Managing CSEF Materials

1. DIMP Implementation Using the NGA/SGA Plan Managing CSEF Materials Western Regional Gas Conference Eric Kirkpatrick, P.E. August 24, 2010

2. Gas Distribution Integrity Management 49 CFR, Part 192, Subpart P §192.1005 No later than August 2, 2011 a gas distribution operator must develop and implement an integrity management program that includes a written integrity management plan

3. Gas Distribution Integrity Management Develop and fully implement a written IM Plan. Plan Elements inlcude: • Knowledge • Indentify Threats • Evaluate and Rank Risks • Identify and Implement Measures to Reduce Risks • Measure Performance, Monitor Results, Evaluate • Effectiveness • Periodic Evaluation and Improvement • Report Results

4. NGA and SGA Collaborative • Northeast Gas Association and Southern Gas Association formed a collaborative to develop a framework document and guidelines for a distribution integrity management plan • 58 companies thus far • Collectively these 58 companies serve more than 55% of the distribution customers in the U.S. • Structural Integrity Associates is the principal author • NGA and SGA DIMP Steering Committees and Member companies participated and provided comments and input during development

5. National Grid NiSource Atmos Energy Corp AGL Resources Nicor Gas ONEOK, Inc. Southwest Gas Corp. Ameren Puget Sound Energy Dominion East Ohio Consolidated Edison of New York We Energies Piedmont Natural Gas Questar Gas Puget Sound Energy National Fuel Questar Gas Companies who are using the Plan • NW Natural • Laclede Gas Company • Baltimore Gas & Electric • New Jersey Natural Gas Company • Alabama Gas Corp • SCANA • TECO Peoples Gas • Memphis Gas, Light & Water Division • LG&E Energy, LLC • Avista • NSTAR Gas • South Jersey Gas Company • Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. • New York State Electric & Gas Corp • Yankee Gas Services Company • Unitil

6. Equitable Gas DTE Energy – Michcon Southern Connecticut Gas Company Connecticut Natural Gas Corp Arkansas Western Gas Company Entergy New Orleans, Inc. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. Mobile Gas, a Sempra Company Florida Public Utilities Company Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp Arkansas Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp Roanoke Natural Gas New England Gas Company Companies who are using the Plan • City of Richmond, VA • Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. • Berkshire Gas Company • City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department • St. Lawrence Gas Company, Inc. • Corning Natural Gas Corporation • Westfield Gas and Electric Light Dept • Norwich Public Utilities • Wakefield Municipal Gas and Light Dept • Middleborough Gas and Electric Department • Maine Natural Gas • Blackstone Gas Company

7. Plan Framework & User Guide PLAN FRAMEWORK DIMP User Guide

8. Written IM Plan Framework • A Generic Framework • High Level & Flexible • Applicable to both the largest and smallest • operators ( 3.4 million to 1,400 customers) • Operator customizes by populating Appendices • material • Operator may use (or incorporate by reference) • existing material and reports

9. Customization via Appendices Appendix A – Knowledge of Facilities Appendix B – Threat Identification Appendix C – Evaluation & Ranking of Risk Appendix D – Measures to Address Risk Appendix E – Performance Measures, Monitoring Results, Evaluating Effectiveness Appendix F – Periodic Evaluation and Improvement Appendix G – Reporting Results Appendix H – Cross Reference to Subpart P

10. DIMP User Guide • Discussion and Instructions for • customizing each section • Optional Plan Sections • 77 Sample Data Tables and • Forms • A discussion of over 40 • distribution threats • Risk Identification approaches • 3 Risk Assessment & Ranking • approaches • Mitigation strategies • Baseline and ongoing • performance measures

11. DIMP User Guide • Optional Sections for: • Company Roles & Responsibilities • Personnel Qualifications • Knowledge Capture – Subject Matter Experts • Program Effectiveness for Damage Prevention • Program, Public Awareness, QA/QC • Exception Process

12. Gas Distribution Integrity Management Plan Elements inlcude: • Knowledge • Indentify Threats • Evaluate and Rank Risks • Identify and Implement Measures to Reduce Risks • Measure Performance, Monitor Results, Evaluate • Effectiveness • Periodic Evaluation and Improvement • Report Results

13. §192.1007 (a) Knowledge §192.1007 (a) Knowledge. An operator must demonstrate an understanding of its gas distribution system developed from reasonably available information. Demonstrated Understanding Data

14. §192.1007 (b) Sources of Data §192.1007 (b) …Sources of data may include, but are not limited to, incident and leak history, corrosion control records, continuing surveillance records, patrolling records, maintenance history, and excavation damage experience.

15. ID Key Data Sources

16. §192.1007 (a) Knowledge §192.1007 (a) (3) Identify additional information needed and provide a plan for gaining that information over time through normal activities conducted on the pipeline (for example, design, construction, operations or maintenance activities). Documented Action Plan Identify Data Gaps and Document

17. §192.1007 (a) Knowledge §192.1007 (a) (1) Identify the characteristics of the pipeline’s design and operations and the environmental factors that are necessary to assess the applicable threats and risks to its gas distribution pipeline. §192.1007 (a) (2) Consider the information gained from past design, operations, and maintenance.

18. §192.1007 (a) Knowledge Incorporate existing reports by reference.

19. §192.1007 (a) Knowledge Operators may also wish to consider: • System Design by Material, Diameter, Operating Pressure • Historical Construction and Leak Repair Practices • Cathodic Protection Design & History • Key Equipment in Use: Regulators, Mechanical Fittings, etc. • Leak Repair frequency per mile and trend over time • Material Failure Report Trends • Excavation damage trends by root cause • Reportable Gas Incidents • Seismic Areas • Flood Zones • Landslide prone areas

20. History of Material Types and Years Installed

21. Historical Construction Practices

22. Leak Repair Frequency Rates

23. §192.1007 (a) Knowledge Role of Subject Matter Experts • Documentation • Selection and Qualifications Demonstrated Understanding • May also wish to involve SMEs in: • Threat Identification • Evaluation & Risk Ranking

24. §192.1007 (b) Identify Threats §192.1007 (b) An operator must consider reasonably available information to identify existing and potential threats.

25. SME Involvement in Threat Identification

26. Corrosion Threats • Cast Iron Graphitization • Ductile Iron • Bare Steel • Copper Pipe/Services • Coated Steel Pipe w/o CP • Damage by Stray Current • Internal Corrosion • Atmospheric Corrosion • Pipe installed in Casing

27. Natural Forces • Seismic Activity • Earth Movement / Landslide • Frost Heave • Tree Root Damage • Floods • Snow / Ice Damage • Other – Wild Fire, Lightning

28. Excavation Damage …… The largest threat

29. Excavation Damage • Mis-marked facilities • Late Locates • Incorrect info from one-call center • No Call for Locate • Improper Excavation Procedures • Incorrect Facility Records • Adequacy of Damage Prevention Program?

30. Other Outside Force • Vehicle Damage • Vandalism • Fire or Explosion • Previous Damage

31. Material or Weld Failure • Early generation Plastics: PVC, ABS, CAB, PB • Century Products MDPE 2306 • Aldyl-A and HDPE 3306 • Delrin Insert Tap Tees • Plexco Service Tee Celcon Caps • PE Fusion Failure • Compression Couplings • Pre-1940 Oxy-Acetylene Girth Welds

32. Plastic Pipe Alphabet Soup:PVC – Polyvinyl Chloride PE – Polyethylene ABS – Acrylonitrile Butadiene StyreneCAB – Cellulose Acetate Butyrate PB – Polybutylene PP – Polypropylene PA – Polyamide PEX – Cross-linked Polyethylene

33. Fusion Failures

34. Mechanical Fittings Nut-Follower Stab Bolted Other - Hydraulic

35. Equipment Malfunction • Valves • Service Regulators • Regulator/Control Station

36. Incorrect Operation • Human Error / Operating Error • Failure to Follow Authorized Procedures • Unauthorized Installation or Repair Methods • Service Lines bored thru sewers

37. Other • Bell Joint Leakage • Copper Sulfide • Construction over gas mains & services

38. §192.1007 (b) Identify Threats §192.1007 (b) An operator must consider reasonably available information to identifyexisting and potential threats. Sources of data may include, but are not limited to, incident and leak history, corrosion control records, continuing surveillance records, patrolling records, maintenance history, and excavation damage experience.

39. Threat Identification –PHMSA Advisory Bulletins

40. Threat Identification – NTSB Recommendations & Letters

41. §192.1007 (c) Evaluate and Rank Risk §192.1007 (c) Evaluate and rank risk. An operator must evaluate the risks associated with its distribution pipeline. In this evaluation, the operator must determine the relative importance of each threat and estimate and rank the risks posed to its pipeline. This evaluation must consider each applicable current and potential threat, the likelihood of failureassociated with each threat, and the potential consequences of such a failure.

42. Evaluation & Ranking Risk • Possible Methodologies • Data Centric Risk Evaluation and Ranking • Methodology • Subject Matter Expert (SME) Risk Evaluation • and Ranking Methodology • Blended Risk Evaluation and Ranking • Methodology

43. Evaluation & Ranking Risk • Risk Evaluation by Geographical Regions • Begin with the End in Mind – Targeting Mitigation • Data availability may be the leading factor • Going too small may result in poor results • Going too large may not yield the ability to target • mitigation

44. Data Centric Risk Evaluation

45. Data Centric Risk Evaluation

46. Frequency of Failure • Use of Historical Leak Repair and Incident History • Uses data the operator already collects • Provides data on root cause • Outcome easy to validate based on actual experience • Confidence when using to target mitigation

47. Data Centric Risk Evaluation

48. Implementation of the NGA/SGA DIMP Model – A Case Study Wednesday 9:15 AM – 10:00 AM Rob McElroy – New Century Software (Palm Ballroom)

49. SME Risk Evaluation • An approach for those who lack Data • Risk Scores developed from both likelihood • and consequence

50. §192.1007 (d) Identify and Implement Measures to address risks §192.1007 (d) Identify and implement measures to address risks. Determine and implement measures designed to reduce the risks from failure of its gas distribution pipeline. These measures must include an effective leak management program (unless all leaks are repaired when found).