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2010 NZ SCHOOLS and DECISION MAKING Gregory MacRae

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  1. SEE6 2011 Schools Workshop Tehran, Iran 2010 NZ SCHOOLSand DECISION MAKINGGregory MacRae

  2. OUTLINE NZ School Seismic Risk 2) Use of a Scenario to as a Decision Tool for Earthquake Risk 3) University of Canterbury Recent Decisions with Earthquake Risk 4) Damage to Schools in the Canterbury Earthquakes

  3. NZ School Seismic Risk Acknowledgements to: Brian Mitchell, Ministry of Education

  4. WHY SCHOOLS?

  5. NZ SCHOOL BUILDINGS New Zealand has a wide variety of school building. The, majority of school buildings are one- or two-storey braced timber-frame constructions with low vulnerability to earthquake damage.

  6. NZ LEGAL FRAMEWORK • The New Zealand Building Act regulates building design and construction. • The Department of Building and housing administers this act and approves standards for loadings and all types of construction. • Schools and other buildings must be designed and constructed, and inspected to ensure that they meet these standards. • Design for ductility started in 1976 so buildings before this date were susceptible

  7. NZ BUILDING VULNERABILITY • Mitchell et al. (2004)

  8. MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK • Ministry of Education developed requirements to minimize building seismic risk involving review of: • buildings of heavy construction (i.e. with concrete floors), and • all buildings with major assembly areas, and • school buildings with a heavy tile roof • If buildings did not meet code levels (with 1.2 factor), they needed to be strengthened to those levels. • In addition, • - conventional timber-framed and floored school buildings with light roofing were reviewed against two-third threshold of the full requirement levels. • - all other pre-1976 blocks containing at least two storeys were evaluated using a Rapid Evaluation (RE)

  9. MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK • Implementation – to prevent life loss (1998-2001) • Ministry of Education commissioned a structural survey by registered engineers of all 21,100 individual buildings at 2,361 state schools • Potential defects that required a more detailed investigation were identified • The key finding of the survey: • NZ school buildings and site structures were generally in sound structural condition given the size and diverse nature of the school property portfolio. • Only four buildings were found to have an unacceptable level of structural risk. Corrective action was undertaken immediately.

  10. MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK • Approximately 11% of the buildings were found to have at least one structural defect that required remedial work. • Typical defects • (Mitchell 2004):

  11. SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO - A Decision-Making Tool for Seismic Risk Acknowledgements to: The Seattle Fault Scenario Project Team

  12. BACKGROUND 3 Response 2b R 2a Ground Motions 1 Faulting Magnitude M 4 Loss ($$$) • Damage • Death • Downtime Surface Site Rock Fault

  13. BACKGROUND 3 Controlling Response - Engineers 2b R 2a Ground Motions - Seismologists 1 Rupture - Geologists Magnitude M 4. Loss Related Decisions - People - Government - Business - Planners (Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery) How are these decisions made? Surface Site Rock Fault

  14. BACKGROUND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS To Perform Mitigation for a Future Disaster, the Decision-Maker must:(Based on Petak) 1) Be Aware of the Problem - E.g. Earthquake Based on - empirical evidence - studies (science/engineering) 2) Be Aware of Possible Solutions - E.g. Design/Retrofit Based on - empirical evidence - studies (engineering/science) 3) Be Prepared to Allocate Resources to address This Need, Rather than Competing Needs Based on - evidence from technical experts - support from stakeholders - ability to raise necessary funds Lobbyists/Media are involved. It requires Policy

  15. BACKGROUND 3 Controlling Response - Engineers 2b R 2a Ground Motions - Seismologists 1 Rupture - Geologists Magnitude M 4. Loss Related Decisions - People - Government - Business - Planners (Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery) POLICY ENGINEERING Surface Site Rock Fault SCIENCE

  16. BACKGROUND The Disconnect: Engineers/Scientists Decision Makers Need to coordinate/communicate to: (a) Decide what should be done + (b) Ensure it is done

  17. BACKGROUND Northridge, 1994 (EERI) Armenia, 1988 (EERI)

  18. BACKGROUND Kobe, 1995 Turkey, 1999 EQE EERI, EQE

  19. BACKGROUND Taiwan, 1999, (DRPI) Bhuj, 2001, (R. Goel)

  20. BACKGROUND = Good structures Good building codes Base Isolated Demonstration Building Pelabuhan Ratu EERI, Taniwangsa

  21. BACKGROUND The Hierarchy of Denial (Cowan 2011) • It won’t happen • Or If it does happen it won’t affect me • Or, If it happens to me it won’t be too bad • Or If it’s bad, there is nothing I can do SO ..... • Why are you worrying me with this?”

  22. BACKGROUND Why is there a problem? - Different Priorities - Different Languages - Different Questions

  23. BACKGROUND Different Languages E.g. Neotectonic Magnitude Liquefaction potential Ductility Business Interruption Reinsurance Loss of market share

  24. BACKGROUND Different Questions/Culture Scientists (e.g. Geologists/Seismologists) ask : - What? and Why? Engineers (e.g. Geotechnical and Structural) ask : - Why? and How? Planners ask : - How can we get a good consensus? Businesses ask : - Do I need to do anything? - Where are the facts in a form that I can understand so that I can make a decision as to what I can do?

  25. BACKGROUND 3 Controlling Response - Engineers 2b R 2a Ground Motions - Seismologists 1 Rupture - Geologists Magnitude M 4. Loss Related Decisions - People - Government - Business - Planners (Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery) POLICY ENGINEERING Surface Site Rock Fault SCIENCE

  26. BACKGROUND Why A Scenario? A scenario is a story …… Types: analytic physical manipulations • Scenario studies are vivid and • highlight strengths/weaknesses pertinent to future events • help decision makers think through ramifications of events • may provide fuel for stakeholders wanting change

  27. BACKGROUND • EERI wanted a methodology for Scenario development • Previous studies existed … • e.g. Hayward Fault Scenario (EERI, 1996) • …. but there have been changes since 1996 • Increased knowledge about Seattle faults • Better tools for estimating losses (e.g. HAZUS) • The 2001 Nisqually earthquake affecting Seattle had just occurred

  28. BACKGROUND

  29. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO The result is a publication

  30. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO LOSSES: Deaths Deaths – > 1,600 Injuries – > 24,000 Damage Buildings destroyed – About 9,700. Buildings unsafe to occupy - About 29,000. Buildings with restricteduse – About 150,000. Fires – ≈ 130, causing $500m loss Property and economic loss – About $33 billion Downtime Business Interruption - Months Full repair - Years

  31. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO PROJECT TEAM Project coordination team- 12 volunteers Areas of expertise - Earthquake risk, emergency preparedness, lifelines, geotechnical engineering, management and decision making, planning, seismology, and structural engineering. Employment: - Consulting engineers, consulting planners, or as public servants with the University of Washington, National Science Foundation, Fire Department, City of Seattle Emergency Management, Washington Military Department Emergency Management or the United States Geological Survey (USGS)

  32. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO REPORT LAYOUT:

  33. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO REGIONAL FAULTS

  34. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO Expected Demands

  35. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO Scenario Shaking Intensities

  36. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS: WSDOT Bridge Group WSDOT Ferries Group A Port Authority Major Companies GENERAL INFORMATION: AUTHORS HAZUS - CENSUS - EXPERT OPINION QUALITY CONTROL: REVIEWERS

  37. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO Residential Housing Damage (HAZUS)

  38. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO CALL TO ACTION • Priority Recommendations : • • Establish an Independent State Seismic Safety Board • or Commission • • Implement Risk Reduction Plan for Critical Public Facilities • • Retrofit of High Risk Buildings • • Protect the Transportation Infrastructure • General Recommendations: • i) Accelerate Earthquake Hazard Assessments, Geological Mapping and • the Use of these Studies, • ii) Develop Incentives for Increased Seismic Safety, • iii) Expand Public Education Programs with Emphasis on Self-Sufficiency; • iv) Enhance the Pacific Northwest Seismographic Network; • v) Establish an Earthquake Information Clearinghouse.

  39. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO METHODS OF COMMUNICATION • Technical Information - No technical jargon • Executive Summary • Detailed Information • Glossy colour photos including damage • - Regional damage after past earthquakes • - Photos relevant to region or to similar situations • General Interest Information in text boxes • Non-Technical Information • Prologue • Introduces a school teacher, a businessman, a tourist, mother, etc. • Chapter Introductions • Describes what happens to these people as the day progresses • It was apparent to Lisa and Marjorie Bona that they were not going to get home to Bainbridge Island; at this point, all they wanted was to escape from the horrors of the Alaskan Way Viaduct, portions of which lay amid twisted cars and bodies …… All transportation had stopped and they did not know what to do.

  40. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO MEASURES OF SUCCESS The impact of the scenario is quantified by - awareness raised regarding earthquake risk - activities initiated to better consider or manage earthquake risk which can be attributed in some part to the scenario effort. There were several presentations to interested groups (of up to 100 people including city organisations such as planners, engineers, fire, police, emergency responders, insurance underwriters) both during the development of the scenario, as well as after the scenario. At the rollout meeting in February 2004, 450 people from different professions attended. The local mayor spoke and the state governor’s office was represented.

  41. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO MEASURES OF SUCCESS • More than a dozen television and radio interviews and newspaper stories including a • big multi-page feature story starting on the front page of the Sunday Seattle Times • Presentations to interested groups • Distribution of 4,100 reports. Downloadable copy at: http://seattlescenario.eeri.org. • Significant presentations were made to the Washington State Senate Transportation Committee and to the Puget Sound Region Freight Mobility Roundtable in Autumn 2004. • Funding for renovation of the University of Washington Seismic Laboratory. • The State Seismic Safety Committee was reconstituted. • Washington State EMD used the scenario for its March 2006 response exercise. • The City of Seattle proposal to analyze the cost effectiveness of retrofit investments

  42. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO MEASURES OF SUCCESS Seattle Times Editorial - Wednesday, March 1, 2006 - 12:00 AM Puget Sound's Katrina The fundamental lesson of the Gulf states' hurricane miseries is that the worst can happen. Puget Sound will be pummeled by storms and floods, but catastrophic earthquakes are the real natural menace here. These issues get to Puget Sound's economic survival and recovery. The failure of layers of government to talk and function after the hurricanes haunts the Gulf states. The Seattle Fault runs from Hood Canal in the west, through Puget Sound and south Seattle, and east through Bellevue and Issaquah roughly parallel to Interstate 90. Last year, a panel of experts looked at the region's earthquake hazards and picked this one to jolt the Bellevue gathering with an extreme disaster. Scenario losses include: 1,600 deaths; 24,000 injuries; 9,700 buildings destroyed; 29,000 buildings too damaged to occupy; 154,000 moderately damaged buildings with restricted use; and 130 fires. Estimated property damage and economic loss: about $33 billion. For the next two days, the thinking gets ramped up several grim notches to contemplate physical destruction and institutional failures that would have been unimaginable before Hurricane Katrina.

  43. THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO MEASURES OF SUCCESS • Planners were initially noticeably uninterested in the scenario until Hurricane Katrina. • “They (the authorities) knew there was a problem, they knew that it was only a matter of time, and they did nothing!” • Planners started to evaluate their own vulnerability and risks to natural hazard. • American Planners Association is using this “window of awareness” to provide seminars on planning. The local APA branch is referencing the scenario document. Many communities, including smaller ones without large planning staff, are participating.

  44. SCENARIO CONCLUSIONS ● Communication between all stakeholders is important● A scenario may be a useful tool leading to the implementation of earthquake disaster mitigation methods

  45. UC RECENT DECISIONS WITH SEISMIC RISK

  46. BACKGROUND Canterbury Earthquakes • Saturday 4 September 2010, 4:40am • M7.1 • 40km West of Christchurch to 20km West of Christchurch • PGA in CBD: About 0.23g • Casualties: 0 • 2. Tuesday 22 February 2011, 12:50pm • M6.3 • 8km South of Christchurch • PGA in CBD: About 0.50g • Casualties: 183 • + many significant aftershocks

  47. BACKGROUND

  48. BACKGROUND N-S W-E V Christchurch Botanical Gardens Records (From Brendon Bradley, U. Canterbury, New Zealand)

  49. BACKGROUND Canterbury Earthquakes 4 September 2010 22 February 2011

  50. FIVE STEP PROCESS - As described by Jeff Clendon • Rapid Damage Assessment • 2A. Structural System Evaluation for Damage • 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation • 3. Life Safety Systems Evaluation • 4. Remediation (i.e. Hazard Removal) • 5. Building WOF • Led by Facilities Management • + Jeff Clendon (Holmes Consulting) • Many engineers participating from BECA, GHD, Holmes, UoC ….