2 September 2015

1. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Lesotho, Burundi and South Sudan by Acting DDG: Branch Africa, Mr EX Makaya 2 September 2015

2. Kingdom of Lesotho

3. Overview • The political and security situation in Lesotho has been characterised by instability since August 2014, after a failed coup attempt, which further politically fractured the countries already fragile coalition government which came to power in 2012. Additionally, a long standing stand-off between the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) has compounded the security situation. • In response to these developments, SADC intervened in Lesotho by appointing Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa as the SADC Facilitator to Lesotho to develop a road map to returning stability and security to the Kingdom. • SADC’s intervention in Lesotho resulted in several milestones, these included: the signing of the Maseru Facilitation Declaration, which established that Lesotho would hold National General Elections in February 2015; and the Maseru Security Accord. • The presence of the SADC Observer Mission in Lesotho (SOMILES) and its efforts to resolve both security and political challenges to enable credible, free and fair elections at the end of February 2015 in the Kingdom of Lesotho yielded tangible and positive results. SOMILES was composed of police officers from the SADC Double Troika countries.

4. Overview Cont. • The National Assembly elections of February 2015 was declared by all Election Observation Missions, including the SADC Election Observer Commission, as peaceful, credible, transparent, free and fair, thus reflecting the will of the people of the Kingdom. • There was no outright winner as a result political parties opted to form coalitions. The ABC ended with 40.31% of the vote, and the DC with 40.99%. The DC and LCD allied and formed a coalition with an additional 5 smaller political parties with a total of 65 seats. The ABC and BNP together have 55 seats. The Coalition Government signed an Agreement which committed the parties to a set of goals, including the recommendations of SADC regarding constitutional review and security sector reform. • However, the killing of former Lesotho Defence Force commander, Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao on 25 June 2015, by army officers who had attempted to arrest him for his alleged involvement in a mutiny plot, has exposed the fault lines in the security sector and has resulted in increased political and security tension. • In the aftermath of the death of Brigadier Mahao, a SADC Ministerial Organ Fact Finding Mission was deployed to Lesotho by South African President, HE Jacob Zuma, in his capacity as the Chairperson of the SADC Organ on Peace, Defence and Security. As a matter of urgency, President Jacob Zuma also dispatched Deputy President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa to Lesotho in his capacity as the SACD Facilitator on 30 June 2015, to consult with Prime Minister Mosilili and examine the situation on the ground.

5. Overview Cont. • An emergency SADC Double Troika Summit took place on July 2015 in Pretoria, South Africa. The Summit received and endorsed the SADC Facilitator’s Report; and approved the Terms of Reference for the Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Brigadier Mahao. It should be noted that Lesotho welcomed the appointment of the Commission of Enquiry. The Summit also approved the establishment of an Oversight Committee to act as an early warning mechanism in the event of signs of instability, and intervene as appropriate in consultation with the SADC facilitator. The SADC Oversight Committee is also tasked with assisting all stakeholders in Lesotho to undertake urgent constitutional and security sector reforms.

6. Recent Developments • South Africa continues to support the SADC led intervention in Lesotho, through the Deputy President of South Africa, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, in his capacity as the SADC Facilitator to the Kingdom of Lesotho, whose mandate was renewed by the SADC Extra Ordinary Double Troika Summit on 3 July 2015. • Additionally, the SADC Double Troika Summit moved to establish a Commission of Inquiry to investigate current developments in the Kingdom; and the creation of an Oversight Committee, to work together with stakeholders in Lesotho on Constitutional and Security Sector Reforms. • On 16 August 2015, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation reaffirmed the Terms of References as approved by the SADC Double Troika Summit on 3 July 2015. The Terms of Reference will guide the investigation of the SADC Commission of Inquiry mandated by the SADC Double Troika Summit on 3 July 2015 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of former Lesotho Defence Force commander Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao.

7. Recent Developments Cont. • The 35th Ordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government, held in Gaborone, Botswana from 17-18 August 2015 supported the decision taken by the SADC Organ to reaffirm the Terms of Reference for the Commission of Inquiry and urged the Kingdom of Lesotho to gazette the SADC approved and reaffirmed Terms of Reference, to allow the Commission to begins it work. • The Commission of Inquiry has been sworn in, and will be led by Justice Mpaphi Phumaphi, a High Court Judge from Botswana, and up of 11 additional members. The Terms of Reference which will guide the Commission were reaffirmed by the SADC Heads of State Summit from 17-18 August 2015. • On 21 August 2015, Lesotho has gazetted the Terms of Reference as approved by the SADC Double Troika Summit on 3 July 2015, and reaffirmed by the same body on 16 August 2015, • The Commission will have 60 days to conduct its investigations and present its findings to the Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

8. South Africa’s Position: • South Africa will continue to support Lesotho bilaterally through structured mechanism and through SADC initiatives. • The Government of Lesotho needs to develop a roadmap on constitutional and security sector reforms assisted by SADC.

9. Republic of Burundi

10. Background • RSA key role player in the Burundi Peace Process, led by President Mandela as Mediator, then by President Mbeki and then-Deputy President Zuma. Resulted in AU-led ArushaPeace Accords in 2000 – 2005, ended decade-long civil war. • In support of Peace Process, SANDF provided 1266 troops to protect the returning leaders of the various political factions, acted as important component of AU and UN stabilization force. SANDF troops withdrawn end-2009. • Peace and stability in Burundi are crucial factors to peace in entire Great Lakes region. • South Africa therefore closely follows developments in Burundi. • Bilateral relations sound and cordial e.g. State Visits August 2011 and November 2014, Presidents speak to each other, Special Envoys in each direction. • SA assistance for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, e.g. Joint Business Council agreed upon; diplomatic training for Burundian diplomats; offer to assist with establishment of TRC etc. • Burundi an important contributor of troops to AU/UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, i.a. in Somalia where there are currently over 5000 Burundian troops serving in AMISOM

11. Genesis of the Current Crisis • 25 April 2015 ruling party announces Pres. Nkurunziza as candidate for re-election. • Civil unrest breaks out, opposition supporters claim “third term” bid unconstitutional • Attempted coup by former DG Military Intelligence, put down by loyalist troops • Coup plotters flee, launch rebellion in northern provinces, continuing at low-intensity • Amid continuing sporadic civil unrest, some grenade attacks etc, EAC, UN, EU and others call for elections to be postponed to create climate conducive to free & fair elections • Many incidents of intimidation, most blamed on (armed) youth wing of ruling party • Parliamentary elections 29 Jun 2015, 100 MPs elected of whom 77 from ruling party, 21 from Agathon Rwasa’s new party, 2 from UPRONA. • UN promotes national dialogue • Successive UN-appointed mediators resign over claims of bias • EAC Summit appointed Ugandan President Museveni to faciliate national dialogue, which had called for the postponement of elections to permit free and fair conditions; a Government of National Unity; and for President not to stand for re-election. • Presidential elections 24 July 2015, President takes 70%, Rwasa 20%. Poll 73.44% • Election observers sent only by EAC, UN and ICGLR. AU and EU do not send observers

12. Post Elections • EAC observers: “...electoral process fell short of the principles and standards for holding free, fair, peaceful, transparent and credible elections as stipulated in various international, continental as well as the EAC Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation”. UN observers stated similarly. • Both EAC and UN election observer teams called for national dialogue to continue and for cessation of all violence. • Since April,180 000 refugees have fled across borders to avoid violence, intimidation. • Two high-profile military officers assassinated, both were powerful security allies of President • President and other Burundian leaders have all called for calm and for their supporters to avoid any resort to violence or reprisals

13. Post Elections Cont. • President sworn-in at low-profile Inauguration 20 Aug, six days earlier than scheduled • New Cabinet 24 August: 20 Ministers of whom 5 from Rwasa’s opposition coalition • AgathonRwasa was earlier voted in as Deputy Speaker of Parliament • Government considers that its numerous concessions to date, despite having won 70% of the vote on a 73% poll, have fulfilled the EAC’s demands (postponement of elections; Government of national unity; and having earlier participated in national dialogue). • A question therefore remains as to whether the national dialogue will continue • Sporadic low-intensity outbreaks of violence and intimidation of known opposition supporters / areas continue. Government continues its crackdown on alleged instigators of violence. • However, it is important to note that, to date, the issue remains political, and the crisis has not assumed an ethnic (Hutu-Tutsi) identity. • Donor countries have withdrawn their budget support (55% of her budget comes from donors – serious implications for social programmes.

14. South Africa’s Efforts • Since the crisis started South Africa participated in three EAC Summits as a special guest . • AU PSC met at Summit level (including President Zuma) in Johannesburg 13 June, called for postponement of elections; deployment of AU military observers to oversee disarming of all militias; deployment of human rights observers; and for continuation of national dialogue under leadership of President Museveni • Since 1994 RSA has invested significantly in Burundi and will continue to stand by the Burundian people in their search for sustainable peace, security and development • Need for national political dialogue, stop violence and return of refugees EAC , AU and UN system to support the process.

15. Republic of South Sudan

16. Map of South Sudan

17. Introduction • South Sudan became an independent State on 9 July 2011 • In less than three years of independence, the young country was plunged into conflict on 15 December 2013 • The conflict prompted President Jacob Zuma to appoint the Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa as his Special Envoy to the Republic of South Sudan • South Africa’s political intervention in South Sudan has focused on reuniting the ruling party SPLM • The intra-party process compliments the IGAD peace process. • South Africa has since been included into the IGAD process which has been expanded to the IGAD plus • The regional block, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has, since January 2014, been seized with the conflict in South Sudan through a mediation process aimed at finding a lasting solution to resolving the conflict. • The mediation process resulted in the signing of the ceasefire agreements in January, May and June 2014. • The IGAD’s subsequent Protocol of 25 August 2014, outlined the terms towards the formation of the Government of National Unity with the aim of accommodating the interests of the parties to the conflict to ensure cessation of hostilities for a period leading to elections.

18. The role of IGAD in the Peace process • The IGAD-led talks were suspended indefinitely after 5 March after the three SPLM faction groups were unable to agree to the proposed Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, the IGAD bloc indicated that it would continue working with the different SPLM group to reach a conclusion on the proposed transitional government. • The IGAD process expanded to the IGAD plus with the hope that the various external groups will successfully achieve consensus between the parties and obtain the elusive peace agreement. • The IGAD-plus includes five Africa representatives i.e. South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Chad and Rwanda; it also includes the Troika (USA, UK and Norway), China, the UN, the EU and the AU. • In an attempt to put pressure on the three SPLM faction groups, IGAD bloc proposed a newly amended compromise peace agreement on 23 July 2015 and issued a deadline for the warring factions to finalise and sign the agreement on 17 August 2015. • 7-11 August 2015 the relevant South Sudanese parties met in Addis Ababa to consider the Compromise Agreement and discuss the issues of contention. • Following the consultations, all the parties to the South Sudanese conflict met again Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 17 August 2015 for the signing of the Compromise Peace Agreement. • The SPLM-IO led by Dr RiekMachar and he SPLM-Former Detainees represented by Mr Pagan Amum signed the accord. • President SalvaKiir however raised reservations to a number of stipulations in the Agreement and requested a period of 15 days to consult his party and the people of South Sudan.

19. The role of IGAD in the Peace process Cont. • The interlocutors granted President Kiir the 15 days but perceived the request as delay tactics. • The United States, on 21 August 2015, proposed a draft resolution at the United Nations Security Council to institute sanctions on South Sudan if President Kiir does not sign the Peace Agreement. The sanctions included a freeze on assets and a travel ban on certain individuals as well as an arms embargo on the country. • Regional and International pressure together with the threat of sanctions from the UNSC compelled the President to sign and on 26 August 2015, President Kiir signed the Compromise Agreement. • He did however ensure that he enclosed an annexure that included a list of 16 reservations that he strongly deemed detrimental to the self-determination of South Sudan as well as clauses that would impede the path to attaining lasting peace in the young country.

20. Appointment of the Special Envoy to South Sudan and the Intra-Party Dialogue • Since the initiation of the Intra-party dialogue, the process has made great strides in the reunification of the SPLM party. • South Africa together with Tanzania successfully managed to get all three different factions of the SPLM to sign the Reunification Agreement in January 2015. • The parties agreed to the implementation of the political, organisational and leadership process included in the agreement. Consequently, a tripartite committee compromising of representatives from all three parties was created to spearhead the implementation process. • The co-guarantors to the process namely the African National Congress (ANC) and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) facilitated an inaugural trip of five former detainees to Juba, South Sudan from 31 May to 1 June 2015. • Subsequently, the majority of the former political detainees who were based in Nairobi, have since returned to Juba and they are currently working with SPLM leadership to reconcile, rebuild and reorganise the party. One of the former political detainees, Mr Pagan Amum has since re-assumed the position of the Secretary General of the SPLM/A. • The process continues to work on the repatriation of the remaining leaders including those in the SPLM-IO under Dr Riek Machar.

21. Role-players in the Conflict & Issues • The role players in the conflict are; • the SPLM-IG (In Government), • SPLM-IO (In Oppositions) and • the SPLM-FD (Former Detainees). .

22. South Africa’s Position • South Africa has since become part of the IGAD Plus and will continue to play her role to assist in the resolution of the South Sudan challenges. • Through the Special Envoy, Deputy President Ramaphosa, South Africa will continue to assist the SPLM to unite, reconcile and focus on developmental challenges. • South Africa will work on her bilateral relations with South Sudan, continuing with post conflict development and reconstruction.

23. Conclusion • President Kiir has made it very clear that he is concerned that the IGAD- Plus countries have not had enough time to familiarize themselves with the magnitude of the conflict. This point is instructive and should be a consideration for the wider IGAD Plus mechanism in trying to address the President’s concerns. • The concerns raised by President Kiir are paramount to the success of the peace deal and thus should be ironed out and addressed as a matter of urgency. If the reservations are not dealt with, there is a risk of the collapse of the Peace Agreement.

24. THANK YOU