to make one’s own choice
James and Clifford • This suggests that Clifford’s general principle is false: • Evidentialism is itself founded on passion – a fear of being wrong – not on evidence. So, self defeating • We have as much a duty to ‘know the truth’ as to ‘avoid error’ • Is evidentialism even rational, if not all choices can be decided by evidence?
Reading and references • Seminar reading • Pascal, Pensees§418 • A useful review of some objections to Pascal: ‘A central theistic argument’ (Schlesinger) in WLC • Kierkegaard, ‘Against proofs in religion’ in Hick • DZ Phillips – try extract in Davies’ Guide • Flew, ‘The presumption of atheism’ in Davies’ Guide • May want to read all of Hume on Miracles (Enq. Concerning Human Understanding §X) • van Inwagen ‘It is wrong to believe…’ in S & M • Davies: 2nd edn. ch. 1, 3rd edn ch. 2
To think about • How do we form our beliefs? • Are all beliefs • Formed on evidence? • Answerable to evidence? • What should we do when there is little evidence? • Are any of us entirely even-handed and indifferent in all cases? Can we be? Should we be? • What proper role does our inclination, our ‘passional nature’ have? • What does this have to do with religious belief?
