Presentation to Portfolio Committee: State of Security in Correctional Centres 12 May 2010
INDEX • What is security for DCS and areas that are covered • What are the current security threats and elements thereof • Environmental scan • Overview: what are the critical security indicators for DCS • Escapes: Comparative analysis between various inmate categories • What are the root causes of assaults • Unnatural deaths – Where and why • What DCS do to address security breaches • Gangs: discussion • Sexual violence and rapes – Where and why • Vetting of security officials • State of readiness: 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup • Functions and structure of emergency support teams • Challenges • Way forward
1. WHAT IS SECURITY FOR DCS AND AREAS THAT ARE COVERED • On overall DCS security operations seeks to provide safe and secure conditions for all persons incarcerated, consistent with human dignity, and thereby enhancing security for personnel and the public • We view ourselves as a government agency charged with rehabilitation of offenders but with security influences • Our primary objective is to provide security to the public, protect our staff, provide protection and safety to inmates, service providers and stakeholders
2. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND ELEMENTS THEREOF • Changing profile of crime in the country points towards decreasing trends, however, • trends that remains high involve sophisticated syndicates • This increases unpredictable ATD population and increases our maximum security inmates • In many instances our staff are vulnerable to corruption temptations • Our facilities are old and not responsive to new threats • Increasing ATD population increases vulnerability in our operations • Overcrowding
3. ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN Total number security classification of inmates : April 2010 • Maximum - 29 682 • Medium - 65 541 • Minimum - 10 260 • ATD’S - 50 620 • All Security Class - 156 103 • Unclassified - 6 733
3.5 ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN : STAFFING SHIFT PATTERNS Shift pattern for staff working the 2 shift system on a 45 hour work week for a 14 day cycle. Staff work a shift length of 12 hours and 15 minutes and a lunch break of 1 hour is included.
SHIFT PATTERNSAlternative shift system for Correctional Centres working a 45 hour work week for a 14 day period. Staff work a shift length of 10 hours per day if a lunch break of 1 hours is included.
4. OVERVIEW: WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL SECURITY INDICATORS FOR DCS • Escapes • Alleged assaults - Inmates to inmates • Alleged assaults - Inmates to staff • Alleged assaults - Staff to inmates • Unnatural deaths • Gang related incidents • Sexual assaults / rapes
5.1 ESCAPE AREAS: 2009/2010 FINANCIAL YEAR • Where and why are these escapes • 53% of escapes take place from within the Correctional Centres by means of tampering with infrastructure, poor supervision at dining halls, courtyards and single cells, erroneous releases due to collaboration between inmates. • Almost 60% of these are ATDs with 7% maximums and the remainder medium or minimum category inmates. • Escape from hospitals, courts and during escourts account for only 14% of escapes. • The remaining percentage ( 33%) is medium to low security sentenced inmates who escaped from work teams.
5.2 TRENDS OF ESCAPE IN DCS OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS • Strategic objective to reduce the number of escapes by less than 4.7 inmates per • 10 000 inmates who escape. • Performance for 2009/2010 financial year 3.7 escapes per 10 000 inmates
6. WHAT ARE THE ROOT CAUSES OF ASSAULTS • Overcrowding cause undue tension/frustration • Idleness • Violent nature of crimes • Profile of offenders • Problem of the necessary use of force and force by officials not equal to the threat • Provocation • Vulnerability • Availability of sharp objects • Involvement of gangs • Drug related
6.1 ALLEGED ASSAULT INMATE ON INMATE • Strategic objective to reduce the number of alleged assaults by less than 83 inmates per 10 000 inmates assaulted. • Where and why are these alleged assaults • 74% of alleged assaults by inmate on inmate mainly due to gang related incidents where self made knives, padlocks and any other sharpened objects were used.
6.2ALLEGED ASSAULT STAFF ON INMATE • Where and why are these alleged assaults • 24 % of alleged assaults by staff on inmate utilizing tonfas during necessary force used to subdue perpetrators of gang fights
6.3. ALLEGED ASSAULT INMATE ON STAFF • Where and why are these alleged assaults • 2% gang related alleged assaults by inmates on staff by stabbing officials and /or hitting them with padlocks placed in pillow sheets and socks.
7. UNNATURAL DEATHS – WHERE AND WHY • 40% of deaths are suicides by means of hanging. • 60% of deaths by hanging occurred in single cells, 25% in communal cell bathrooms and the remainder occurred in hospital cell ablution facilities. • In almost all cases bed linen or pieces of clothing were used. • 8% of deaths are caused by assaults by fellow inmates while 5% of deaths were caused by assaults by staff on inmates. • Remainder of deaths caused by burn wounds, medication overdose, toxins whilst 6% of cases the cause of death is still not yet determined.
7.1 UNNATURAL DEATHS: INMATES: FOR THE PAST THREE FINANCIAL YEARS • Strategic objective to reduce the number of unnatural deaths by less than 3.3 inmates per 10 000 inmates deaths • Performance for 2009/2010 financial year 3.3 unnatural deaths per 10 000 inmates
7.2 UNNATURAL DEATHS: CAUSES : 2009/2010 Note: Unnatural causes unknown - Cause of death not yet determined
8. WHAT DCS DO TO ADDRESS SECURITY BREACHES • Incidents reporting • Role out of APIS • Integration of technology • Video arraignment • Training of staff • Anti gang Strategy • OSD for security officials
9. GANGS: SUSPECTED GANG RELATED INCIDENTS: 2009/2010 • Where and why are these gang activities • Gang violence e.g. stabbing incidents, gang fights, etc mostly take place during the day outside cells at dining areas, courtyards, walking passages etc. • During 09/10 financial year four (4) gang related incidents occurred where five (5) inmates died, and • Three (3) gang related incidents occurred where four (4) staff members were injured .
9.1 GANGS: DISCUSSION • Information with regard to gang incidents are not readily available and under reported ( sworn to secrecy, intimidation, fear tactics etc.) • Statistics in previous slide based on information provided through DCS Risk Management Processes • Most gang incidents occur in KZN and EC Regions with Gauteng and Western Cape also problematic • Gang violence involving sexual abuse/ rape under reported but occur mostly in communal cells after lock up
9.2 ANTI GANG STRATEGY • Round table discussions took place in February 2009 and task team consisting of internal and external role players appointed in June 2009 • Draft gang management strategy developed and consulted • Short term actions : • Initial and continuous risk assessment, supervision and separation of predatory and vulnerable inmates • Increased access control, movement control, searching • Create an environment that encourages the reporting of victimization / bullying and abuse • Render support to the victims of violence • Strict enforcement of disciplinary and criminal procedures • Provide inmates on admission with accurate information on their rights and responsibilities and risks
ANTI GANG STRATEGY Continue • Medium to longer term actions: • Training of staff on: • Recognizing and understanding different forms of violence, coercion, abuse and threats • Risk assessment – self harm, suicide associated with gang coercion • Effective handling of complaints • Conflict resolution • Dealing with incidences of violence • Presenting alternatives to reasons for inmate involvement in gangs • Establish a structure and data base at all levels to identify collect and analyze data on gangs • Fully implement sentence and development plans for offenders
ANTI GANG STRATEGY Continue • Include programmes for inmates on: • Inmate personal safety ( including definitions of abuse) • Sexual and reproductive health • Gender and sexuality • Healthy and constructive coping mechanisms ( yoga) • Research and record good practice in respect of prevention, code enforcement and victim support: • Legislative provisions • Criminal reporting • Reclassification • Reality of environment, (female staff searching of males) • Security environment weakened by female security staff, strength depleted • Transfer of gangsters to maximum facilities
9.3 BEHAVIOUR MODIFICATION PROGRAMME ON GANSTERISM • Compulsory attendance based on correctional sentence plan • The purpose of programme is to prevent newly admitted offenders from joining gangs, as well as those already gang members to change their behavior. • Programme consist of seven sessions presented by trained correctional intervention officials • Gangsterism • Reasons and consequences for joining gangs • Coping in a correctional centre
10. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND RAPES - WHERE AND WHY • Information with regard to sexual violence /rapes incidents not readily available and under reported (intimidation, fear tactics etc) • Official information system of DCS does not make provision for separate capturing of sexual violence /rape • Information in previous slide based on information provided by regions through DCS Risk Management processes • Whilst non sexual related gang violence predominantly occurs outside cells when inmates are unlocked sexual violence and abuse mainly occurs after lock up in cells - minimum staffing levels • Complicated matter especially in differentiating between consensual and forced sex • Sexual violence and rapes are a reality in DCS Facilities and condoms are provided as a health precautionary measure
10.1 SEXUAL VIOLENCE/RAPES IN CORRECTIONAL CENTRES:2009/2010
10.2 STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND RAPE • Strategies closely linked with anti gang strategies already discussed • Development of DCS Policy on addressing sexual abuse of inmates a high priority is already in progress. NGO’s involved • Main elements of policy : • Clear definition of terms e.g. consensual versus forced sex • Prevention • Detection and reporting • Response • Monitoring
STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND RAPE Continue Prevention: • Statement of zero tolerance • Employee screening • Staff training: • Inmate’s right to be free from sexual abuse • The right of inmates and employees to be free from retaliation for reporting sexual abuse • Mechanisms available to inmates and staff for reporting sexual abuse • Dynamics of sexual abuse in detention • Common reaction of sexual abuse victims • Common signs indicating that sexual abuse may be occurring • Handling of disclosures of sexual abuse • The basis of HIV and AIDS and its transmission
STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND RAPE : Continue • Officer staffing and inmate supervision • Inmate orientation and education • Procedures for reporting of abuse • Availability of mental health counseling • Sex education • HIV and AIDS and Sexual Transmitted Illnesses awareness. • Inmate classification / screening / separation • Protection of vulnerable inmates through separation and close supervision by staff (transgender, feminine appearance, sexual orientation, youth, first time offenders) • Protection of inmates during transport (separation of different groups and use of security equipment e.g. cuffs)
STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND RAPE : Continue Detection and reporting: Immediate intervention by staff when inmate appears to be the target of sexual harassment or intimidation Refine procedures for allowing inmates to lodge complaints about sexual abuse – confidentiality Reporting of all allegations of sexual assault to National and Regional Offices Incidents of sexual assault to be captured and tracked separately from other types of assaults and incident reports
STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND RAPE : Continue Response: Attending to victim (take all allegations seriously, take victim to safe place, confidentiality, support victim, report incident, secure crime scene etc) Dealing with perpetrator (separation from victim, disciplinary / criminal action, counseling, educational programs etc) Medical care and forensic exam Investigation of incident Disciplinary action Monitoring: Establish data base on sexual violence including status of disciplinary and criminal processes and cases withdrawn with reasons
11. VETTING OF SECURITY OFFICIALS • Vetting plan for 2010/11 developed and in process of implementation. (Maximum staff and control room officials a priority) • Maximum staff will be given a secret security clearance and the confidential level will be upgraded • Creation of database in conjunction with Persal and NIA information on staff security clearance status
11.1 PROGRESS ON THE VETTING OF OFFICIALS 5 948 officials working in maximum Correctional Centres and Control Rooms identified as priority for vetting. Currently only 225 officials vetted: Confidential : 95 Secret : 128 Top Secret : 02 VETTING CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES Insufficient budget Accredited Service Provider not appointed yet Vetting component not yet fully staffed
12. STATE OF READINESS: 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP • DCS on all levels represented on Local Organizing Committee and National /Provincial JOINTS Committees and Administrative of Justice Steering Committee Meetings. • At each host city a Correctional Centre has been identified to deal with possible influx of ATD’s • DCS do not anticipate undue overflow from SAPS and crime is a crime which will be prosecuted with no special treatment • DCS is part of the general government plan which intends to process world cup related incidents within 24 hours which also includes deportation.
12.1 STATE OF READINESS: 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP : Continue • Contingency plan for world cup period developed with following focus areas: • Identification and preparation of centres for accommodation of inmates • Security staff deployment as per normal high risk periods (Operation Vala) • Strong focus on access control, limitation of unnecessary movement of inmates and strict supervision by managers • Restriction on leave taken by officials to ensure availability of sufficient staff • Emergency support teams placed on standby and state of readiness • Dog and mounted units in support of relevant centres
13. FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAMS Currently an interim structure in place consisting of 47 EST Units and 1 190 officials countrywide Functions of EST Units • response to emergencies specifically to riots/acts of orchestrated violence by inmates inside Correctional Centres • Escorting of high risk/profile inmates • Physical protection • Crisis /surprise searches of inmates and their cells Training • Assisted by SAPS and Defense Force in training of EST’s on basic aspects of emergency management such as tactical shooting, riot/crowd control, use of riot type equipment, cell extraction, fire fighting, first aid and transport of high risk inmates
13.1 FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAMS : Continue Establishment of new structure • One Unit per management area based on operational realities • EST Unit consist of a unit leader with two assistant leaders and thirty two operational officials Units to operate individually and collectively depending on the nature of the operations Training - medium to long term • Skills development framework , training curriculum , training material to be developed and implemented over the next two years • Negotiate with NIA for training of EST Officials on intelligence information gathering and management
13.2 Emergency Support Teams: Roles definedFunctions are the following: Escort Services Emergency Response Investigation Monitoring Emergency Support Team Info Collection & Analysis Physical protection Search and seizure
14. CHALLENGES • Improvement in case flow management • Overcrowding management • Vetting • Gang culture • Budget constraints • CJS review • Sophisticated crime syndicates • Measures to be taken to improve surveillance (CSIR Technology Project )
15. WAY FORWARD Continuous investment in the improvement of minimum security standards as it relates to : • Personnel measures • Technological measures • Information measures • Physical measures • Operational measures • Management supervision