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Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition

Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition. Jonathan St. B.T. Evans. The Gist…. Dual Processing; Fast, automatic, and unconscious Slow, deliberative, and conscious. Multiple theories – can we get to a generic model? Multiple kinds of implicit processes described.

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Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition

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  1. Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition Jonathan St. B.T. Evans

  2. The Gist… • Dual Processing; • Fast, automatic, and unconscious • Slow, deliberative, and conscious. • Multiple theories – can we get to a generic model? • Multiple kinds of implicit processes described. • Not all attributes map to the two general systems cleanly. • Conclusion of this review: NO. Generic dual-system theory would be “oversimplified and misleading”.

  3. Why…? Talk about Type 1 and Type 2 processes instead? Mixture and mapping of attributes? Two forms of learning leading to two forms of knowledge (explicit and implicit)?

  4. Decision Making Heuristics and biases DM under risk Social Judgment Theory Default-interventionist vs. parallel-competitive? Recognition-primed decision making? Value of system 1? Is system 2 superior? Experts vs. novices? Better decisions in unconscious decision-making when?

  5. A Perspective on Judgment and Choice Daniel Kahneman

  6. Mapping Bounded Reality Intuition and accessibility Framing effects Changes of state: prospect theory Attribution substitution Prototype heuristics

  7. “Because the overall capacity for mental effort is limited, effortful processes tend to disrupt each other, whereas effortless processes neither cause nor suffer much interference when combined with other tasks (Kahneman, 1973; Pashler, 1998).”

  8. “Moreover, the “hot” states of high emotional and motivational arousal greatly increase the accessibility of thoughts that relate to the immediate emotion and current needs, as well as reducing the accessibility of other thoughts (Loewenstein, 1996).”

  9. “The new model departs from the original formulation of heuristics in three significant ways: (a) It proposes a common process of attribute substitution to explain how judgment heuristics work. (b) it extends the concept of heuristic beyond the domain of judgments about uncertain events. (c) it includes an explicit treatment of the conditions under which intuitive judgments are modified or overridden by the monitoring operations associated with System 2.”

  10. “1. An intuitive judgment or intention is initiated, and (a) Endorsed by System 2; (b) Adjusted (insufficiently) for other features that are recognized as relevant; (c) Corrected (sometimes overcorrected) for an explicitly recognized bias; or (d) Identified as violating a subjectively valid rule and blocked from overt expression. 2. No intuitive response comes to mind, and the judgment is computed by System 2.”

  11. Summary System 1 control judgments and preferences, unless adjusted by System 2? Circular? What about the Evans article – no generic theory?

  12. Conditions for Intuitive Expertise Kahnemanand Klein

  13. Digging into Intuition… • Naturalistic decision making? • Take the mystery out of intuition by understanding the cues that experts utilize. • NDM vs. HB (Heuristics and Biases): “It is entirely possible for the predictions of experienced clinicians to be superior to those of novices, but inferior to a linear model or an intelligent system”

  14. Conclusions Skill – NDM, inappropriate cues/biases – HB Skilled folks – can be unaware of cues (difficult to articulate when asked), recognize more often what they don’t know (compared to novices). Subjective confidence is unreliable. Go forth boldly! High validity: relationship between cues and outcomes? Validity and uncertainity Developing skill vs. luck Fractionation and overconfidence Low validity and algorithms?

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