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International Politics Week 10: The Political Economy of the UN Security Council

International Politics Week 10: The Political Economy of the UN Security Council. Instructor: James Raymond Vreeland , Professor 2.0. Questions for 3-4 page assignment. What are the ostensible economic reasons for the arrangement?

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International Politics Week 10: The Political Economy of the UN Security Council

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  1. International Politics Week 10:The Political Economy of the UN Security Council Instructor: James Raymond Vreeland, Professor 2.0

  2. Questions for 3-4 page assignment • What are the ostensible economic reasons for the arrangement? • What is the size of the loan? What are some (one) of the policy conditions attached to the loan? (See the Letter of Intent for the arrangement – search “country name + letter of intent” at www.imf.org.) • What is the international political context of this country? Is the country important to any of the major shareholders of the IMF? If so, how (militarily strategic, economic, position on the international stage)? If not, why not? • What are the implications of international politics on the likelihood of compliance with the policy conditions attached to the arrangement? • Describe the domestic political institutions in the country. Is the country democratic or authoritarian? Who are the key “veto players” when it comes to policy change? What are the policy preferences of the various political actors? • How do the domestic political preferences and political institutions impact the likelihood of compliance with the policy conditions attached to the arrangement?

  3. Putting the domestic and international stories together…

  4. Entering into IMF Programs: The effect of domestic politics depends on international politics Effect of domestic institutions Favorable US interest in the country

  5. The Political Economy of the UN Security Council: Money and Influence

  6. Letter (PDF)…

  7. Collaboration

  8. Cooperation, Sacrifice & Change

  9. The UN Security Council IMF/WB project in Ghana IMF World Bank

  10. The question: • Do temporary members of the UNSC receive financial perks?

  11. Yes. Why? • The United States and other powerful countries seek additional influence over the UNSC.

  12. The goal of the donor countries: • Get countries under a program – in case important issues come up. • Godfather-esque: “Some day, and that day may never come, I'll call upon you to do a service for me. But uh, until that day, accept this justice as a gift on my daughter’s wedding day.” • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Bz9iXernY4&feature=fvw • http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/24/obama-does-brando-impress_n_128865.html

  13. Plan: • Politically important countries: • UN Security Council – IMF/World Bank connection? • Evidence • Anecdotes • Large-n • Economically important countries: • Tequila Crisis vs. East Asian Financial Crisis • So what?

  14. The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council:Money and Influence • Ch1: Money and Politics on the International Stage • Ch2: A Theory of Trading UNSC Votes for Aid • Ch3: Examples of Punishments, Threats, and Rewards • Ch4: Who Wins Election to Represent the World? • Ch5: Statistical Evidence • Ch6: Consequences • Ch7: Reform?

  15. What is the UNSC(United Nations Security Council)?

  16. What is the UNSC? 5 permanent members with veto power 10 elected members (2 year term - limited) Nominated by REGIONAL caucus, elected by GENERAL ASSEMBLY • Resolutions (open ballot) require 9 votes • UNSC votes on • UN military action against aggressors • Economic sanctions & arms embargoes 1 2 2 2 3

  17. Why bribe/reward votes? • Elected members of the UNSC potentially will vote on matters of extreme international importance • Voting power? • Legitimacy • There is a premium for getting (near) unanimous votes to win domestic public support (Prof. Voeten) • Symbolic • Informational

  18. US President public support before and after military action – with and without UNSC authorization

  19. Conservative UNSC member Typical US voter US President

  20. Evidence: Direct foreign aid

  21. (non-UNSC: n=5719) (UNSC: n=339)

  22. Enter: • The IMF • The World Bank • Regional Development Banks: • Asian Development Bank • African Development Bank

  23. Two Key points about the IMF & World Bank • Involved with developing countries through “programs”: loans + conditions. • Influence over decisions pegged to economic size.

  24. Why use the IMF and the World Bank to influence the UNSC? • Political benefits (for both actors) • “DIRTY WORK” • Leverage benefits • Conditionality & loan disbursements • Cost benefits • Shared:

  25. Examples of The Godfather Theme…

  26. Gulf War Examples • Zimbabwe – UNSC member 1991-92 • 1992 – 1st IMF arrangement in a decade • Votes for 2 resolutions against Iraq • Then abstains… • And Zimbabwe was threatened with new IMF conditions • Subsequently votes for 11 resolutions condemning Iraq.

  27. Gulf War Examples • Zaire in early 1991: PRESIDENT of UNSC • Request emergency UNSC meeting • Inconvenient for: • “Zaire was offered undisclosed ‘debt forgiveness’ and military equipment in return for silencing the Security Council when the attack was under way.”

  28. Obama – Bongo • Spring 2011: President Obama & senior State Department officials meet with President Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon • Why would the United States grant Gabon (pop. 1.5 mil) a high-level meeting? • Gabon supported • Res. 1970 (26 February 2011): Imposed sanctions on Gaddafi’s regime • Res. 1973 (17 March 2011): Established a no-fly zone over Libya & provided the legal basis for the military intervention in the Libyan Civil War. • Res. 1973 was crucial & passed with only ten votes

  29. Sec. Clinton • Togo elected to the UNSC fall 2011 to serve 2012-13 • Sec. Clinton visits Togo • Why? • “No Secretary of State had ever been to Togo before. • “Togo happens to be on the UN Security Council. • “Going there, making the personal investment, has a real strategic purpose. • “When... you look at the voting dynamics in key international institutions, you start to understand the value of paying attention to these places.” – Sec. Clinton

  30. Counter examples?

  31. Gulf War Examples • Cuba – UNSC member 1990-1 • Consistently opposed Iraq resolutions • IMF arrangement? • Left the IMF in 1964 – not an IMF member • (Why? Claimed the IMF was a tool of the US)

  32. MEXICO? Tan lejos de Dios… tan cerca de los Estados Unidos!

  33. United Nations Security Council election17 October 2013

  34. Gulf War Examples • Yemen – UNSC member 1990-1 • Voted against Desert Storm • U.S. representative was overheard declaring to the Yemeni ambassador that it was “the most expensive vote you have ever cast.” • The US cut hundreds of millions of dollars in aid • (No IMF arrangement)

  35. A more historical example? • Tanzania • 1961-1974 no IMF, no UNSC • 1975 • UNSC member • First IMF arrangement – exceedingly weak conditionality

  36. IMF reply in the Washington Post (November 1, 2006): • An IMF spokesman said “the [Tanzania] evidence is anecdotal and circumstantial.” • To convince people, we need • many more anecdotes • statistical evidence (it’s not just luck)

  37. Conditionality?

  38. World Bank evidence “It is true that during the Cold War years aid was politically motivated.” “Now however, aid is being delivered to countries most in need and to those who show they are determined to use it well.” (World Bank, FAQ, www.worldbank.org)

  39. avg=1.29 avg=2.13 avg=1.29 avg=2.06 avg=2.19 avg=1.28 avg=2.15 avg=1.30 avg=2.10 std=1.95 std=2.93 std=1.95 std=2.75 std=3.11 std=1.96 std=2.96 std=1.93 std=2.92 n=5333 n=357 n=5333 n=176 n=181 n=2638 n=183 n=2695 n=174 Non- Member Non- 1st.year 2nd year Non- Member Non- Member member member member member member member Total sample Over time During the cold war After the cold war Average # of World Bank projects by UNSC membership If politics mattered during the Cold War, but not after, this bar should be above the line, and this one should be at/below the line… UNSC members continue to get more World Bank programs 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0

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