Stability, Security and Development GP3200 May 21, 2012 Social Well-Being Dr Robert E. Looney email@example.com
Outline • Social Well Being • Humanitarian Assistance • Iraq Case Study – Development at the Local Level • Internal Migration • Development Strategy • U.S. Aid • CERP • Some Final Guidelines/Advice
Humanitarian Assistance Overview • Overview • Humanitarian assistance is provided to save lives and alleviate suffering caused by conflict or other human-made or natural disasters • Provided by national governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, foreign governments, and militaries and combatant groups • Some groups provide assistance for purely altruistic or humanitarian reasons: others may provide aid to attain political goals • If the host government is incapable of responding to needs and if security concerns limit what civilian assistance providers can do, military personnel often called upon to help • Even when civilians are actively involved, military personnel may play a supporting role in helping ensure that assistance is provided effectively • The commander has a moral and legal obligation to the civilian population in his or her area of responsibility (AOR) • Understanding the humanitarian situation and who is taking what action with regard to it is also critical to SA.
Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems I • 1. Getting relief to victims can be hard • Civilian international relief agencies have become adept at determining requirements needed after a disaster • Many agencies have substantial stockpiles ready for an emergency • However transportation and distribution remain major challenges • People may live in remote areas with poor transport links – conflict has often destroyed what networks existed • The roads that exist may be controlled byu insurgents or criminals or be mined • Local police, customs officers, government officials, and militias may demand payments to facilitate free movement of relief supplies or individuals working for humanitarian relief organizations
Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems II • 2. Refugee camps can make conflict worse • In many countries refugee camps fell under control of insurgents who • abused residents, controlled supplies, and used the camps as recruiting grounds and bases for insurgent attacks against the host-nation government • 3. Humanitarian assistance is used as a political and security tool • Both armed groups party to the conflict (such as insurgents) and peace-keepers often provide assistance in part to gain the support of local population • In the aftermath of its 2006 conflict with Israel, Hezbollah played a lead role in reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, including one year’s rent to affected families • U.S. military units also provide assistance, both to meet needs and to gain public support • However provision of assistance in a discriminatory fashion violates U.S. government policy, international humanitarian guidelines and international law • It can also perpetuate inequalities and foster discontent/conflict
Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems III • 4. Ineffective host government responses to disasters may foster support for an insurgency • In an insurgency the support of the local population is the ultimate objective of each party • If armed groups opposed to the government visibly do a better job of responding to a disaster than the government • Public support for the government weakens • The position of the insurgents strengthens • On the other hand, security forces that support the local government will strengthen the government’s position if they effectively provide humanitarian assistance • Combatants may compete with one another to provide assistance even as they engage in combat • Although U.S. government guidance for humanitarian assistance requires that aid be given to those who need it, U.S. forces may be seen both aid recipients and other assistance providers as having a political as well as humanitarian purpose.
Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks I • Key Tasks for the host government, civilian assistance agencies and NGOs include: • Determine what needs to be done and coordinate efforts • Help displaced people survive and eventually resettle • Distribute relief • Make sure that relief supports, not undermines, longer- term development goals • 1. Determine what needs to be Done • If the host government is able to function, its primary task is to work with relief agencies to determine what needs to be done and to coordinate the relief efforts offered by other countries and agencies • If it is incapable of coordinating this effort, and international organization like the UN may take on this role • The host government and its agencies may be the only institutions that have detailed information on the situation – host government is responsible for transferring this information to assistance providers.
Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks II • 2. Help Displaced People Survive and Eventually Resettle • If large numbers of people flee, host government should provide or help identify safe locations for shelter • If camps are needed, host government or assistance providers should help set them up • The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has the most expertise in the area. • Organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) may also be involved • Who does what will be a senior policy-level decision, but military leaders at operational and tactical level should be prepared to help their civilian counterparts involved in these efforts • by providing security and • in some cases transportation or other logistical support
Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks III • 2. Survival/Resettlement (contd.) • Security is a key concern • If displacement lasts more than a brief period, schools will also be needed in addition to assistance with earning money • In cases where the displaced are not living in camps or other temporary shelters, such assistance can be provided as part of development assistance to the broader community • In these cases, important to make sure that the needs of the displaced are neither ignored nor appear to take precedence over the needs of the long-term population • The displaced can also be employed in short-term jobs in construction and the clinics and schools for their communities. • If the displaced cannot return home quickly it is usually better thaytthey be integrated into the surrounding community, rather than housed in temporary shelters such as camps
Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks IV • 2. Survival/Resettlement (contd.) • Camps are often recruiting grounds for insurgents who may take over the camp and monopolize its resources • Programs to assist refugees and the internally displaced need to be designed so that they do not perpetuate or reignite the conflict • Ethnic cleansing, continued violence and the ability the ability to enforce property rights will affect what is possible • Donors and the host government should design programs to help the displaced return home or find new permanent homes • They can also provide cash grants or vouchers to pay for travel, seeds, and tools to help people resume their livelihoods. • Donors and the host government may have to work with local governments and leaders to integrate the displaced into new communities which may not be fully welcoming.
Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks V • 3 Distribute Relief • Host government should permit humanitarian assistance to be given to anyone who needs it. • According to international law, neither it nor the foreign providers of assistance can deny or use aid to punish or reward particular groups • This principle of neutrality protects (albeit not fully) relief agencies that operate in conflict zones from being seen as aligned with combatants and targeted. • Relief supplies can be an especially valuable commodity during disasters and can be used for personal gain or as leverage to induce desired behavior • Used to be wide spread use of religious groups to distribute assistance. Practice had to be abandoned because cases of aid only going to that religious denomination or people being forced to join a religious group • Cases of organizations ordering more supplies than needed in order to sell the surplus • Militias and other armed groups can also use aid to fund their operations • One of major sources of revenue for militias in Somalia is providing protection for aid delivery or diverting the aid.
Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks VI • 4. Make sure relief supports, not undermines, longer-term development goals • Many relief activities have longer term impacts • Newly constructed infrastructure often becomes permanent after the crisis subsides • Seeds and other agricultural support provided to meet needs will affect what farmers grow • How the displaced are or are not reintegrated in a given area or assisted to return will help define the future economy of to the their place of refuge and the area they fled • Host government should consult with agencies that are providing relief to ensure that the aid provided is positioned to best support the future development of the country • Care should also be taken to protect against thepotential negative effects of food aid on local agriculture • Food aid, particularly arriving late in a humanitarian crisis may serve to drive down prices of local crops hurting farmers and providing disincentives for future production
Potential Army Tasks • In a situation where humanitarian assistance needs to be provided the Army can expect to be involved in the following tasks: • Provide immediate relief and supply management, logistical, and transport support to assist the delivery of relief if civilian groups are incapable of doing so • Coordinate with other groups • Provide security for the population at risk • Protect roads, ports, airports warehouses, relief personnel and critical infrastructure • Provide technical assistance and training
Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study I • Small water purification in Iraq • Working in consultation with the local PRT, a brigade combat team installed a number of small water purification units throughout Dhi Qar province in Iraq • These successfully reduced water-borne illnesses and infant mortality • However to keep the units running, trained technicians, replacement parts, and coordination with the Iraqi government would be necessary • The BCT worked with the PRT to hand off the project to them • The PRT then worked to staff the units with technicians and link them into the Iraqi government supply system • Coordination and effective assignment of tasks and resources resulted in a successful project
Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study II • Necessity of civilian guidance in relief operations • As increasing numbers of Iraqis have been displaced, U.S. commanders have often known what their tasks should be to respond to the problem • The absence of clear U.S. government guidance led units to do what they could, when they could • They provided water, temporary shelter etc to people forced from their homes because of combat operations • Reportedly some U.S. military units tried to prevent Iraqis from fleeing their homes • The first of these acts is appropriate; the second is not. Under international law, people have the right to flee violence or other crisis, and should not be prevented from doing so • Over time cooperation between senior military personnel and USAID improved efforts by providing more oversight and guidance, although uncertainties remained.
Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study IIIa • Providing security for humanitarian assistance in Somalia • The initial mission of the UN security force in Somalia was to help ensure that humanitarian aid could be provided to over 1.5 million people at immediate risk of starvation in the wake of war and drought. • Warlords were attacking humanitarian convoys and supply ships, seizing supplies and controlling their distribution. • Supplies were not getting through to camps for Somalis who had fled the fighting and drought • The initial military mission under UN mandate, Unified Task Force (UNITAF), was successful • UNITAF protected humanitarian convoys, distribution centers, ports and airports. Key facilities were secured • UNITAF troops built and repaired roads and bridges, dug wells, and set up hospitals • Aid began to flow throughout the country preventing widespread starvation
Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study IIIb • Somalia (contd.) • The presence of the U.S. contingent at the head of UNITAF was especially important in convincing warlords to stop attacking aid deliveries and facilities. • This security assistance saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people • The mission ran into trouble when the objectives expanded to bring warlords to heel and create a single national government while dramatically reducing U.S. forces. • The subsequent mismatch between resources and goals resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. military forces and eventually all UN forces as well • Somalia lapsed back into conflict
Iraq Case Study • Stabilization and Development at the Local Level
Iraq: Internal Migration I • Iraq 2007-08 • 1.4 million refugees • Tend to migrate to areas where they have family or friends and the environment is considered safer -- typically an area with homogenous sectarian composition. • Northern Iraq • Northern provinces outside Kurdistan are multi-sectarian melting pots that have complex patterns of migration. In Kirkuk, the situation is unstable. • Sunni areas • Many Sunnis from dangerous multi-sectarian communities, who cannot afford to travel abroad, have relocated to predominately Sunni provinces such as Al-Anbar and Salahuddin. Many non-Sunnis have left these provinces.
Internal Migration II • Central/Southern Provinces • Large numbers of Shia left Baghdad for the nine predominately Shia provinces of central and Southern Iraq • The majority will seek to settle in new areas • Baghdad • The number of displaced persons inside Baghdad has doubled since February 2006 • Eighty-five percent of these migrants have relocated from one part of the city to another • 72% are Shia Arabs • 99% feel they are safer since they moved to neighborhoods controlled by their sectarian bloc
Internal Migration III • Within Iraq, displaced persons strain local economies by: • Inflating rents, and prices of food and commodities • Reducing local access to jobs, healthcare and fuel • Several of the more stable governorates now restrict entry or are closed to migrants • Karbala now requires that new residents have family in the local area that will formally sponsor them
Displacement and Trauma • Displacement has taken a long run toll on the energy and mental health of many Iraqis. Of those displaced: • 77% reported being affected by air bombardments and shelling or rocket attacks. • 80% were witness to a shooting. • 68% were interrogated or harassed by militias or other groups with threats to their lives. • 22% had been beaten by militias or other groups. • 23% had been kidnapped • 72% had been eye witness to a car bombing • 75% knew someone close to them who had been killed or murdered.
Elements of Development Strategy I • The Counterinsurgency Field Manuel recommends a strategy that relies on first restoring essential services, then promoting economic development • Essential services • Should be restored immediately regardless of the security situation • These include: police; fire protection; water; electricity; schools; transportation networks; medical aid; sanitation; food supply, fuels and basic financial services • Economic Development = programs to improve living standards • Includes: job creation; local investment; clarifying property ownership and resolving conflicts; protecting property rights; creating markets, and providing vocational training.
Elements of Development Strategy II • The distinction between essential services and economic development is one of timing • Restoration of services must begin immediately. • Economic development must often wait until security is restored. • As a general rule, at the present time, economic development should be the focus in peaceful regions such as Sahul, Irbil, Sulaimaniya, Qadisya, Misan and Muthanna • Essential services are more important in the unstable areas of Ninevah, Baghdad, Babil, and Kirkuk and Basra.
Elements of Development Strategy III • The key is to demonstrate that programs are bringing prosperity to the average Iraqi • Where possible, focus on economic development projects that have a quick pay-off and create as many winners as possible who have a stake in the future • Effectiveness is more important than efficiency • More efficient, integrated state-of-the-art systems, like a national electricity grid, are fragile and vulnerable to the insurgency • More robust systems, like community generators, are equally effective and much less vulnerable
Elements of a Localized Strategy I • The security situation dictates the role of government in the economy • Active government substitutes for the lack of markets • Government focus should be on establishing an institutional framework that will allow markets to develop and grow • The security situation and shrinking budgets also dictate strategy • The first priority is to use aid-related funds as a tool to bring about stability, not long- or medium-term growth. • This implies a bottom-up approach, rather than the traditional top-down strategy
Elements of a Localized Strategy II • To begin generating development at the local level, it is critical to address the way projects, programs and policies impact and interact with: • The informal/shadow economy, • social capital formation • Insurgency/criminal gangs. • The object of policy is to create positive linkages and feed-back loops between these elements and the economy so as to create virtuous circles of growth and development capable of offsetting the negative forces at play.
Bottom-Up Development Strategy • A bottom-up orientation that focuses on the local population is best for addressing Iraq's shadow economy, social capital deterioration and criminal/insurgent gangs • Instead of a simple free market strategy, opt for an "evolutionary" development strategy that begins by focusing on a limited number of critical development constraints • Use trial and error at the local level to find out what works before making major commitments of funds and personnel • Build on established institutions and traditions to prevent further economic disruption and social capital deterioration • Sequence activities to generate a virtuous circle so that local Iraqis become winners invested in advancing the reform process
Implications for Local Projects • The following general actions are useful at the provincial and regional levels: • Improve essential services like electricity, water, fuel , sewage, focusing on robust, easily maintained technologies • Encourage labor-intensive employment opportunities in agriculture and small business • Employ local labor to improve the quality of transportation and infrastructure, i.e., phone system, roads, bridges, pipelines • To reach those who would otherwise be locked out of the economy introduce: • Microfinance • Vocational training • Establish more efficient provincial government and institutions
Vocational Training I • Vocational training is another key program at the local level • It enables localities to draw on their strengths and put under-utilized resources to use • It helps solve the shortage of skilled labor, which surveys suggest is a major concern of private businesses in Iraq. • Key elements of a setting up a vocational training program include: • Determining locally needed skills and desired qualifications • Choosing a school site, keeping in mind that vocational training sites are an insurgency target • Securing buildings and conceal students’/instructors’ identities
Vocational Training II • Other key elements of a setting up a vocational training program: • Training the trainer • Balance language versus technical skills • Consider team teaching or sending an Iraqi translator to school • Selecting the students can be the most difficult challenge • Be sensitive to ethnic and gender considerations • Consider paying students for their participation or charging tuition to raise their stake in the outcome • Remember that subsidies are required to cover travel and living expenses • Set up a service to place the students in appropriate jobs
Microfinance Institutions (MFI) • Microfinance institutions are a key component of bottom-up development • Microfinance puts basic financial services within reach of the poor • It provides small loans, typically for working capital • By assessing small amounts of credit at reasonable interest rates, it gives people the opportunity to set up small businesses • Based on informal appraisal of borrowers and investments, it makes capital available to those who would be turned down by conventional banks • Records show that poor people are a good risk, with higher repayment rates than conventional borrowers
Microfinance in Iraq I • Currently in Iraq there are 5 MFIs: • Three are run by international NGOs and two by domestic NGOs • Together, they have twenty-six branch offices in fifteen provinces, with four more branches being organized • Outstanding as of 2007: • 19,019 loans totaling $26,765,000 total loan value • Average loan size $1,407 • Since their establishment, MFIs have made 52,768 loans with a total value of $109,471,000. • Less than 1% of MFI loans are delinquent 30 days or greater. • This success rate is the result of careful selection of potential borrowers and proper loan management • Additional grants to start up microcredit financial institutions are an excellent investment in both economic development and Iraqi goodwill
Microfinance in Iraq II • Microfinance is an indirect conflict resolution tool. • Microfinance works best for poverty reduction but is also an efficient job creator. • Micro-loans create about one and a half direct new permanent jobs per every $2,000 loaned to small businesses • These small businesses tend to provide essential goods and services that have stable demand over time (e.g. localized clothiers, small electronic retailers, grocers, etc.). • Military support of MFI should be invisible • The greatest challenge is hiring and training quality MFI staff
U.S. Funding for Reconstruction • Since 2003 the U.S. has appropriated $52.27 billion for Iraqi reconstruction efforts. 89% of these appropriations are accounted for by: • The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) – $20.86 billion • Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) – $18.04 billion • Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) -- $3.63b • Economic Support Fund (ESF) -- $4.18billion • As of June 30, 2009 more than 42.59 billion had been expended. • Nearly $3.54 billion remains available to be obligated • $8.22 is unexpended • The preponderance of unexpended U.S. funds is in the ISFF, which supports Iraq’s military and police forces.
Assessing U.S. Aid Programs in Iraq • While immense efforts were made between 2001 and 2008, with much local success, many problems still remain: • Only limited measures of effectiveness have been developed • SIGIR has documented immense waste and corruption • There are serious shortfalls in qualified aid, PRT and EPRT personnel • There are still issues surrounding the plans for transferring projects to the Iraqi government for management and funding
CERP I • The Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables commanders to respond to urgent requests for humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance • Under MNC-I 092, commanders are directed to use CERP funds to focus on projects that will employ substantial numbers of Iraqi workers. • CERP funds can be used for goods or services, as long as the best effort is made to identify/employ local Iraqi firms. • All projects must be coordinated with local Iraqi governorate and regional coordinators, civil affairs elements, and provincial reconstruction teams.
CERP II • Since FY04, $3.63 billion in CERP funds have been allocated to Iraq. These funds have been used for: • Emergency repair of critical facilities • Critical infrastructure shortfalls that could be rapidly resolved • Projects to reduce the risk of injury to the local populace • Procurement of critical equipment to replace lost, stolen, and non-repairable items or to establish critical community essential services • Rapid reconstruction following combat operations • As of June 30, 2009 $3.41 billion (94%) had been obligated and $3.19 billion had been expended
CERP III • Projects are chosen on the basis of: • How quickly they can be executed • How many Iraqis can be employed • How many Iraqis will benefit • How visible the project is • Approval levels • MNC-I CG: Projects requiring over $500K • Division CG: Projects requiring less than $500K • Brigade/Lower: At the discretion of the Division CG • Projects exceeding $200K must be contracted by warranted contracting officer
CERP Project Selection • How CERP projects are selected: • Commanders, in coordination with Iraqi government officials, agencies and other staff, identify projects to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs • Units examine the proposed project, developing a statement of work or a project proposal that • Describes what project is and what it will do • Identifies the estimated cost of the project based upon similar projects and other supporting information • Units provide information to the CERP Project Manager to identify it as a planned project
Authorized CERP Projects I • Here are some examples of the range of CERP projects authorized in Iraq: • Water and sanitation • Food production and distribution • Electricity • Healthcare • Education • Telecommunications • Economic, financial and management improvements • Transportation • Rule of law and governance
CERP Authorized Projects II • Range of CERP projects authorized in Iraq (contd) • Irrigation • Civic cleanup activities • Civic support vehicles • Repair of civic and cultural facilities • Repair of damage • Condolence payments • Payment to individuals upon release from detention • Protective measures • Other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects • Micro-grants