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Soldier Survivabilty

MANPRINT . Soldier Survivabilty. For MANPRINT Workshop 4-6 February 2003. By Frank Woo U.S. Army Research Laboratory Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate Air and Missile Defense White Sands, New Mexico 88002 Voice: 505-678-7989 E-Mail: fwoo@ARL.ARMY.MIL.

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Soldier Survivabilty

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  1. MANPRINT Soldier Survivabilty For MANPRINT Workshop 4-6 February 2003 By Frank Woo U.S. Army Research Laboratory Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate Air and Missile Defense White Sands, New Mexico 88002 Voice: 505-678-7989 E-Mail: fwoo@ARL.ARMY.MIL

  2. Soldier Survivability (SSv) Domain Methodology Tools: Parameter Assessment List (PAL) Risk Assessment TOPIC COVERAGE

  3. Why? Defined 7th Domain of MANPRINT Soldier Survivability (SSv) Domain

  4. Why Soldier Survivability? VISIBILITY NATURE OF BATTLE TECHNOLOGY LIMITED VIS OPS INCREASED RANGES SOLDIER SURVIVABILITY MULTI-NAT’L EQUIPMENT BATTLE INJURIES SPEED OF BATTLE DETECTION LETHALITY JOINT OPS MANEUVERABILITY FRATRICIDE

  5. SOLDIER SURVIVABILITY THE 7TH DOMAIN OF MANPRINT SS HH M,P,T HFE SSv • SSv officially began 1 Oct 94 per AR 602-2 • DCSPER initiative • Prevent casualties through RDA rather than • adding survivability enhancements after fielding • Combat and peacetime incidents verify need • SLAD designated the domain assessor • HRED designated to provide methodology for • domain assessments

  6. SOLDIER SURVIVABILITY DEFINED • Reduce Fratricide • Reduce Detectability of the Soldier • Reduce Probability of Being Attacked • Prevent Damage • Minimize Injury • Reduce Physical and Mental Fatigue ARL-SLAD ARL-HRED

  7. Soldier Survivability Methodology

  8. SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS MISSION OFFENSE DEFENSE PEACE KEEPING COUNTER TERRORIST GROUND AIRBORNE AMPHIBIOUS LONG RANGE RECON SPECIAL FORCES MOBILITY NATURAL ENVIRONMENT WEATHER TEMPERATURE PRECIPITATION WIND SPEED SOLAR RADIATION VISIBILITY NIGHT/ILLUMINATION TERRAIN GRADE SURFACE CHARACTERISTICS VEGETATION ALTITUDE FLORA AND FAUNA WATER ENDEMIC DISEASES MILITARY ENVIRONMENT BLAST/OVERPRESSURE PROJECTILES FLAME/INCENDIARY DIRECTED ENERGY ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS OBSCURANTS NUCLEAR RADIATION BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL SOUND VIBRATION SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS PROTECTION CLOTHING EQUIPMENT WEAPONS* INTERCHANGEABILITY INTELLIGENCE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT ADEQUATE FORCES MAN/MACHINE INTERFACING PHYSIOLOGICAL FITNESS STATE HYDRATION STATE NUTRITIONAL STATE SLEEP DEBT STATUS THERMAL STATE FATIGUE STATE DEGRADATION FACTORS HUMAN FACTORS VISION PSYCHOLOGICAL MENTAL STATE MOTIVATION VIGILANCE PSYCHOMOTOR ISOLATION COMMUNICATION TRAINING CLAUSTROPHOBIA

  9. SYSTEM/SOLDIER SURVIVABILITY DON’T BE SEEN DON’T BE HIT DON’T BE ACQUIRED VISUAL SIGNATURE REDUCTION THERMAL SIGNATURE REDUCTION RADAR SIGNATURE REDUCTION ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE REDUCTION MULTI-SPECTRAL SMOKE MATERIALS OPTICS JAMMER IR JAMMER LASER JAMMER IR DECOY (FLARE) MULTI-SPECTRAL JAMMER RADAR JAMMER SHAPING COATINGS OPTICS JAMMER NBC SENSOR COUNTER-FIRE IR JAMMER PASSIVE ARMOR RADAR JAMMER LASER JAMMER REACTIVE ARMOR ACTIVE ARMOR SPALL- LINERS FIRE-SUPPRESSION COMPARTMENTS DON’T BE PENETRATED DON’T BE KILLED NBC

  10. SSv METHODOLOGY - 1 A Rating Tool Was Needed Because: New Domain Is Complex and Interdisciplinary. Multiple Agency Involvement Requires a Common Guidance and Consistency in Approach. Listing of Issues for Assessment Would Operationally Define the Domain, and Show its Differences from the Other Domains.

  11. SSv METHODOLOGY - 2 The Parameter Assessment List (PAL): 6 Components. 21 Subcomponents. 170 Issues for Rating. Ratings are Assigned Based Upon: - Probability of the Deficiency Occurring. - Magnitude of the Impact on the Soldier or the System. Report Sent to PM & HQDA MANPRINT

  12. Severity of Deficiency ISSUE To be Assessed By Required System Actual System Performance Does Not Apply Performance Critical Major Minor None System likely to be detected by threat forces because of its: i. Radio Frequency Signature? S 3 2 1 0 ( ) ii. Millimeter Wave Signature? S 3 2 1 0 ( ) iii. Combined Signature? S 3 2 1 0 ( ) iv. Optical Cross Section? S 3 2 1 0 ( ) SOLDIER SURVIVABILITY PARAMETER ASSESSMENT LIST COMPONENT II: REDUCE DETECTABILITY 1. Assess the system’s signature detectability

  13. PARAMETER ASSESSMENT LIST RATING PROCESS • Magnitude of Impact on Soldier or System. • Probability of Occurrence. Severity Rating Assigned Based On:

  14. PARAMETER ASSESSMENT LIST RATING PARAMETERS Bodily Injury: • Death: Self-Explanatory. • Life-Threatening: May Result in Loss of Life or Major Limb if Not Medically Treated Within 1 Hr. • Serious: May Result in Loss of Life or Major Limb if Not Medically Treated Within 24 Hrs. • Mild: May Result in Some Loss of Performance Capability if Not Medically Treated Within 24-72 Hrs. • Negligible: Medical Treatment is Optional, and is For Comfort and to Prevent Infection.

  15. PARAMETER ASSESSMENT LIST RATING PARAMETERS System Damage: (Damage to System Which May Cause Soldiers to be Injured Directly or Indirectly.) • Loss of System: Self-Explanatory. • Heavy: Considerable Loss of Capability. • Light: Reduced Capability. • Negligible: No Loss of Capability.

  16. PARAMETER ASSESSMENT LIST RATING PARAMETERS Probability of Occurrence: • Frequent: Likely to Occur Frequently. • Occasional: Likely to Occur Sometime in the Life of the System. • Remote: Unlikely But Possible to Occur in the Life of the System. • Improbable: So Unlikely, It Can Be Assumed It May Not Be Experienced. Note: This Category is Adapted From AR 40-10, Health Hazard Assessment Program in Support of the Army Materiel Acquisition Decision Process, 1 Oct 1991.

  17. PARAMETER ASSESSMENT LIST RATING PROCESS Severity Index Criteria Loss of System Major Minor

  18. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLGY

  19. RISK ASSESSEMENT METHODOLOGY • Provide a measure of expected system/soldier survivability. • Probability of Encounter (threat). • Confidence Level (method of analysis: theoretical, simulation, live fire tests). • Note: Adapted from ARL-TR 1045, Vulnerability Risk Assessment, US Army Research Laboratory/Survivability Lethality Analysis Directorate, June 2000.

  20. LETHALITY SURVIVABILITY System vs Natural Opn Env System vs EM (E3) Opn Env System vs DS Threat Spectrum System vs Spec Opns Forces System vs Info Wfr CMs Interceptor vs Target System vs Convention Weapons System vs Nuclear Weapons System vs Chem/Bio Weapons System vs Penaid CMs System vs Elct Wfr CMs Radar vs DS Threat Spectrum Radar vs Convention Weapons Radar vs Nuclear Weapons Radar vs Chem/Bio Weapons Radar vs Penaid CMs Radar vs Elct Wfr CMs Intcptr/Lchr vs DS Threat Spectrum Intcptr/Lchr vs Convention Weapons Intcptr/Lchr vs Nuclear Weapons Intcptr/Lchr vs Chem/Bio Weapons Intcptr/Lchr vs Penaid CMs Intcptr/Lchr vs Elct Wfr CMs BMC3 vs DS Threat Spectrum BMC3 vs Convention Weapons BMC3 vs Nuclear Weapons BMC3 vs Chem/Bio Weapons BMC3 vs Penaid CMs BMC3 vs Elct Wfr CMs Soldier System/SoldierSurvivability/Lethality Analysis Structure

  21. System Description/ Definition Technical Design - Critical Functions - Critical Components Tactical Operation - Critical Operations/TTPs Susceptibility Analysis [ Threat Effects ] Vulnerability Risk Assessment ORD: system rqmts Timeframe: - IOC - IOC + 10 Critical Issues PSUSCEPTIBLE: Magnitude / Severity of Effect Impact PSURVIVABLE = 1 - PVULNERABLE = 1 - PENCOUNTERPSUSCEPTIBLE Theoretical Analysis - Math Models Simulation Analysis - Digital (SW) - HWIL (HW) Test Data Analysis - Lab Test - Field Test STAR: threat capabilities Threat Description/ Definition Technical Design - Techniques/Effects - Devices/Sources Tactical Operation - Tactics/Feasibility PENCOUNTER: Likelihood of Effect Encounter Technical Parameters Tactical Probabilities - Offensive Threat - Def Sup Threat: Weapons & CMs - Operational Environments: Natural & Man-Made; Friend & Foe - Baseline (Existing) & Reactive (Projected) PENCOUNTER= PTARGET PATTACK PHIT (APPLICATION) PSUSCEPTIBLE= PKILL / HIT (APPLICATION) ClassicalSystem AnalysisMethodology

  22. Hazard Risk Assessment Code Risk Level Decision Authority I A-D II A-C III A High Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) I E II D III B-C IV A Medium Program Executive Officer (PEO) II E III D-E IV B-E Low Program Manager (PM) S e v e r i t y Catastrophic I H a z a r d Critical II Marginal III Negligible IV E D C B A Reasonably Probable Improbable Remote Occasional Frequent Hazard Probability Risk Analysis MatrixHealth & Safety Hazards> MIL-STD-882C <

  23. Threat Vulnerability Risk [Near-Term] Threat Effect Susceptibility [ Magnitude / Severity of Threat Effect Impact ] Very Low No Concern [Accept Risk] Low Minimal Concern [Investigate Options] Medium Minor Issue [Provide Options] High Major Issue [Remedy ASAP] Very High Critical Issue [Remedy Immediately] Confidence: Vuln Risk L M H 100 Very High Catastrophic / Extreme CRITICAL H Conf: Susc M 90 L High Extensive / Significant MAJOR L M H Confidence: Probability 60 [ Confidence ]: H: adequate analysis/data M: marginal analysis/data L: inadequate analysis/data Medium Moderate MARGINAL 40 Low Limited / Insignificant MINOR 10 Very Low Minimal / None NEGLIGIBLE 0 0 10 40 60 90 100 Very Low VERY UNLIKELY or Improbable Low UNLIKELY but Possible Medium UNCERTAIN but Possible High LIKELY and Probable Very High VERY LIKELY or Certain Threat Probability [ Likelihood of Occurrence / Encounter / Attack ] Vulnerability RiskAssessment Matrix(SAMPLE)

  24. Threat Vulnerability Risk [Near-Term] Threat Effect Susceptibility [ Magnitude / Severity of Threat Effect Impact ] Confidence: Vuln Risk Very Low No Concern [Accept Risk] Low Minimal Concern [Investigate Options] Medium Minor Issue [Provide Options] High Major Issue [Remedy ASAP] Very High Critical Issue [Remedy Immediately] L M H 100 5,12 1-4 H Very High Catastrophic / Extreme CRITICAL Conf: Susc [12] GBE,S: SOF [15] GBE,S: Mult Thrt Atk (Sim/Seq) [1] R: Radar ARM 11,15 6-10 13,14 M 90 L [2] GBE,S:ConvWpn [4] IFI: Nuc Wpn [8] R,I,B: PCMComb High Extensive / Significant MAJOR L M H [7] R,I: PCM (Dec) [11] BM: IW CM Confidence: Prob of Encounter 60 [ Confidence ]: H: adequate analysis/data M: marginal analysis/data L: inadequate analysis/data Medium Moderate MARGINAL [5] GBE,S: C/B Wpn [10] R: EW CM (SL) [3] GBE,S: NucWpn [6] R,I: PCM (Den) [9] R: EW CM (ML) 40 Low Limited / Insignificant MINOR [13] GBE,S:EM Env [14] GBE,S:Nat Env 10 Very Low Minimal / None NEGLIGIBLE 0 0 10 40 60 80 100 Very Low VERY UNLIKELY or Improbable Low UNLIKELY but Possible Medium UNCERTAIN but Possible High LIKELY and Probable Very High VERY LIKELY or Certain Threat Probability [ Likelihood of Occurrence / Encounter / Attack ] System/Soldier SurvivabilityDefense Suppression Threat Spectrum(SAMPLE)

  25. SUMMARY • SSv Domain Now 9 Years in Existence. • SSv is About Successful Operation of Equipment and an Individual’s Continued Ability to Live in a Battlefield Environment. • SSv Domain Now Recognized Within U.S. Army Acquisition, and by Outside Organizations.

  26. Back up slides

  27. Definition Survivability - the capability of a system and crew to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environment without suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. {DoD Regulation 5000.2-R}

  28. Habitability (HAB) • Defined as the acceptability of conditions on-board a ship or vessel in terms of vibration, noise, indoor climate, lighting conditions, physical and spatial characteristics. • Affects human performance by increasing physical and mental fatigue. • Increase in human errors.

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