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SECRET-ONLY SYSTEM (SoS) POA&M

SECRET-ONLY SYSTEM (SoS) POA&M. 21 February 06. Larry Tingler PMA-281, Bernard.Tingler@navy,mil Bruce Hewston PMA-280, Bruce.Hewston@navy.mil. Secret-Only System (SoS) Outline. Objectives Discussion Data distribution Proposed distribution of secret mission data short-term solution

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SECRET-ONLY SYSTEM (SoS) POA&M

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  1. SECRET-ONLY SYSTEM(SoS)POA&M 21 February 06 Larry Tingler PMA-281, Bernard.Tingler@navy,mil Bruce Hewston PMA-280, Bruce.Hewston@navy.mil

  2. Secret-Only System (SoS)Outline • Objectives • Discussion • Data distribution • Proposed distribution of secret mission data short-term solution • Approach • FRU changes – assumptions • FRU changes – surface and submarine • TC2S changes • Transition Plan • Issues

  3. Secret-Only SystemObjectives • The Joint Warfighter wants to conduct Tomahawk operations at the Secret level to improve joint interoperability • TC2S uses TS data to plan missions, but the resulting mission data file contains no higher than Secret data (with the exception of TLAM-N) • For TST, ultimately want to conduct mission planning in a Secret environment to reduce planning timelines (responsiveness) and Post-Launch Execution (PLE) • Strike plans can be LIMDIS/SPECAT and distribution can be managed within TC2S infrastructure • For SPECAT strike plans, FRUs and C2 nodes can use mirror strikes (TACAIR style) to practice at Secret level • On ATO (or at move to DEFCON II), strike plans sheds SPECAT LIMDIS caveat and distributed to FRUs and C2 nodes • In very limited situations, strike plans and/or execution may be TS and execution can move to record message traffic and voice • Tomahawk becomes a Secret system, with only CMSA & APS mission planning and selected C2 nodes having both Secret and TS

  4. Secret-Only SystemDiscussion • All TWS components exposed to TS networks require sanitization • Cycle power, new disk drives, etc. • Strike/Mission data distribution • Requires Secret vice TS crypto keys • Primary paths are ADNS (with TACLANE) and EHF • TSN will also be keyed and operated at Secret • Mission Planning • Downgrade of mission planning (TPS) is problematic due to TS level data bases • Multiple Surface and Sub FRU configurations exist and must be considered • Final solution will likely require software/hardware modifications, and system re-accreditation (may align with IPv6 compliance) • However, a near-term solution is proposed

  5. Secret-Only SystemData Distribution • TC2S current or near-term capability can support the segregation and distribution of Secret data • Requires approval & distribution of Secret keymat • Procedural changes • Manage distribution • Possible installation of redundant H/W at some C2 nodes (dual configured) • Privacy encryption could be used (MDS to MDS) to carry information over SIPRNET without TACLANES CMSA or APS Mission planning TS Mission/SP Distribution (TS) Mission/SP Distribution (S) C2 C2 C2 FRU FRU … Dual-configured C2 Node

  6. TTWCS TTWCS Proposed Distribution of Secret Mission data Short-Term Solution1 Sub FRU TS msg traffic TACLANE ADNS Top Secret key SIPRNET Surface FRU MDS * Secret key Hub TACLANE MDS TCIP Hub Secret key TCIP TC2S Site Secret key Secret key Notes: 1 This is a top-level view showing primary data paths. The specifics of each operational platform will be considered in the implemented solution * Privacy encryption EHF Direct NECC STU-III OTCIXS/TADIXS TSN TACLANE MDS * Hub EHF/UHF SATCOM Secret key TCIP OTH_TCP

  7. Secret-Only SystemFRU Changes – Assumptions • ATWCS platforms when transitioned will never be used for TS OPS in the future • ATWCS FRUs use record message traffic for tasking, do not have MDS in MDU path • Can perform a round-robin replacement with reclassified drives or, • Supply new disk drives • Surface and submarine configurations are described separately on following slides • If TS is required, it will be specific platforms with Fire Control System isolated from the strike network; manual operations will be required and procedures will be documented • TTWCS v4 and v5 will be transitioned to secret operations

  8. Secret-Only SystemFRU Changes CURRENT (TC2S 4.0.4.x) • FRU operations for TOMAHAWK take place in the TS Domain • Both TC2S and TTWCS are TS • TTWCS is isolated from Secret domain via approved safeguards SOS Modifications • FRU must receive Secret crypto and Secret hard drives for TTWCS, MDS and TCOMMS • Updated user documentation, Tech Bulletins, etc. • TTWCS-specific • Updated COE from SPAWAR introduced as a mail-out patch for SoS • SSN-specific • TACLANE is shared with TWS and other TS message traffic • Downgrade would require additional H/W, SHIPALT and re-accreditation • Propose to resolve in TC2S by using SIPRNET and PKE GOTS software in MDS

  9. Surface Firing UnitSecret-Only Strike Enclave MDS WCS TCOMMS S CRYPTOANDEXISTINGSECRETPATHS OTHER SECRETSOURCES ONLY TO STC2S OR MISSILES

  10. Surface FRU Changes • ATWCS Platforms • Prepare and deliver clean disks to CMSA for archive creation of Secret mission database extract, qualify and distribute 12 new disks/FRU with tech pubs • TTWCS v4 • Mail out of patched software with COE update, new disk drives and tech pubs • TTWCS v5 • Mail out of patched software with COE update, new disk drives and tech pubs

  11. Submarine Configurations • The two primary discriminators for submarine configurations are boats that are IP communications capable, and those that are not • SSGN, VA and SEAWOLF boats as well as TI-04 boats are IP-capable • With exception of the classes described above, all other pre-TI-04 boats are non-IP-capable • The IP data path for those boats capable will originate at the C2 node • MDUs, FDUs and ESPs will be public key encrypted and sent via SIPRNET to the IP-capable boats • Legacy comm circuits with Secret KEYMAT will be used for non-IP-capable boats • C2 node will manage which platforms use which circuits

  12. Submarine Pre-TI-04 Boats • Multiple options are available for these boats, prevailing principle is that the strike communications are legacy circuits • 42 boats involved • 10 HDDs each with expected mail out delivery • Schedule • Two years for complete HDD replacement • More timely if HDDs can be reclassified in place • Costs increase if HDD replacement on deployed platforms required

  13. Submarine TI-04 Boats and IP-Capable Boats • Not looking to re-architect network configurations to create strike enclave (too costly) • Propose use of SIPRNET with Public Key Encryption for MDS to MDS communications of MDUs, FDUs and ESPs • Changes required • Modifications to 688I & Seawolf SHIPALT to change CCS SUBLAN • Network address changes • Install on 13 boats • Integrate software encryption • ILS updates • Purchase and install new HDDs • Schedule approx 12 months

  14. Secret-Only SystemTC2S changes • CMSA (3 sites) • Additional TCOMMS on Secret MDS • APS / Carrier configurations (12 platforms) • Reconfigured TCOMMS (connected to secret MDS) • New TCOMMS HDDs • Dual-configured C2 nodes • Full MDS / TCOMMS configured at TS and Secret • Dual configuration proposed for numbered fleets • Secret-only C2 nodes (~150 sites) • Replace HDDs for MDS and TCOMMS • Mostly commercial equipment • MDS / TCOMMS on FRUs • New HDDs and crypto keys

  15. Secret-Only System Transition Plan • Schedule impact in-work • ~ 6-9 months lead time to request and receive keymat • Reconfiguration and testing (partially in parallel with above) • Final testing with new keymat and integration sites (WPC, NSWCDD, NUWCDN) ~ 2-3 months • Information assurance documentation and testing in parallel with above • Notionally, prepared to begin deployment ~ 12-15 months

  16. Secret-Only SystemIssues • Fleet implementation / deployment • Recommend establishing an IPT with Fleet representation to plan deployment / switchover considering: • Fleet CONOPS and priority • FRU / Staff / CVN availability • SHIPMAIN (SCD) process • Information Assurance acceptability • Update TWS SSAA • Submit for approval • Obtain and integrate/test COTS Tools (Public Key Encryption (PKE))

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