SR 530 Flooding and Mudslide – March 2014

1. SR 530 Flooding and Mudslide – March 2014 FirstNet initial consultation with the state of washington 16 October 2014

2. SR 530 Incident Overview • 10:37 a.m. March 22 a landslide impacted the North Fork of the Stillaguamish River, devastated the Steelhead Haven community and flooded adjacent properties and homes. • A debris dam locked the river and backed up water creating a “lake”. • 45 homes were impacted • 36 destroyed, 9 flooded • SR 530 was impassible and partially destroyed. • Fiber line was cut leaving no Internet, phones or 911 service to Darrington and areas near the slide.

3. Approximately 1 square mile covered up to a depth of 70 feet

4. Overview Continued • Daily deployment was nearly 1000 people! • 705 tactical Personnel are assigned (includes community volunteers and Nat’l Guard team members) • 139 Overhead Personnel, 19 FEMA IST personnel (not including 8 cache drivers), 13 Agency Liaison Officers • Includes: 2 Type 1 US&R Task Force, 6 National Guard SAR Teams, 3 Rescue Boats, 2 Helicopters, 6 HazMat units, 25 K-9 Search Teams, 2 Tech Rescue Teams, 4 Engines, 2 ALS Ambulances, 2 BLS Ambulances, 71 Heavy Equipment, 15 Law Enforcement, 2 National Guard FSR Teams, 2 National Guard Decon Teams, 1 CISM (15 Members) Team

5. Human Impact • 14 survivors were airlifted within hours of the disaster • 43 victims were reported as missing • All were found and identified • Hundreds of responders and community members continue to deal with the emotional and social impacts of the disaster

6. North Fork Stillaguamish River: • Slide blocked river channel & caused upstream flooding • River carved its own channel through slide debris • Steps taken to help search & recovery efforts: • Channel excavation to improve river flows • Temporary berm & pumps installed to remove water • Multi-agency Task Force will review short/long term options for river

7. Challenges • Multiple incidents in one • Search, rescue, flooding, mass casualty, mass fatality, evacuation, infrastructure failure, missing persons, mental health, volunteers, donations, etc… • Remote location with limited roadways • Depth and type of debris material • Weather • Public/media expectations • Wanted to know everything immediately • Didn’t comprehend the process or time involved

8. Communications Issues • Limited public communications with Darrington • Verizon Wireless was the only operational provider • Over the air TV reception not possible • Twitter and Facebook were primary media sources • County 800/VHF radio infrastructure worked perfectly • Cache radios used extensively but a limited resource • Icall/Itac and SERS talk groups used for debris field communications • Radio and data available through command vehicles • Data performance limited to overloaded Verizon 3G in Darrington

9. Future Solutions SERS already purchased cache of radios/chargers DEM completed portable repeater, expanded cache and is creating deployable portable VHF/UHF/800/Air band systems Command vehicles are getting new computer systems, better CAD access and radio improvements Several new CarryViewer aircraft video downlinks have been purchased Redundant/secure data would be helpful