Scepticism Relativism

1. ScepticismRelativism Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson

2. Questions What is scepticism? What makes people doubt? Where does doubt lead to? Rational, reasonable, constructive? What is relativism? Where does it come from and where does it lead? Unreasonable or indicative of toleration? What‘s the difference between scepticism and relativism?

3. Doubt We can sooth ordinary doubt by destruction or confirmation. Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe (Jh 20:25) Doubting Thomas touched the wound and destroyed his doubt. As we can see from Caravaggio:

5. Scepticism • Philosophical scepticism is directed towards all propositions within a certain domain, or all propositions that are held true. • Although Thomas doubted, he was no sceptic.

6. Scepticism and knowledge The sceptic is critical of the idea that we can acquire knowledge. He even criticises our ideas about knowledge, e.g. the idea that knowledge is a true justified belief.

7. Epsietemology and scepticism The sceptic: Do we have reason to accept any justification for a belief; can justifications dispel all doubt? Scepticism assumes that there is a notion of knowledge, and that according to that notion one can gain knowledge by some means.

8. The origins of scepticism First people tackled the question of how the world is. That question leads to another: how can we gain knowledge of the world. To answer that, one may first have to answer whether one can gain knowledge of the world. Enter the sceptic, who in some fashion doubts or even rejects that one can gain knowledge.

9. The Academy and Pyrrho When philosophical theories about reality and knowledge had arisen, there emerged a systematic attack on them, first in Plato‘s Academy, later among those who called themselves Pyrrhonists: Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism.

10. Scepticism in the modern age Scepticism is revitalised in the 16th century (although it had been quite forceful in the later stages of medieval scholasticism – without in any way infringing on the belief in God). Scepticism was taken very seriously.

11. René Descartes (1596-1650) architect of modern philosophy, at the forefront of the Scientific Revolution, deems it necessary to dispel scepticism before proceeding any further. Neither must we think that the sect of the sceptics is long extinct. It flourishes to-day as much as ever ...

12. David Hume (1711-76): The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfection in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? ...

13. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): The sceptic is thus the taskmaster who constrains the dogmatic reasoner to develop a sound critique of understanding and reason ... While, therefore, the sceptical procedure cannot of itself yield any satisfying answer to the questions of reason, none the less it prepares the way by arousing reason to circumspection, and by indicating the radical measures which are adequate to secure it in its legitimate possessions.

14. The sceptic’s constructive bickering • Scepticism, although it bickers, is positive: it keeps people on their toes, and has succeeded in removing errors and superstition, and in sharpening our understanding of what should count as knowledge.

15. Return to 200 AD • There was a radical sceptic: Sextus Empiricus (translated into Latin in the 16th century). • He discerned three types of philosophies.

16. Sextus: When people are investigating any subject, the likely result is either a discovery, or a denial of discovery and a a confession of inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation.

17. The first group believes that knowledge is possible. This is the largest group and includes most philosophers and scientists of any ilk.

18. The second group rejects the possibility of knowledge: we cannot be certain of anything, or have the required justification for accepting any proposition as true. Sextus calls this group the Academic sceptics. In our age they are usually called Cartesian sceptics (after Descartes (Lat. Cartesius). This is a fairly common version of scepticism. Let us call it negative scepticism.

19. The third group is also called sceptical, for it includes the Pyrrhonian sceptics. Let us call it radical scepticism. Not very popular.

20. Two types of scepticism: negative radical

21. negative vs. radical Sextus the radical: the continuous search of one who hasn‘t as yet found the truth (skepsis = investigation). The negative ones: Not real sceptics (says Sextus), for they are as sure that knowledge is impossible as the first group is sure that it is possible.

22. The negative sceptic • believes that one can demonstrate and justify negative scepticism. • The radical one is baffled by his negative collegue‘s trust in reason.

23. Relativism vs. scepticism Beliefs do conflict. Grant that we are incapable of deciding who is right.  Should we infer that everyone is right or no one? Relativism decides that everyone is right. Not so scepticism.

24. Relativism can be confined to certain domains (e.g. morality), but also be quite general, as probably is the case with the version of Protagoras (5th century B.C.), who said: Man is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not.

25. Aspects of the problem: (1) Even though we don‘t know who is right, can we infer that, of two conflicting beliefs, both are true? (2) If everything is true, is it also true that relativism is false? (3) Is it not a contradiction if relativism is both true and not true? (Maybe not). (4) Can the relativist claim that it is simply true that all truth is relative?

26. Contradiction? Let p be a proposition: I believe that p is true (p is true for me). You believe that p is not true (p is not true for you). Are our beliefs contradictory?

27. Same problem, different reactions (1) I say p. (2) You say not-p. (3) We cannot rationally decide between p and not-p. The relativist says: (4a) p is true for me, but not-p is true for you. The radical sceptic says: (4b) suspend judgment on which is true The negative sceptic says: (4c) we cannot know which is true Others say: (4d-e) p is true / not-p is true (and there are arguments)

28. Negative scepticism • Descartes used it, but he managed to overcome his doubts. • The senses deceive me (he said); hence there is no reason to trust them. •  I cannot be certain.

31. Í Nature 2005......

32. But surely we can trust something! • Here are my hands  we can do away with doubt generated by illusions. • Descartes always finds answers, until he reaches this:

33. Descartes: I shall then suppose, ..., [that] some evil spirit not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this spirit has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity. ...

34. If this turns out to be true, which it no doubt could, then Descartes has no justification for believing that the external world is as it appears to be. The problem is that he cannot dispel this doubt (well, he actually does a little later ...)

35. Doubt is tricky • One might think that anyone claiming that knowledge is impossible would be hoisted by his own petard, for how can he know this, if he cannot know anything. • Does negative scepticism refute itself?

36. Matrix-argument I (1) If I know that something is the case, then I have no reason to doubt that it is the case. (2) If I cannot trust the instruments with which I find out what is the case, then I have reason to doubt that the case is as I think it is. (3) Therefore I do not know that such is the case. If I can‘t trust my instruments, I have reason to doubt. But why shouldn‘t I trust my instruments?

37. Matrix-argument II I proclaim: „You are in from of me“ (no big news). (1) If I have a good enough justification for agreeing that you are in fact in front of me, and it follows that there is no mean computer deceiving me, then I have a good enough justification for agreeing that there is no computer deceiving me. (2) But I don‘t have a good enough justification for agreeing that I‘m not being deceived by a mean computer. (3) Hence, I don‘t have enough justification for agreeing that you are in front of me. [I‘m speaking out loud on the off chance that you are in fact in front of me.]

38. Radical (Pyrrhonian) scepticism Sextus: All sceptic say that they go along certain things, but „to go along with“ is ambiguous. „It means not resisting but simply following without strong inclination or adherence ...; and it sometimes means assenting to something by choice and, as it were, sympathy ... In a sense Sextus entertains beliefs, but still without accepting anythings as true. [Is this possible?]

39. Sextus‘ prehistory Sextus investigated matters in the hope of attaining truth, but found out that perception and reason are incapable of deciding what is true (at least as yet). Hence he doesn‘t agree to anything, but just suspends judgment.

40. One way of the radical: (1) x appears F to certain people or in certain circumstances (2) x appears not-F to certain other people or in certain other circumstances (3) We cannot decide whether x is really F or not-F (4) Hence we suspend judgment as to whether x is really F or not-F After (3) the relativist goes a different way.

41. Other ways of the radical (A) Infinite regress: a demonstration nedds another demonstration ... Where does it end? (B) Foundations: when confronted with infinite regress, people decide to stop at the most secure foundation. Is that permissible? (C) Vicious circle: when the support for the proposition requires that the proposition itself be true. Doesn’t sound well?

42. Water-tight? People can offer three kinds of arguments: Either the argument satrts somewhere (on some foundation) or not. If not, the argument is circular or infinite. If you don’t like this, you better suspend judgment.

43. Scepticism rebutted? A negative sceptic is refuted by his own argument (for how can he know that nothing is knowable). Should a radical sceptic not also suspend judgment as to whether he should suspend judgment. And where would that leave him?

44. A better line of attack? If the radical suspends judgment, how can he act? Isn‘t his bluff called as soon as he stands up?

45. Hume Esq. again: • “The sceptical objections to moral evidence, or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact, are either popular or philosophical. The popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man’s opinions and sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is needless to insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be insufficient to destroy that evidence.

46. cont. • The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.”

47. Contradiction? (1) We cannot know that we’re not being deceived. The negative sceptic: (2) If we don’t know this, we don’t know much (even nothing; cf. Matrix II). (3) Hence we don’t know much (even nothing). But we know a whole lot! (And at least we know that we don’yt know much!) The radical: (2‘) If we don‘t know that we‘re not being deceived, we can‘t decide about anything.

48. The problem facing scepticism is not really theoretical but practical. It ok to be a sceptic, either in some areas or all, for scepticism is insulated from life. This is quite right, but it didn‘t use to be right.

49. New and old The ancient sceptic took his scepticism so seriously that he was obliged to live by it, and explain how this was possible. If one doesn‘t hold anything as true, isn‘t one bound to get oneself killed? The ancient sceptics didn‘t think so. And in fact some of them thought that you‘d get tranquillity through scepticism.

50. Is scepticism a decent stance? A follower might approve of what she thinks plausible or compelling, or what appears to be the case, so long she doesn‘t claim to have found the truth. She doesn‘t disavowe truth, but only claims that it is not known what the truth is. A salutary stance?