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Cyber Adversary Characterization . Know thy enemy!. Introduction and Background. Cyber Adversary Characterization workshop in 2002 Research discussions continued via email Briefings to Blackhat and Defcon to introduce concept and obtain feedback Future workshops planned for October 2003

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introduction and background
Introduction and Background
  • Cyber Adversary Characterization workshop in 2002
  • Research discussions continued via email
  • Briefings to Blackhat and Defcon to introduce concept and obtain feedback
  • Future workshops planned for October 2003
  • Slides will be on both conference web sites
why characterize
Why characterize?
  • Theoretical: To gain understanding of and an ability to anticipate an adversary in order to build improved threat models.
  • Practice: Improved profiling of attackers at post attack and forensic levels.
point scoring why
Point Scoring: Why?
  • No “standard” system to help rate the attacker
  • No system to help with the threat level
  • Help management in the decision making process
point scoring the categories
Point Scoring: The Categories
  • Passive Fingerprinting
  • Intelligence
  • The Attack
  • The Exploit
  • Backdoors | Cover up
  • Other
point scoring past present future
Point Scoring: Past, Present, Future
  • Originally posted on
  • Currently on rev2
  • Soon to release rev 3
tool characterizations disclosure patterns and technique scoring

Tool characterizations, Disclosure Patterns and Technique scoring.

Tom Parker – Pentest Limited (UK)

the hacker pie
The Hacker Pie
  • Representative of characterization metrics which build the final characterization.
  • Available elements dependant upon scenario.
  • Does not rely solely upon IDS/attack signature data.
the hacker pie continued
The Hacker Pie (continued)
  • Pie reliant upon the results of multiple metrics which are, in many cases inter-related, strengthening the likelihood of an accurate characterization.
  • Relationships between key metrics and key data enable accurate assumptions to be made regarding unobserved key information.
the pie explained
The Pie Explained






Metric One

Metric Two

Metric Three

Metric Four

Key Data

Key Data

Key Data

Key Data

Key Data

point scoring systems continued
Point Scoring Systems (Continued)
  • Attempt to characterize an adversary based on attack information captured from the wild.
  • Attempt to characterize adversary based upon “technique classification model”
  • Attempt to characterize adversary based upon “tool classification model”
tool classification model
Tool classification model
  • Availability of application
  • Origins of application
  • Ease of use
    • Requires in-depth knowledge of vulnerability to execute?
    • Other mitigating factors
disclosure food chain characterization
Disclosure Food Chain Characterization
  • All tools have a story
  • Often years before dissemination into public domain.
  • Social demeanour often key to placing in disclosure disclosure chain.
  • “Pyramid” metric.
2 approaches to modeling the cyber adversary offender profiling remote assessment

2 Approaches to Modeling the Cyber Adversary: Offender Profiling & Remote Assessment

Dr. Eric D. Shaw

Consulting & Clinical Psychology, Ltd.

[email protected]

offender profiling
Offender Profiling
  • Roots in Law enforcement & intelligence community (criminal event or incident analysis)—intensive review of past offenders
  • Insider Computer Crimes, 1998-present
    • 50 cases
    • 10 in-depth case studies from companies or gov’t. contractors
  • Products
    • Typology of actors: motivation, psychological characteristics, actions
    • Critical pathway—process of interactions w/environment (personal and professional) leading to attack
    • At-risk characteristics
    • Organizational vulnerabilities & Insights into prevention, deterrence, detection, management
offender profiling headlines
Offender Profiling Headlines
  • The Termination Problem
  • Actor subtypes—the Proprietor & Hacker
  • The Tracking Problem
  • Organizational Vulnerabilities
  • Detection Issues
  • Intervention Challenges
  • Hacker Overview
attacks the termination problem
Attacks: The Termination Problem
  • Simple termination of Disgruntled Insider is not theanswer—80% attack after termination (4 hours-2 months)
  • 70% attack from remote locations vs. inside—termination did not impact access
  • Attack types:
    • DOS to disrupt business
    • Destruction & corruption of data
    • Theft of Proprietary data
    • Time bombs
    • Extortion
    • Attack on reputations
  • Hackers—40%: affiliated with and active in hacking community, brings hacking practices to worksite
  • Proprietors—40%: defend system as belonging to them, resist efforts to dilute control
  • Avengers—20%: attack impulsively in response to perceived injustice
prevention screening selection
Prevention: Screening & Selection

The Tracking Problem

  • Screening & Selection Problems in 60% of cases—no or delayed background, nepotism, failure to detect risk factors
  • 30% had prior felony convictions
  • 30% had high-profile hacker activity
organizational issues
Organizational Issues
  • 80% of cases occur during periods of high organizational stress or change at the highest to supervisory levels
  • Lack of policies contributed to disgruntlement or facilitated attack in 60% of cases
  • Lack of policy enforcement contributed to disgruntlement of facilitated attack in 70% of cases
detection problems
Detection Problems
  • 80% of attackers used operational security to protect attack planning or identity
  • Time disgruntled to attack: 1-48 months with a mean of 11.3 months
  • Time active problems (probation) to attack: 0-76 weeks with a mean of 26 weeks

Forget the “big bang” theory of the sudden, unforeseen attack

intervention problems
Intervention Problems
  • Management intervention initially exacerbated problems in 80% of cases (ignore, placate or tolerate problems, negotiate then cut-off, terminate poorly)
  • Problems with termination process in 80% of cases (esp. failure to terminate access)
  • Multidisciplinary risk assessment prior to termination
why use warmtouch software to detect disgruntlement or psych change on line
Why Use WarmTouch Software to Detect Disgruntlement or Psych Change on-line?
  • Communication has moved on-line
  • Loss of visual & auditory cues on-line
  • Failure of other systems to detect violations: technical noise, supervisor & peer reporting
  • Protects Privacy
  • Provides Objectivity
person situation interaction detect psychological leakage








Person-Situation Interaction:Detect Psychological “Leakage”

Personal Stressors

MountingStress and Frustration

Professional Stressors

software components
“Software” Components
  • Psychological Profiling Algorithms
    • Emphasis on measuring emotional state
      • Anger
      • Anxiety
      • Depression
    • Changes in emotional state from baseline
  • Psychological characteristics: decision-making and personal relations
    • Loner/team player
    • plans/reacts
    • Rigid/flexible
    • Sensitivity to environment
  • Alert Phrases-key words
    • Threats
    • Victimization
    • Employment Problems
  • Communication Characteristics
    • To, From, Time, Length, etc.
warmtouch software overview
WarmTouch “Software” Overview
  • WarmTouch origins in IC, 1986-present
  • Use of WarmTouch with Insider Communications
    • Khanna at Bank
    • Threat Monitoring
    • Sting operations & negotiations
    • Suspect identification
    • Hanssen
  • Other WarmTouch Applications
case example financial proprietor
Case Example: Financial Proprietor
  • Well paid systems administrator
  • Personality Traits-Proprietor
    • Entitlement
    • Manipulative
    • Devaluing of others
    • Padded OT
  • Context: Supervisor Change
email from boss
Email from Boss
  • Asked to train back-up
  • “You seem to have developed a personal attachment to the System Servers. These servers and the entire system belong to this institution not to you…”
email 1 april
Email 1: April
  • (Asked to train his back-up, subject refuses) “His experience was ZERO. He does not know ANYTHING about ...our reporting tools.”
  • “Until you fireme or I quit, I have to take orders from you…Until he is a trained expert, I won’t give him access...If you order me to give him root access, then you have to permanently relieveme of my duties on that machine. I can’t be a garbage cleaner if someone screws up….I won’t compromise on that.”
email 3 july
Email 3: July
  • “Whether or not you continue me here after next month (consulting, full-time, or part-time), you can always count on me for quick response to any questions, concerns, or production problems with the system. As always, you’ll always get the most cost-effective, and productive solution from me.”
email 4 july
Email 4: July
  • “I would be honored to work until last week of August.”
  • “As John may have told you, there are a lot of things which at times get “flaky” with the system front-end and back-end. Two week extension won’t be enough time for me to look into everything for such a critical and complex system.”
  • “Thanks for all your trust in me.”
the event
The Event
  • On last day of work, subject disables the computer network’s two fileservers.
  • Company executives implore subject to help them fix the problems, but he refuses.
  • Independent consulting firm hired to investigate problems, discovers sabotage.
  • Timing: deception to cover plotting.
warmtouch challenge
WarmTouch Challenge
  • Detect deterioration in relationship with supervisor
  • Detect Deception
covert vs overt hostility in email prior to attack
Overt Hostility

Covert Hostility

Covert vs. Overt Hostility in Email Prior to Attack


Three Months


Two Months


Two Weeks


zezev vs bloomberg managing his psychological state
Zezev vs. Bloomberg: Managing his Psychological State
  • Task: to lure him to London for the bust
    • must manage his anger and anxiety at delays and manipulations
    • satisfy his dependency—need for $ & job
  • Warmtouch help:
    • Objectively highlight and help manage psychological states
    • Objectively measure success
robert hanssen
Robert Hanssen
  • 8 Communications with Soviet Handlers
  • Between October 1985 & November 2000
  • Challenge for Software:
    • Detect signs of emotional stress associated with spying, disgruntlement and “affair” as documented in public records
other warmtouch applications
Other WarmTouch Applications
  • Communications Manager
    • Analyze state of relationship
    • Assess characteristics of persons in relationship
    • Help modify language to improve/modify relationship
    • Track success/changes over time
  • Media Monitoring
    • Attitude of Egyptian press toward U.S.
    • Attitude of customers toward product or service
internet threat actors

Internet Threat Actors

Marcus H. Sachs

Director, Internet Storm Center

The SANS Institute

The Cyber Threat to the United States
  • US national information networks have become more vulnerable—and therefore more attractive as a target
  • Growing connectivity among secure and insecure networks creates new opportunities for unauthorized intrusions into sensitive or proprietary computer systems
  • The complexity of computer networks is growing faster than the ability to understand and protect them
  • The prospects for a cascade of failures across US infrastructures are largely unknown
Cyber Threats to the Critical Infrastructure
  • Hacker/Script Kiddies/Hobbyist
  • Disgruntled Employee
  • Insider aiding others
  • Hacktivist
  • Industrial Espionage
  • Foreign Espionage
  • Terrorist
  • State Sponsored Attack
The Threat is Increasing



State Sponsored










Probability of occurrence

Low High

Source: 1997 DSB Summer Study

Why are we so Vulnerable?
  • Internet was not built to be secure
  • “Secure” (i.e., obscure) software being replaced by commercial products in infrastructures
  • Software development focused on “Slick, Stable, Simple” (not “Secure”)
  • System administrators lack training
  • Leaders rarely see computer security as part of the “bottom line”
  • User awareness is low
Why The Feds are Concerned About Hackers
  • The real threat to the Critical Infrastructure is not the hacker, but the structured state-sponsored organization
  • However...
    • Sometimes it’s hard to tell the difference - both use the same tools
    • Growing sophistication and availability of tools increases concern
    • Must assume the worst until proven wrong
  • So...
    • The government takes seriously all unauthorized activity
    • They will use all technical and law enforcement tools to respond ... and deter
    • They will seek legal prosecution where appropriate
New Homeland Security Strategies

national strategy to secure cyberspace
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
  • Nation fully dependent on cyberspace
  • Range of threats: script kiddies to nation states
  • Fix vulnerabilities, don’t orient on threats
  • New vulnerabilities require constant vigilance
  • Individual vs. national risk management
  • Government alone cannot secure cyberspace
priority ii a national cyberspace security threat and vulnerability reduction program
Priority IIA National Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program
  • Enhance law enforcement’s capabilities for preemption, prevention, and prosecution
  • Secure the mechanisms of the Internet including improving protocols and routing
  • Foster trusted digital control systems/ supervisory control and data acquisition systems
  • Reduce and remediate software vulnerabilities
  • Improve physical security of cyber and telecommunications systems
inside the internet storm center
Inside the Internet Storm Center

Data Collection



DShield Users

typical residential cable modem log
Typical Residential Cable Modem Log

FTP attempts

FTP attempts

Pop-up ads (Spam)

Pop-up ads (Spam)

2002 top 20 list
2002 Top 20 List

Top Vulnerabilities to Windows Systems

W1 Internet Information Services (IIS)

W2 Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) -- Remote Data Services

W3 Microsoft SQL Server

W4 NETBIOS -- Unprotected Windows Networking Shares

W5 Anonymous Logon -- Null Sessions

W6 LAN Manager Authentication -- Weak LM Hashing

W7 General Windows Authentication -- Accounts with No Passwords or Weak Passwords

W8 Internet Explorer

W9 Remote Registry Access

W10 Windows Scripting Host

Top Vulnerabilities to Unix Systems

U1 Remote Procedure Calls (RPC)

U2 Apache Web Server

U3 Secure Shell (SSH)

U4 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

U5 File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

U6 R-Services -- Trust Relationships

U7 Line Printer Daemon (LPD)

U8 Sendmail


U10 General Unix Authentication -- Accounts with No Passwords or Weak Passwords