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All Director’s Training 2010

All Director’s Training 2010. Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009. Background of Facility. Good facility on surface ACA Accreditation Low drug use and incidents of trafficking Good overall metrics Better culture

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All Director’s Training 2010

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  1. All Director’s Training2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

  2. Background of Facility • Good facility on surface • ACA Accreditation • Low drug use and incidents of trafficking • Good overall metrics • Better culture • Positive staff/offender relationships • T.C. environments • Many offender organizations

  3. Description of Critical Incident • On July 12, 2009 at 1030 hours (CST) Shift Supervisor was notified that three (3) offenders were missing from I-Cell house. • An emergency count was conducted at 1100 hours. It was verified that three (3) offenders were missing at 1107. • Nationwide search commenced with multiple Federal, State, and local agencies.

  4. Mark Booher • #996357 • Murder • 85 years • Charles Smith • #876055 • Murder • 95 years • Lance Battreal • #988084 • Rape • 53 years

  5. An internal search of the prison grounds turned up a change of clothes in the I-Cell house tunnel area. • Offenders gained access to the I-Cell house midway utility area unsupervised.

  6. Once in midway offenders were able to access tunnel system beneath the facility. After entering I-tunnel they were able to breach two walls which allowed access to D-Cell house tunnel

  7. From D-cell house tunnel they climbed through an access door separating the ventilation feed/return system into the return side of the ventilation system and crawled to the New Service Building (NSB) basement area. The offenders were able to cut a chain securing a security grate and breach another wall allowing access to the Main Street tunnel system

  8. Offenders maneuvered through the Main Street tunnel system over to Back Street tunnel. • At the beginning of the Back Street tunnel they cut through the tag shop gate to gain access to Back Street Offenders utilized carbon tipped cutting blades to breach the security grates (approximately 7 minutes cutting time)

  9. Once through the Back Street gate they cut through the bars surrounding the storm drain enclosure From there they climbed through the hole previously broken in the storm drain …

  10. … where they gained access to the 10th street storm drain system managed by the city. They went through the city system and came up through a manhole lid on 7th street and Grant

  11. 7th Street & Grant Ave

  12. FACTORS LEADING TO ESCAPE • Procedure breakdowns: • Staff allowed offender workers unauthorized and unsupervised access to Midway. • Supervisory staff were not conducting walk-through inspections of housing units. • I-Cell house (honor dorm) offenders were allowed out of cell time from 0345 hours until approximately 2100 hours with exception of counts. • Counselor was compromised and admitted to trafficking with offender. • Lack of effective security practices and comprehensive Security Plan of Inspection.

  13. FACTORS LEADING TO ESCAPE • Tunnel officer post frequently closed due to staff shortages. • Tunnel officers failed to report a broken/cut hinge on security door in tunnel areas approximately two weeks prior to escape. • Maintenance staff complacent and over familiar with offender maintenance workers. • Tunnels poorly maintained (repair debris removal needed). Facility maintenance staff would not work tunnels. • Physical Plant shortfalls: • Tunnels not properly alarmed with security electronics. • Tunnel gates not updated with current technology.

  14. PLAN OF ACTION – IMPROVEMENTS • Tunnel system cleaned and additional lighting added. • Fiber optic motion sensors and stun fencing placed on security grate – all alarms routed to control. • Guard One installed in tunnel system to monitor security inspections. • Enhanced staff search procedures implemented at facility entrances to prevent introduction of prohibited property. • High strength aircraft grade stainless steel bars installed throughout storm/sewer drains. • All midway keys removed from the unit (must be a Lieutenant or above to draw) • Policy changes (no offenders allowed in tunnel system) • Status of I housing unit changed. No additional out of cell house time allowed.

  15. FOLLOW-UP • Comprehensive Security Plan of Inspection implemented to include inspection of storm drain security systems. • Annual security audits to enforce compliance with inspection procedures. • Initiated complacency drills throughout agency to challenge staff and ensure we are thinking about basic security practice ALL OF THE TIME.

  16. “Those who don’t know history are destined to repeat it.” - Edmond Burke Questions/Comments?

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