1 / 20

Internet Economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement

Internet Economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement. Richard T.B. Ma Columbia University Dah-ming Chiu, John C.S. Lui The Chinese University of Hong Kong Vishal Misra, Dan Rubenstein Columbia University. Outline. Current Practices and Associated Problems Our approach

eshe
Download Presentation

Internet Economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Internet Economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement Richard T.B. Ma Columbia University Dah-ming Chiu, John C.S. Lui The Chinese University of Hong Kong Vishal Misra, Dan Rubenstein Columbia University

  2. Outline • Current Practices and Associated Problems • Our approach • A clean-slate multilateral settlement • Results • Implications • Future work and limitations

  3. What is an Internet Service Provider (ISP)? • The Internet is composed of Autonomous Systems (ASes). • An ISP is a business entity. • Might comprise multiple ASes. • Autonomous sub-network • Provide Internet access • Maximize profits ISP objective: maximize profits ISP routers customers

  4. Current ISP Business Practices Provider ISP Three levels of decisions • Interconnecting decision E • Routing decisions R (via BGP) • Bilateral financial settlements f Settlement faffects E, R Interconnection withdrawal provider charges, customer might want to save money Hot-potato Routing Customer/provider relationship Route change Peering relationship Source Destination Shortest Path Routing Customer ISP Customer ISP

  5. W = 1 An ideal case of the ISPs’ decisions Well-connected topology Fixed Revenue Backbone ISP 1 Local ISP 1 Local ISP 2 A simple example: Peering links at both coasts Locally connect to both backbone ISPs Two backbone ISPs Two local ISPs End-to-end service generates revenue Backbone ISP 2

  6. The Cost Model x2/4 • Assumptions • Routing costs on links, e.g. bandwidth capacity and maintenance. • Going across the country is more expensive. • More expensive when link is more congested. • Costs increase with link loads • Standard queueing theory results. • Capital investment for upgrades.

  7. W = 1 An ideal case of the ISPs’ decisions Global Min Cost Well-connected topology Minimized routing cost and maximized profit Fixed Revenue Cost|Profit Backbone ISP 1 x22/4 x12/16 x32/16 Local ISP 1 Local ISP 2 1/2 A simple example: Two backbone ISPs Two local ISPs End-to-end service generates revenue x42/8 x52/8 1/2 x62/16 x82/16 x72/4 Backbone ISP 2 We normalize the total required traffic intensity to be 1.

  8. Problems with the current practice Global Min Cost Topology Balkanization Well-connected topology Increased routing and reduced profit Minimized routing cost and maximized profit Cost|Profit x22/4 x12/16 x32/16 1/2 An example: Two backbone ISPs Two local ISPs End-to-end service generates revenue Routing costs on links, e.g. bandwidth and maintenance x42/8 x52/8 1/2 x62/16 x82/16 x72/4 Problem 1: ISPs interconnect selfishly to maximize profits! e.g. Backbone ISPs charge local ISPs.

  9. Problems with the current practice Global Min Cost Hot Potato Topology Balkanization Increased routing and reduced profit Cost|Profit Further profit reduction from routing inefficiency x22/4 x12/16 1/2 An example: Two backbone ISPs Two local ISPs End-to-end service generates revenue Routing costs on links, e.g. bandwidth and maintenance x42/8 x52/8 1/2 1 x82/16 x72/4 Problem 1: ISPs interconnect selfishly to maximize profits! Problem 2: ISPs route selfishly to maximize profits! e.g. upper backbone ISP wants to use hot-potato routing to reduce its routing cost.

  10. Problems summary: selfish interconnecting and routing Global Ideal case: cooperative ISPs ISPs selfishly interconnect ISPs selfishly route traffic

  11. Our solution: A clean-slate multilateral settlement $$$ j(E,R) $$ $$ Provider ISP Recall: three levels of decisions • Interconnecting decision E • Routing decisions R • Bilateral financial settlements f Multilateral financial settlements j jcollects revenue from customers jredistributes profits to ISPs E, R follow fromj Settlement faffects E, R Customer/provider relationship Peering relationship Customer ISP

  12. Our solution: A clean-slate multilateral settlement Each ISP’s local interconnecting and routing decisions. Given:j Local decisions:Ei,Ri Objective: to maximizeji(E,R) Ei Ri

  13. v( ) = 0.8125 D ( ) = v( ) = 0.625 D ( ) = v( ) - v( ) = 0.1875 v( ) = 0 v( ) = 0.625 v( ) - The Shapley value mechanism j Revenue Worth function v(S) on any subset of ISPs. Routing cost Profit: v(S) x22/4 Marginal contribution ISP i to set of ISPs S: Di(S). x12/16 x32/16 1/2 x42/8 x52/8 1 1/2 x62/16 x82/16 x72/4

  14. S(p, ) j( )=2.4/6=0.4 p D(S(p, )) v( )=0 v( )=0 Empty Empty v( )- v( )- v( )=0.2 v( )=0.6 v( )=0.8 v( )=0.8 v( )- v( )- The Shapley value mechanism j N: total # of ISPs, e.g. N=3 P: set of N! orderings S(p,i): set of ISPs in front of ISP i

  15. Results: incentive for optimal routing Hot Potato Global Min Cost Local Min Cost j Recall the inefficiency situation Cost|Profit x22/4 Shapley mechanism distributions profit x12/16 Profit maximized Profit increase 1/4 1/2 E.g. the upper ISP wants to minimize local routing cost x42/8 x52/8 1 3/4 1/2 Best strategy for all ISPs: global min cost routing x82/16 x72/4 ISPs route selfishly to maximize profits!

  16. Results: incentive for using optimal routes • Given any fix interconnecting topology, ISPs can locally decide routing strategies {Ri*} to maximize their profits. • Theorem (Incentive for routing): Any ISP i can maximize its profit ji by locally minimizing the global routing cost. • Implication: ISPs adapt to global min cost routes. • Corollary (Nash Equilibrium): Any global min cost routing decision is a Nash equilibrium for the set of all ISPs. • Implication: global min cost routes are stable. Surprising result: Selfish local behavior coincides with global optimal solution!

  17. Results: incentive for interconnecting Global Min Cost j Recall: the best strategy for all ISPs is to use global min cost routes. Cost|Profit x22/4 Profit increase x12/16 x32/16 E.g. the left local ISP connects to the low backbone ISP. 5/12 1/2 x42/8 x52/8 1/2 7/12 Further the right local ISP connects to the upper backbone ISP. x62/16 x82/16 x72/4 Profit increase ISPs interconnect selfishly to maximize profits!

  18. Results: incentive for interconnecting • For any topology, a global optimal route R* is used by all ISPs. ISPs can locally decide interconnecting strategies {Ei*} to maximize their profits. • Theorem (Incentive for interconnecting): By interconnecting, both ISPs have non-decreasing profits. • Implication: ISPs have incentive to interconnect. • Does not mean: All pairs of ISPs should be connected. • Redundant links might not reduce routing costs. • Sunk cost is not considered.

  19. Results: Summary Under bilateral settlements, ISPs interconnect and route selfishly j solves the selfish interconnecting problem ISPs have incentive to use optimal routes j j solves the selfish routing problem ISPs have incentive to interconnect j

  20. Future Work and Limitations • Computational Complexity • Information Structure • Limited information • Centralized mechanism versus distributed mechanism • Trust Issues

More Related