Political Interaction across t he Taiwan Strait

1. Political Interaction across the Taiwan Strait Week 6

2. Outline • Introduction • Lee Teng-hui’s Policy to the Mainland • Chen Shui-bian’sMainland Policy • Ma Ying-jeou’s Mainland Policy • Hu’s Six Points: A Framework of peaceful development

3. 1. Introduction • Political transition in Taiwan has led to the redefining of the legitimacy of KMT regime in Taiwan • From military and political retaking of the mainland to retaking the mainland by ideology

4. 1. Introduction • Secret messengers between the two sides in mid-1980s • Decreasing demand for sovereignty over the mainland • Different strategies in gaining maximal votes • Continuing opening for visitors to the mainland • Su Chi-cheng: a special messenger for Lee Teng-hui

5. 2. Lee Teng-hui’s Policy to the Mainland A、Weakening the one-China principle • To end the period of “mobilization and pacifying the rebellion”（1991） • Three stages in National Unification Guideline 1)Exchange of reciprocity 2)Mutual trust and cooperation

6. 1、Weakening the One-China Principle 3) Negotiating on unification • Economic liberalization • Social pluralization (pluralism) • Political democratization • Cultural Sinonization (Chinese cultural in Taiwan) • “one country, two governments” • temporary two Chinas leading to one China in the future（1993） • One country , two equivalent entities

7. 1、Weakening the One-China Principle • “Independence first，Unification later” • Unification: saying without doing (lip service) • Independence: doing without saying • Pragmatic diplomacy • cross-recognition by other countries, dual representation in international organizations • Lee’s 1995 U.S. trips (product of elections) • First cross-Strait crisis

8. 1、Weakening the One-China Principle • Special state-to-state relations with the mainland （1999） • Diplomatic isolation and sentimental expression, frustration • Bombing of Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia • Wang Daohan’s forthcoming trip to Taiwan • American pressure on Taipei for reaching interim agreements with the mainland

9. Changing Identity among Taiwanese People (1)

10. Changing Identity among Taiwanese People (2)

11. B. Avoiding Political Talks • Lee’s Six Points（1995.4.8） • Condition for cross-strait talks on ending hostilities: Beijing giving up military means against Taiwan • More concern about Taiwan’s International space

12. B. Avoiding Political Talks • Lee’s inauguration speech（1996.5.20） • “China in twenty century is a suffering country” • Separated government across the strait as a matter of fact • Pursuing national unification as a matter of fact too • Promoting pragmatic diplomacy • “visiting the Chinese mainland and engaging with peace trips”

13. B. Avoiding Political Talks • KU Chenfu’s “ice-breaking trip” （1998） • The beginning of political dialogue • From separated government to unification • No recognition, no denial（Su Chi） • Preparing and announcing “two-state thesis” • Coming back to “one China, respective expression” • “We simply don’t want to talk with mainland too quickly”（Wu Anchia）

14. C.LimitingCivil Exchange • “unilateral, indirectly, civil” • Reducing “Mainland Fever,”“Be patient and self-restraint,”“Walking stably and going far away” • Pressure from business circle • Opposition from the New Party and “Formosa faction” led by Hsu Hsin-liang

15. 3. Chen Shui-bian’sMainland Policy A.Mainland policy in Chen’s early term • Victory remarks on March 18（the Chinese mainland） • One China can be an issue ，but not precondition • “Four Nos” • To handle together “the issue of one China in the future（issue vs. problem) • Not accepting “92 consensus” • agree to disagee

16. A. Mainland policy in Chen’s early term • Unification is not the only option for Taiwan（Chen Shuibian） • Taiwan does not exclude the possibility of unifying with the mainland in the future • If Taiwan“totally denial the possibility of unification, China will bother Taiwan forever, there would be no peace in the Taiwan Strait • “Taiwan can give up part of sovereignty to exchange for long peace, as long as the political arrangement proposed by the mainland is reasonable and acceptable”

17. A.Mainlandpolicy in Chen’s early term • From independence as an ideal to independence as a tool, to unification as a tool” • “From economic and cultural integration, to gradually build up mutual trust, and then seek long peace and a framework for political integration”（New Year speech, Chen Shui-bian, 2001）

18. A. Mainland policy in Chen’s early term • Meaning of integration, independence within unification, unification within independence • Since the two sides cannot be unified now, they should move to share rights and obligation（Yan Chian-fa）

19. A. Mainland policy in Chen’s early term • Chai Ing-wen: political integration could mean direction, process or goal; integration does not exclude the 3 options: unification, independence or maintaining the status quo. • Lee Teng-hui’s mainland policy: independence first, unification later • DPP’s policy: independence first, deciding on other options later

20. A. Mainland policy in Chen’s early term • Chen’s policy was more confrontational to the mainland than KMT on three perspectives • KMT recognizes 92 consensus (one China, different interpretation, though). DPP’s reject one China framework, however ambiguous. For Chen, one China is a discussable issue, but not a precondition for reopening strait talks

21. A. Mainland policy in Chen’s early term • KMT regards people on the island as both Chinese and Taiwanese. DPP regards them as Taiwanese, or cultural Chinese at the best. • KMT regards unification as the final goal, however remote, DPP considers it as an option only.

22. B. From “one country on each side” to referenda on Entering UN • DPP’s Anti-Tide behavior • “China up” • Taiwan Down • Getting benefits from chaos • Tail wags the dog • Either talks or independence • Going on street

23. B. From “one country on each side” to referenda on Entering UN • Referenda vs. representative democracyre • Referenda as a tool to maximize votes on the part of DPP • Avoiding political obligation • Shifting burden to the public

24. 4. Ma Ying-jeou’s Mainland Policy • No unification, no independence, no war • Accepting the 92 consensus • Both sides belong to one China (weak principle) • Both sides strive for China’s reunification (strong principle) • Not a state-to-state relationship

25. 4. Ma Ying-jeou’s Mainland Policy • promoting economic and cultural exchanges (first step) • Conciliation and No fighting (next step) • CBMs and surviving diplomacy • Value congruence in the future • China’s movement to freedom, democracy, and prosperity can create historical conditions favorable to peaceful development of cross-Strait relations

26. 4. Ma Ying-jeou’s Mainland Policy • Competition on the issue of core values • The key for finally resolving the cross-Strait issue is not sovereign dispute, but living style and the core value (Taiwan spirit: kindness, integrity, diligence, honesty, compromise, progressiveness)

27. 5. Hu’s Six PointsA Framework of peaceful development • Both sides belong to one China as the base for building political mutual trust • Political relations redefine • Reunification is not a recreation of sovereignty and territory, but ending the political confrontation between the two sides, a legacy of the Chinese civil war • Advancing Economic Cooperation • Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)

28. 5. Hu’s Six PointsA Road Map for peaceful development • Promoting Cultural and educational exchange • the main task of 2009 • To strengthen two-way visits of people and expand exchanges in various sphere • Engaging with Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) members

29. 5. Hu’s Six PointsA Road Map for peaceful development • Not wasting diplomatic resource in the international arena • Ending hostility and reach a peace agreement • Military exchange and CBMs