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Rule Set Based Access Control. Presented by: Tan Wee Hon Lee Ruiwen. Presentation Outline. Introduction Framework Implemented Models & Demo Application Advantages Resources & References. Introduction. History Why RSBAC? Goals. History of RSBAC. Amon Ott Nov 1996: Master thesis

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Rule set based access control

Rule Set Based Access Control

Presented by:

Tan Wee Hon

Lee Ruiwen


Presentation outline
Presentation Outline

  • Introduction

  • Framework

  • Implemented Models & Demo

  • Application

  • Advantages

  • Resources & References


Introduction
Introduction

  • History

  • Why RSBAC?

  • Goals


History of rsbac
History of RSBAC

  • Amon Ott

  • Nov 1996: Master thesis

  • Jan 1998: First public release

  • Current stable version: 1.2.2


Why rsbac
Why RSBAC?

Insecurity of LINUX/UNIX access control

  • Crude granularity - drwxrwxrwx

  • Discretionary control

  • Super user root


Goals of rsbac
Goals of RSBAC

  • Secure access control

  • Flexible choice of models

  • Combination of models

  • Portability


Framework
Framework

  • Subjects, Objects and Requests

  • Architecture

  • Security Officer


Subjects objects requests
Subjects, Objects & Requests

Subjects

Processes

Objects (Targets)

e.g. FILE, DIR, USER, PROCESS

Requests

What a subject wants to do with an object

e.g. CHANGE_OWNER, DELETE, READ_OPEN, MOUNT


Components
Components

  • ACI: Access Control Information

  • AEF: Access control Enforcement Facility

  • ADF: Access control Decision Facility


Components1
Components

  • ACI: Stores status data and configuration items

  • AEF: Intercepts Linux kernel calls

     grant or deny

  • ADF: Makes decisions


Security officer secoff
Security Officer (secoff)

  • Configure modules using utilities provided in the RSBAC distribution

  • Difference between root and secoff is effort to obtain rights to access anything


Implemented models

Authentication (AUTH)

Functional Control (FC)

Security Information Modification (SIM)

Privacy Model by Simone Fischer-Hübner (PM)

Malware Scan (MS)

Linux Capabilities (CAP)

Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

File Flags (FF)

Role Compatibility (RC)

Access Control Lists (ACL)

Implemented Models


Implemented models1

Authentication (AUTH)

Functional Control (FC)

Security Information Modification (SIM)

Privacy Model by Simone Fischer-Hübner (PM)

Malware Scan (MS)

Linux Capabilities (CAP)

Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

File Flags (FF)

Role Compatibility (RC)

Access Control Lists (ACL)

Implemented Models


Mandatory access control mac
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

  • Bell-La Padula

  • 253 security levels

  • 64 categories (bit vector)

  • For programs not MAC aware, current security levels and categories are automatically adjusted as necessary, but within read and write level boundaries


File flags ff
File Flags (FF)

  • Conveniently assign rights to whole directory trees

  • Inheritable FILE, DIR, FIFO and SYMLINK attributes

  • e.g. read-only, no-execute, secure-delete


Role compatibility rc
Role Compatibility (RC)

  • Roles and types

  • Role can access type only if “compatible”

  • Forced and Initial Roles based on program files

  • Separation of Administration Duties

    • Separate sets of roles e.g.

      • Admin Roles

      • Assign Roles

    • Additional access rights for types: Admin, Assign, Access Control, Supervisor


Access control lists acl
Access Control Lists (ACL)

  • What subject may access which object with which requests

  • Subjects: RC roles, Users, ACL Groups

  • ACL Groups:

    • All users can have individual groups

    • Private and global groups

  • Inheritance with masks

  • Special Rights e.g. supervisor


Application
Application

  • Workstations

  • Server systems

  • Examples


Workstations
Workstations

  • Protection against unwanted configuration changes

  • Malicious software (malware) protection

  • Reduced administration work


Server systems
Server Systems

  • Encapsulation of services

  • Need-to-Know principle

  • Malware protection

  • Firewalls: DNS, Proxies

  • (Virtual) Webservers: Apache

  • (Virtual) mail servers: POP3, IMAP

  • File servers: Samba

  • Application servers


Examples
Examples

  • Compuniverse Firewalls

    • More than one year with RSBAC

    • Use of AUTH, FF and RC models

    • Software selection for better RSBAC control, e.g. POP3 with separate authentication program


Advantages
Advantages

  • Provides well-known and new models

  • Extensible

  • Flexible

  • Powerful logging system

  • Support for current Linux kernels, ports to others systems likely

  • Increasing downloads and feedback


Resources references
Resources & References

  • Homepage: www.rsbac.org

  • The RSBAC Library

    • An Introduction

    • Programmer’s Reference Manual

    • Programmer’s Cookbook

    • Reference Manual

    • Cookbook

  • Detailed paper:

    Ott, Amon (2001). The Rule Set Based Access Control (RSBAC) Linux Kernel Security Extension. (International Linux Kongress, 2001)