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Secure Biometric Authentication for Weak Computational Devices

Secure Biometric Authentication for Weak Computational Devices. Mikhail Atallah (Purdue) ,Keith Frikken (Purdue), Michael Goodrich (UC-Irvine), Roberto Tamassia (Brown) March 3, 2005. Introduction. Biometric Authentication Pros: Provides simple authentication mechanism

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Secure Biometric Authentication for Weak Computational Devices

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  1. Secure Biometric Authentication for Weak Computational Devices Mikhail Atallah (Purdue) ,Keith Frikken (Purdue), Michael Goodrich (UC-Irvine), Roberto Tamassia (Brown) March 3, 2005

  2. Introduction • Biometric Authentication • Pros: Provides simple authentication mechanism • Cons: Changing is difficult and privacy concerns • Difficulties: • Readings vary each measurement • Standard techniques such as hashing won’t work FC 2005

  3. Related Work • Many schemes • [Chaum and Pedersen, 1993] • [Davida et al, 1998] • [Bleumer, 1998] • [Davida and Frankel, 1999] • [Juels and Wattenburg, 1999] • [Davida et al, 1999] • [Juels and Sudan, 2002] • [Clancy et al, 2003] • [Impagliazzo and More, 2003] • [Kershbaum et al, 2004] • [Dodis, 2004] FC 2005

  4. Our Goals • Lightweight Authentication Scheme • Nothing more than hash functions • Smartcard based • No single point of failure • Not smartcard • Not server • Server compromise should not lead to the ability to impersonate user (even to the server) • Goal is to have a Biometric PIN for banking systems FC 2005

  5. Framework • Reader: Can be on card or other device, but this is what the user uses to read biometric • Server: Stores information about clients • Comparison Unit: Makes the comparison between the client’s information and server data and grants access • Two biometrics are “close” if their hamming distance is below some threshold (we generalize this to other distances) FC 2005

  6. Adversary Model • Adversary is defined by resources • Smartcard • Uncracked (SCU) • Cracked (SCC) • Fingerprint (FP) • Eavesdrop • Communication Channel (ECC) • Server’s Database (ESD) • Comparison Unit (ECU) = ESD+ECC+”outcome” • Malicious • Communication Channel (MCC) • Things that are outside our model • Adversaries that crack smartcard and give it back to user • Malicious Server’s Database • Malicious Comparison Unit FC 2005

  7. Security Requirements • Confidentiality: An adversary should not be able to learn the user’s fingerprint • Integrity: An adversary should not be able to impersonate the user to the comparison unit • Availability: An adversary should not be able to prevent a user from authenticating FC 2005

  8. Confidentiality • Have 3 oracles which are acceptable • Oracle A: {0,1}|f’|→{0,1} where A(f) returns true if f is a match • Oracle B: →{0,1}log|f’| where B() returns various distances between readings • Oracle C: {0,1 }|f’|→{0,1}log|f’| where C(f) returns the distance between f and f’ (this is weakly secure) FC 2005

  9. False Starts • Suppose f0 and f1 are readings of a fingerprint • How does “bank” determine if f0 is close to f1 without revealing private information • Correctness: The distance should be computed correctly • Privacy: Minimal information should be revealed about f0 and f1 FC 2005

  10. False Starts • False Start #1: • Client sends f1 to bank which compares to f0 in the clear • Correct but not private • False Start #2: • Client sends H(f1) to bank which compares to H(f0)in the clear • Private but not correct FC 2005

  11. False Starts (cont.) • False Start #3: • Client sends f1r to server that compares it to f0r • Correct as dist(f1r,f0r) = dist(f1,f0) • Kind of private: individual bits are protected, but it leaks locations where things change • False Start #4: • Client sends Π(f1r) to server that compares it to Π(f0r) for a permutation Π • Correct as dist(Π(f1r), Π(f0r)) = dist(f1,f0) • Private if permutation is only used once • If it is reused, then it has similar problems as #3 FC 2005

  12. Our Protocol • Goal is to be able to update r value and permutation Π between each authentication • Assume H is a keyed hash function • Before a round, server has • siΠi(firi),H(si),H(si,H(si+1)) • Before a round client(smartcard) has: • Πi, ri, si, si+1 FC 2005

  13. Protocol -- Authentication • Client obtains fi+1, and generates ri+1, si+2, and Πi+1 • It sends to the server Πi(fi+1ri), si, and some transaction information T • Server tests if • H(si) matches previously stored value • siΠi(fi+1ri) is close to the previously stored siΠi(firi) • If there is a match, then server temporarily performs T, and it sends H(T) back to the user FC 2005

  14. Protocol -- Update • Client tests if transaction information matches request • Yes then continue to 2 • No then abort wipe out this set of key information • Client sends to server si+1Πi+1(fi+1ri+1), H(si+1), and H(si+1,H(si+2)) • The server verifies that H(si,H(si+1)) matches the previous value • If yes, then it commits transaction and updates values • If no, it aborts FC 2005

  15. Security Summary • Confidentiality: The cases where the adversary learns the fingerprint are : (FP) or (SCC and ESD) or (SCU, ESD, and MCC) or weakly in the case of (SCU and ECU) or any superset of these cases • Integrity: The cases where the adversary can impersonate the user are : (SCU and FP) or (SCC and ESD) or (ESD and MCC) or weakly in the case of (SCU and ECU) or any superset of these cases • Availability: The cases where the adversary can deny access to the user are : (SCU) or (MCC) or any superset of these cases FC 2005

  16. Security Summary FC 2005

  17. Extensions • Extended to other distances • Storage-Computation Tradeoff: • Previous scheme requires several values to be stored on smartcard (in case of mismatches) • Can reduce storage by increasing computation (similar to SKEY) FC 2005

  18. Summary • Have introduced lightweight biometric scheme that uses only hash functions • No single point of failure • Future Work: • Must update values in our protocol FC 2005

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