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HN assumes lead in counterinsurgency Alleviates a large CF presence Stabilize the HN for:- Larger social equality- Economic prosperity- A free and democratic society (self rule). Security Force Assistance. Use of combat arms, combat support, combat service support arms to protect the civilian population (and infrastructure) and to physically and psychologically separate the insurgents from the population..
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1. Security Force Assistance
2. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations
forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs
forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their
unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively
a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may
conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other
ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general
purpose forces.
In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.
Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations
forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs
forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their
unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively
a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may
conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other
ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general
purpose forces.
In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.
3. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations
forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs
forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their
unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively
a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may
conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other
ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general
purpose forces.
In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.
Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations
forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs
forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their
unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively
a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may
conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other
ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general
purpose forces.
In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.
4. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations
forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs
forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their
unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively
a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may
conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other
ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general
purpose forces.
In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.
Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations
forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs
forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their
unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively
a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may
conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other
ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general
purpose forces.
In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.
5. Cycles of Violence “The police force, to defend themselves, took sort of an offensive approach to it. They committed atrocities and injustices as well, and so it began this cycle of…tribal violence which further destabilized the city and further victimized the people.”
Colonel HR McMaster
6. HN Leadership What are the traits of a great leader?
Competent
Honest
Selfless
Trusts his Subordinates
All are traits we want to pass on to a
professional HN force
Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be?
Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs.
Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie.
Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us.
Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.
Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be?
Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs.
Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie.
Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us.
Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.
7. What are the principles of a military leader?
Know yourself and seek self-improvement
Technically and tactically proficient
Know your soldiers and look out for their welfare
Keep your soldiers informed
Set the example
Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and
accomplished
HN Leadership Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be?
Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs.
Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie.
Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us.
Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.
Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be?
Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs.
Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie.
Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us.
Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.
8.
What are the principles of a military leader?
Train your soldiers as a team
Make sound and timely decisions
Develop a sense of responsibility among your subordinates
Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities
Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your
actions competent HN Leadership Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be?
Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs.
Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie.
Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us.
Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.
Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be?
Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs.
Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie.
Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us.
Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.
9. “You have to prove to them your intentions through
your deeds and through building relationships, and we
were able to do that over a period of a few months. So
lifting the fear off the community is the first element.
The second element then is to be able to follow that up
with the security capability, Iraqi police backed up by
Iraqi Army.”
Colonel HR McMaster
10. Overall Advisor Mission The most important mission of an advisor is to
enhance the military professionalism of his counterpart.
Influence the HN military to deal with the changing
environment by emphasizing the concept of “self
government”
Use of “common sense” or “common decency” is so
basic (to us) it is not discussed much in training.
11. So You Want to Be an Adviser To create an effective Iraqi military, you must
accomplish three tasks:
1) Train and equip to a uniform standard
2) Partner each Iraqi organization with a similar
coalition formation
3) Provide a small team of combat advisers to live,
train, and fight day and night with their Iraqi brothers
BG Bolger
12. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations
forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs
forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their
unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively
a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may
conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other
ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general
purpose forces.
In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.
Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations
forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs
forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their
unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively
a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may
conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other
ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general
purpose forces.
In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.
13. Campaign Plan
14. Campaign Plan
15. Campaign Plan
16. Campaign Plan
17. Campaign Plan
18. Campaign Plan
20. Facilitate HN & Partner Unit Combined Commander’s Update Briefings (CUB)
Combined Target Meetings
Combined Training Meetings
Commander, S-3 attend back briefs
HN LNOs
Attend parallel planning
Proximity is a consideration Treat them as equals, not as subordinatesTreat them as equals, not as subordinates
21. What the Combat Advisor is not Liaison (Just passing information)
A fire and forget mission
A supporting effort
22. Remember, it’s a Marathon Major causes of an advisor’s failure
Inability to maintain a good working relationship
Fails to understand why his counterparts do not feel the “sense of urgency” that he does
Unable to realize that his counterpart will remain and continue to fight the enemy long after his tour is over
Insurgency by it’s nature is protractedInsurgency by it’s nature is protracted
23. Key Points Recognize institutional and cultural differences
between the HN and US Army
Rapport, credibility, and legitimacy can only be
established through time, proximity, and interaction
Mentor HN leadership at every opportunity
Combat advisor (Must leave the wire)
Partner units must always be engaged in every
aspect of the HN’s development
26. Understand the Operational Environment
Strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, power centers of the organizations.
Interrelationships among these organizations.
Assess host nation abilities
In Iraq, where the host nation government has been in existence only a short time, the administrative machinery is still developing. The advisor must be aware of such situations and not be overly critical.
Goals and motivating factors for each organization.
Relationships with the Multinational Force and Iraqi Security Forces.
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The sources and assistance available to further mission accomplishment.
The role of the United States and the international press.
The applicable rules of engagement, to include their intent and the specifically enumerated provisions. In an insurgency, the host nation government is experiencing major problems. To begin with, the money needed for social and economic programs is mostly directed toward security needs. In an ideal situation, the host nation government would use this money to cure the society’s economic and social ills.
Understand the Operational Environment
Strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, power centers of the organizations.
Interrelationships among these organizations.
Assess host nation abilities
In Iraq, where the host nation government has been in existence only a short time, the administrative machinery is still developing. The advisor must be aware of such situations and not be overly critical.
Goals and motivating factors for each organization.
Relationships with the Multinational Force and Iraqi Security Forces.
-----------------------------------------
The sources and assistance available to further mission accomplishment.
The role of the United States and the international press.
The applicable rules of engagement, to include their intent and the specifically enumerated provisions. In an insurgency, the host nation government is experiencing major problems. To begin with, the money needed for social and economic programs is mostly directed toward security needs. In an ideal situation, the host nation government would use this money to cure the society’s economic and social ills.
27. Recognize Political Implications
All actions by the US as well as Iraqi forces will have political implications. Iraqi forces and their actions are the responsibilities of the US government. Multinational Force represents the US and coalition governments.
Recognize Political Implications
All actions by the US as well as Iraqi forces will have political implications. Iraqi forces and their actions are the responsibilities of the US government. Multinational Force represents the US and coalition governments.
28. Facilitate Interagency Activities
Example: Joint coordination center
External Factors
Understand relationship between Iraqi, Combat Advisors, and partnering units as well as with other government agencies.
Scope and limitations of each agency’s influence and programs.
The legal and political restrictions on their activities.
The sources and assistance available to further mission accomplishment.
The role of the United States and the international press.
The intent and goals of the U.S. government.
The applicable rules of engagement, to include their intent and the specifically enumerated provisions.
Facilitate Interagency Activities
Example: Joint coordination center
External Factors
Understand relationship between Iraqi, Combat Advisors, and partnering units as well as with other government agencies.
Scope and limitations of each agency’s influence and programs.
The legal and political restrictions on their activities.
The sources and assistance available to further mission accomplishment.
The role of the United States and the international press.
The intent and goals of the U.S. government.
The applicable rules of engagement, to include their intent and the specifically enumerated provisions.
29. Engage the Threat Discriminately
- Resources ( Information Operations, Civil Affairs, Civil Military Operations) - COIN Center of Gravity analysis
Selection and distribution of resources (personnel and material).
Appropriateness, not mass, is the standard. (Prioritize)
Select qualified and trained personnel necessary to the effort.
Minimizing the Multinational Force presence while (Iraqi face on everything)
- Train, Advise, and Assist
An understanding of the operational environment and its internal dynamics is key to selecting type of training, operations, and advice to give.
Impact is as much a consideration in selecting training and advice as are the political implications of the type of subject and assistance given.
- Tactical Considerations
Tactical operations in Foreign Internal Defense, whether directed against insurgents, criminal activities (lawlessness), or subversion, must be carefully targeted to avoid alienating the populace being defended. Populace and resource control measures, in particular, must be carefully weighed for potential gain versus potential cost. The use of force in Populace and Resource Control measures should be minimized.
The insurgents’ best recruiting program is indiscriminate killing and damage by government forces. Keeping violence to the absolute
minimum is important to the government.Engage the Threat Discriminately
- Resources ( Information Operations, Civil Affairs, Civil Military Operations) - COIN Center of Gravity analysis
Selection and distribution of resources (personnel and material).
Appropriateness, not mass, is the standard. (Prioritize)
Select qualified and trained personnel necessary to the effort.
Minimizing the Multinational Force presence while (Iraqi face on everything)
- Train, Advise, and Assist
An understanding of the operational environment and its internal dynamics is key to selecting type of training, operations, and advice to give.
Impact is as much a consideration in selecting training and advice as are the political implications of the type of subject and assistance given.
- Tactical Considerations
Tactical operations in Foreign Internal Defense, whether directed against insurgents, criminal activities (lawlessness), or subversion, must be carefully targeted to avoid alienating the populace being defended. Populace and resource control measures, in particular, must be carefully weighed for potential gain versus potential cost. The use of force in Populace and Resource Control measures should be minimized.
The insurgents’ best recruiting program is indiscriminate killing and damage by government forces. Keeping violence to the absolute
minimum is important to the government.
30.
Consider Long-Term Effects
Most Foreign Internal Defense efforts are inherently long-term. Their goal is to alleviate the root causes of the current situation, not just treat the symptoms.
Tactical victories are of little value unless they contribute to the overall operational scheme.
Understand legal and political constraints (rules of engagement) to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success.
Understanding the problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context.
Consider Long-Term Effects
Most Foreign Internal Defense efforts are inherently long-term. Their goal is to alleviate the root causes of the current situation, not just treat the symptoms.
Tactical victories are of little value unless they contribute to the overall operational scheme.
Understand legal and political constraints (rules of engagement) to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success.
Understanding the problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context.
31. Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Operations
-Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support.
-Without legitimacy and credibility, operations will not receive the support of the Iraqis, the U.S. populace, and the international community
Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Operations
-Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support.
-Without legitimacy and credibility, operations will not receive the support of the Iraqis, the U.S. populace, and the international community
32.
Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects
- All operations have significant psychological effects.
- Populace and Resource Control measures, combat operations, and civic action programs.
- Some operations are done specifically for the psychological effect.
- Tactical victory maybe negated or overshadowed by negative psych. effects.
- Perception is more important than reality.
- Include Information Operations in all planning and execution of operations.
Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects
- All operations have significant psychological effects.
- Populace and Resource Control measures, combat operations, and civic action programs.
- Some operations are done specifically for the psychological effect.
- Tactical victory maybe negated or overshadowed by negative psych. effects.
- Perception is more important than reality.
- Include Information Operations in all planning and execution of operations.
33.
Apply Capabilities Indirectly
- Primary role of Combat Advisors and partnering units is to advise, train, and help host nation forces take the lead in the fight and to stabilize Iraq.
- It is important to teach them to plan instead of giving them tasks.
- Successful Multinational Force efforts reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the Iraqi armed forces and government.
- Legitimacy gives us credibility with the Iraqis which helps divide the Insurgents with the population.
Apply Capabilities Indirectly
- Primary role of Combat Advisors and partnering units is to advise, train, and help host nation forces take the lead in the fight and to stabilize Iraq.
- It is important to teach them to plan instead of giving them tasks.
- Successful Multinational Force efforts reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the Iraqi armed forces and government.
- Legitimacy gives us credibility with the Iraqis which helps divide the Insurgents with the population.
34.
Develop Multiple Options
- The nature of COIN and guerrilla warfare is the unexpected.
- Prepare for contingencies and follow-on missions.
- Plan to use full range of capabilities
- Operational environment may dictate a change of ROE or mission.
- Adaptability and operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options. ( Center of Gravity analysis)
- Can shift from one option to another before and during mission execution.
Develop Multiple Options
- The nature of COIN and guerrilla warfare is the unexpected.
- Prepare for contingencies and follow-on missions.
- Plan to use full range of capabilities
- Operational environment may dictate a change of ROE or mission.
- Adaptability and operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options. ( Center of Gravity analysis)
- Can shift from one option to another before and during mission execution.
35.
Ensure Long-Term Sustainment
- Limited advice and training of host nation forces in techniques and procedures beyond their capabilities to sustain.
- Modify Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures, training, operations, and logistics to fit the culture, educational level, and technological capability of the host nation forces.
- Recognize the programs that are durable, consistent, and sustainable by the host nation.
- Do not begin programs beyond economic or technological capacity of the host nation.
- Develop hand-over and sustainment in economic, social, political, and military/security initiatives and projects.
- Multinational Force funded programs are counterproductive if the populace becomes dependent on them and funding subsequently is lost.
Ensure Long-Term Sustainment
- Limited advice and training of host nation forces in techniques and procedures beyond their capabilities to sustain.
- Modify Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures, training, operations, and logistics to fit the culture, educational level, and technological capability of the host nation forces.
- Recognize the programs that are durable, consistent, and sustainable by the host nation.
- Do not begin programs beyond economic or technological capacity of the host nation.
- Develop hand-over and sustainment in economic, social, political, and military/security initiatives and projects.
- Multinational Force funded programs are counterproductive if the populace becomes dependent on them and funding subsequently is lost.
36.
Provide Sufficient Intelligence
Intelligence forms the basis for all COIN activities and programs. Detailed, near-real-time, all-source tactical intelligence products.
Act on information in a timely manner. Operations also depend on detailed and comprehensive intelligence on all aspects of the operational environment and its internal dynamics. Establish priority of effort when identifying intelligence requirements.
They note which are mission essential and which are “nice to have.”
Prioritize and request specific request for information to receive timely and specific intelligence.
Combat Advisors and partnering units insure host nation are conducting operations using accurate, real-time intelligence.
Human Intelligence, urban recon, and internal security elements which can assess the insurgent threat, warn the government, take action to penetrate the insurgent organization, and assist in neutralizing it.
In assessing the enemy threat consider aspects of the society not directly related to the tactical combat situation.
The information from intelligence assets allows them to advise, train, and help host nation counterparts and ease interagency efforts.
Provide Sufficient Intelligence
Intelligence forms the basis for all COIN activities and programs. Detailed, near-real-time, all-source tactical intelligence products.
Act on information in a timely manner. Operations also depend on detailed and comprehensive intelligence on all aspects of the operational environment and its internal dynamics. Establish priority of effort when identifying intelligence requirements.
They note which are mission essential and which are “nice to have.”
Prioritize and request specific request for information to receive timely and specific intelligence.
Combat Advisors and partnering units insure host nation are conducting operations using accurate, real-time intelligence.
Human Intelligence, urban recon, and internal security elements which can assess the insurgent threat, warn the government, take action to penetrate the insurgent organization, and assist in neutralizing it.
In assessing the enemy threat consider aspects of the society not directly related to the tactical combat situation.
The information from intelligence assets allows them to advise, train, and help host nation counterparts and ease interagency efforts.
37.
Balance Security and Synchronization
Partnering units often conduct planning, intelligence, and contingencies unilaterally due to security concerns, but compartmentalizing can exclude key Iraqis from the planning and learning process. (Unity of Effort)
Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security will usually cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination. (Armed Forces and Police)
Multinational Force forces must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution.
Balance Security and Synchronization
Partnering units often conduct planning, intelligence, and contingencies unilaterally due to security concerns, but compartmentalizing can exclude key Iraqis from the planning and learning process. (Unity of Effort)
Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security will usually cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination. (Armed Forces and Police)
Multinational Force forces must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution.
38. Challenges for the Combat Advisor Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be?
Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs.
Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie.
Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us.
Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.
Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be?
Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs.
Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie.
Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us.
Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.
39. It is necessary to empower HN junior leaders. Through
out Arab history officers have led down to the lowest
level. The development of a strong NCO and Warrant
Officer base is the road to a highly successful military.
How do we build an NCO Corps?
Answer:
Effective training centers
Promotion on merit
Combat Advisors insured senior unit HN leaders directed HN junior leaders to push NCOs into leadership. Senior leaders expressed that a mistake by an NCO would not
be detrimental (no zero defect) Answer:
Effective training centers
Promotion on merit
Combat Advisors insured senior unit HN leaders directed HN junior leaders to push NCOs into leadership. Senior leaders expressed that a mistake by an NCO would not
be detrimental (no zero defect)
40. Cultural Obstacles A Professional Culture that values
Who you know
Denial in the interest of saving face
Entitlements
Micro-management
41. The Warehouse Many IA soldiers were short Individual equipment to include:
body armor, helmets, and NVDs. Paperwork showed that all
the equipment in sufficient quantities had been delivered to
the BDE. MiTTs began to inspect the base warehouses. All
the equipment was in the warehouses, the supply officer
hadn’t issued it out. Having “things” equates to power. Therefore the more “things”: people, equipment, whatever I have, the more important and prestigious I am. Having “things” equates to power. Therefore the more “things”: people, equipment, whatever I have, the more important and prestigious I am.
42. The Number 2 Man An American unit trained an IA Strike element for Direct
Action missions. The unit was proficient in small unit tactics
and CQB. Each individual team and squad was able to
“flow” through a building. However, each time the unit
prepared to breach a structure, the Platoon Leader was
always in the initial stack. The Major viewed the flashbang as an important item. Therefore it was important for him to choose which soldiers would receive the equipment.The Major viewed the flashbang as an important item. Therefore it was important for him to choose which soldiers would receive the equipment.
43. Culture of Change The HN security forces are the model and best hope to break cycles of violence.
When we do make a change in the attitudes and habits of HN leadership, the effectiveness of the unit increase exponentially.
44. Building Teams Cohesive US units are not created overnight
Effective junior leaders are not born, they are built
Good leaders and good units eat, sleep, sweat
and bleed TOGETHER.
45. Challenges for U.S. Units “Take Charge” attitude
Dignity and Respect
Cultural sensitivity
Is perfection the enemy of good enough?
Over-coaching desensitizes the unit in training
Patience
46. Chow Plan for Combat Advisors An American Bn S-3 decided to send a
transition team an MKT (mobile kitchen) and crew due to the
following situation:
- Combat Advisors was constantly sick from HN mess hall.
- US and HN unit were geographically separated enough to make daily resupply unrealistic The Major viewed the flashbang as an important item. Therefore it was important for him to choose which soldiers would receive the equipment.The Major viewed the flashbang as an important item. Therefore it was important for him to choose which soldiers would receive the equipment.
47. The Military as a Reflection… How do we change a people?
Build Rapport:
HN must believe you care for him and his people.
Establish Credibility:
As a professional and a soldier
Legitimacy:
Do you practice what you preach?
48. You must have a plan Part of infiltration plan
Rapport Plan
Language
Culture
History
Credibility
Technically and tactically proficient
WHAT can you do and HOW can you do it?
49. Time, Proximity, and Interaction How do you (Combat Advisor and Partner Unit) build rapport, credibility, and legitimacy?
You must be there.
A cohesive, effective US unit is built as a Team
Why would we expect to create an effective HN unit, if we are not willing to be part of the team?
Only then will you be able to teach, coach, and mentor. (Shape the HN Security Forces) How do you build rapport?
You must invest your time in them.How do you build rapport?
You must invest your time in them.
50. Mutual Respect Only after rapport, credibility and legitimacy are
established can you effect change.
Imparting the “Good Boss” on a fellow professional
51. Pick and Choose Your Battles You cannot change culture
They want to emulate you
They want to be successful
Make your opinion valuable
A professional Army
Promotion based on merit
Professional NCO corps
Military must support political process
Defend the rights of citizens You can’t change a culture, but you can understand it.
Are our soldiers going to change their culture? No, but we can get the HN to understand it.
Only in a professional army can you reach self actualization.
Professional army will never overthrow their government
They are defending the polling sites but they don’t know about the process they are defending
You can’t change a culture, but you can understand it.
Are our soldiers going to change their culture? No, but we can get the HN to understand it.
Only in a professional army can you reach self actualization.
Professional army will never overthrow their government
They are defending the polling sites but they don’t know about the process they are defending
52. Being There Trends that can not be addressed if advisors
are not there
CQB – didn’t communicate/mark rooms clears, no one cleared or communicated moving to stairwell and roof
Didn’t utilize NCOs
Actions on contact
Hand and arm signals
Finger in trigger well
Fire control measures
Can’t call for assets
Assessment Do you go on the raid?
Are you in the Stack?
Do you go in the building?
When you first show up and take over for a MiTT they will tell you everything is good, we are Ts across the board. Wrong!!
You must do your own assessmentDo you go on the raid?
Are you in the Stack?
Do you go in the building?
When you first show up and take over for a MiTT they will tell you everything is good, we are Ts across the board. Wrong!!
You must do your own assessment
53. Combat Advisor Duties and Responsibilities
54. MiTT Chief ensures the HN Commander:
Issues planning guidance
Provides C2
Devises time plan
COA development
Ensures OPLAN are IAW higher OPORD
MiTT Staff ensures the HN Staff:
Prepares estimates of COA for identified task
Prepare tentative plan of COA
Coordinate execution of tasks Mission Planning Commander The MiTT commander issues planning guidance for planning the execution of the
FID mission and ensures that his intent is clearly understood. He provides C2 during
the MiTT's FID mission planning process. He devises a time event plan and
ensures that planning is completed accordingly. He selects COAs examined in
staff estimates that are IAW his intent, the higher commander’s OPORD or
OPLAN, and the available external CłI, CS, and CSS. He ensures the completed
portions of the MiTT's OPLAN for the execution of all specified and implied
mission-essential tasks are IAW the higher commander’s OPORD or OPLAN and
international and domestic laws.
S t a f f The MiTT staff prepares estimates of COAs for those tasks identified as essential
during the mission analysis IAW their functional areas or as directed. The staff
members prepare estimates that include, as a minimum, the best alternative COAs
supported by significant information and the coordination that will be necessary
for them. They write tentative plans IAW the COAs selected by the MiTT commander,
based on the planning guidance and unit’s SOP. They include in tentative
plans primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans, based on the criticality
of the task, the planning guidance, and anticipated changes to the mission.
They coordinate the execution of the tasks they are planning by disseminating pertinent
portions of their plans to other concerned SFODs, senior and subordinate
staff sections, and supporting elements. They notify other concerned (higher,
lower, or adjacent) staff sections of modified estimates and plans. They update, in
coordination with the S2, the MiTT's CCIR list IAW the latest information available
and requirements for additional CCIRs that arise from modified estimates
and plans.
Commander The MiTT commander issues planning guidance for planning the execution of the
FID mission and ensures that his intent is clearly understood. He provides C2 during
the MiTT's FID mission planning process. He devises a time event plan and
ensures that planning is completed accordingly. He selects COAs examined in
staff estimates that are IAW his intent, the higher commander’s OPORD or
OPLAN, and the available external CłI, CS, and CSS. He ensures the completed
portions of the MiTT's OPLAN for the execution of all specified and implied
mission-essential tasks are IAW the higher commander’s OPORD or OPLAN and
international and domestic laws.
S t a f f The MiTT staff prepares estimates of COAs for those tasks identified as essential
during the mission analysis IAW their functional areas or as directed. The staff
members prepare estimates that include, as a minimum, the best alternative COAs
supported by significant information and the coordination that will be necessary
for them. They write tentative plans IAW the COAs selected by the MiTT commander,
based on the planning guidance and unit’s SOP. They include in tentative
plans primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans, based on the criticality
of the task, the planning guidance, and anticipated changes to the mission.
They coordinate the execution of the tasks they are planning by disseminating pertinent
portions of their plans to other concerned SFODs, senior and subordinate
staff sections, and supporting elements. They notify other concerned (higher,
lower, or adjacent) staff sections of modified estimates and plans. They update, in
coordination with the S2, the MiTT's CCIR list IAW the latest information available
and requirements for additional CCIRs that arise from modified estimates
and plans.
55. MiTT XO ensures HN Executive Officer:
Chief of Staff
Performs analysis
Directs development
Coordinates and prepares plans
Reviews tentative plans with S3
MiTT S-1 ensures HN S1:
Prepares HN personnel status estimate
Prepares personnel support of the IA’s OPLAN
Proper coordinations
Mission Planning Executive Officer The MiTT XO (WO) performs the organizational analysis of the MiTT's coordinating
staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process IAW the initial
planning guidance. He directs the development of estimates and plans by the
staff sections IAW the time event plan. He coordinates and prepares planning
2-3
FM 31-20-3
documents for defensive source operations IAW oversight directives and mission
guidance. He reviews, with the MiTT S3, all estimates and tentative plans for
completeness to ensure they satisfy the planning requirements for essential tasks,
for specified or implied requirements for coordination, and for compliance with
the MiTT commander’s intent. He identifies and resolves conflicts between tentative
plans by first directing coordination between the concerned staff sections
and then, if necessary, requesting a decision from the MiTT commander. He approves
completed tentative plans and acts on specific matters IAW the MiTT
commander’s guidance. He also performs CMO officer (S5) FID mission planning
duties and prepares the CMO estimate and the civil affairs annex for the
MiTT's OPLAN.
Adjutant The MiTT adjutant (S1) prepares the MiTT personnel status estimate. He prepares
the personnel support portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of
the mission including, as a minimum, MiTT unit strength maintenance, administrative
and morale support services, and discipline. He coordinates with the proper
agencies for administrative and morale support services for MiTT personnel during
all phases of the mission. He reviews HN training plans for safety and accident
prevention measures.
Executive Officer The MiTT XO (WO) performs the organizational analysis of the MiTT's coordinating
staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process IAW the initial
planning guidance. He directs the development of estimates and plans by the
staff sections IAW the time event plan. He coordinates and prepares planning
2-3
FM 31-20-3
documents for defensive source operations IAW oversight directives and mission
guidance. He reviews, with the MiTT S3, all estimates and tentative plans for
completeness to ensure they satisfy the planning requirements for essential tasks,
for specified or implied requirements for coordination, and for compliance with
the MiTT commander’s intent. He identifies and resolves conflicts between tentative
plans by first directing coordination between the concerned staff sections
and then, if necessary, requesting a decision from the MiTT commander. He approves
completed tentative plans and acts on specific matters IAW the MiTT
commander’s guidance. He also performs CMO officer (S5) FID mission planning
duties and prepares the CMO estimate and the civil affairs annex for the
MiTT's OPLAN.
Adjutant The MiTT adjutant (S1) prepares the MiTT personnel status estimate. He prepares
the personnel support portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of
the mission including, as a minimum, MiTT unit strength maintenance, administrative
and morale support services, and discipline. He coordinates with the proper
agencies for administrative and morale support services for MiTT personnel during
all phases of the mission. He reviews HN training plans for safety and accident
prevention measures.
56. MiTT Intelligence Officer ensures HN S-2:
Prepares intelligence estimate and annex for OPLAN
Prepares IPB and intelligence collection plans
Updates PIR’s and IR’s from higher
Prepares Target Package
MiTT Operations and Training Officer ensures HN S3:
Prepares IA’s operation estimate
Supervises updating CCIR
Task organizes the HN unit
Responsible for advising HN on PSYOP activities
Issues planning guidance from partner unit commander’s guidance
Prepares training plans
Advises on paragraph 2 ,3 and 5 Mission Planning Intelligence Officer
Focuses those CTR teams and collection assets
Teaches how to conduct IPB and incorporate ASCOPE
Insures they are using their vast HUMINT capability
Continually facilitates cross talk with partner unit S2
Operations OfficerThe MiTT S2 prepares the MiTT intelligence estimate and annex for the MiTT's
OPLAN IAW the format in FM 101-5. He prepares the MiTT's IPB and intelligence
collection plans IAW FMs 34-36 and 34-130. He prepares the MiTT for all
phases of the mission, updating the MiTT's PIR ardor IR list and the area assessment.
He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as
SFOD-provided HN intelligence training and/or advisory assistance, as directed.
He analyzes the MiTT OPSEC measures and recommends to the MiTT S3 additions
and/or changes to the MiTT's OPSEC measures and plans. He supervises
the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent information
within the MiTT and, as applicable, to higher, lower, and adjacent concerned
units or agencies. He coordinates for intelligence support by consolidating IRs
and routing them to the proper supporting agencies IAW the MiTT's collection
plan(s). He ensures the security of the planning area and personnel.
Training Officer
Operations and The MiTT S3 prepares the MiTT's operations estimate. He supervises the updating
of the SFOD'S CCIR list. He presents to the MiTT commander the significant
changes to the MiTT's CCIRs that will cause changes to the intended execution
of the mission. He task organizes the MiTT to include the integration of any attachments
IAW the approved concept of the operation. He takes responsibility for
planning and coordinating all PSYOP activities. He issues planning guidance
through the MiTT XO to the MiTT staff sections for the development of their
portions of the MiTT's OPLAN. This guidance also includes the assignment of
specific tasks, the approved task organization, the concept of the operation, the
coordinating instructions, and the desired OPLAN format. He prepares Paragraph
2 (Mission) for the MiTT's OPLAN. He coordinates the restated mission
statement with the MiTT commander. He prepares Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the
MiTT's OPLAN including the MiTT commander’s intent. He prepares Paragraph
5 (Command and Signal) of the MiTT's OPLAN with the assistance of the
MiTT's communications-electronics (CE) staff. He prepares planning documents
and OPLAN annexes. He also schedules MiTT training to support defensive
source operations. He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's
OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN operational training and/or advisory assistance,
as directed. He prepares the MiTT commander’s guidance and the time
event plan for predeployment MiTT training and the rehearsal of mission essential
tasks. As a minimum, the rehearsals of the HN training program of
instruction (IWI) and/or advisory assistance are included. He compiles all prepared
and approved portions of the MiTT's OPLAN into one document IAW FM
101-5. He supervises MiTT OPSEC measures IAW the unit’s SOP, the MiTT
commander’s guidance, and the S2’s recommendations.
Intelligence Officer
Focuses those CTR teams and collection assets
Teaches how to conduct IPB and incorporate ASCOPE
Insures they are using their vast HUMINT capability
Continually facilitates cross talk with partner unit S2
Operations OfficerThe MiTT S2 prepares the MiTT intelligence estimate and annex for the MiTT's
OPLAN IAW the format in FM 101-5. He prepares the MiTT's IPB and intelligence
collection plans IAW FMs 34-36 and 34-130. He prepares the MiTT for all
phases of the mission, updating the MiTT's PIR ardor IR list and the area assessment.
He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as
SFOD-provided HN intelligence training and/or advisory assistance, as directed.
He analyzes the MiTT OPSEC measures and recommends to the MiTT S3 additions
and/or changes to the MiTT's OPSEC measures and plans. He supervises
the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent information
within the MiTT and, as applicable, to higher, lower, and adjacent concerned
units or agencies. He coordinates for intelligence support by consolidating IRs
and routing them to the proper supporting agencies IAW the MiTT's collection
plan(s). He ensures the security of the planning area and personnel.
Training Officer
Operations and The MiTT S3 prepares the MiTT's operations estimate. He supervises the updating
of the SFOD'S CCIR list. He presents to the MiTT commander the significant
changes to the MiTT's CCIRs that will cause changes to the intended execution
of the mission. He task organizes the MiTT to include the integration of any attachments
IAW the approved concept of the operation. He takes responsibility for
planning and coordinating all PSYOP activities. He issues planning guidance
through the MiTT XO to the MiTT staff sections for the development of their
portions of the MiTT's OPLAN. This guidance also includes the assignment of
specific tasks, the approved task organization, the concept of the operation, the
coordinating instructions, and the desired OPLAN format. He prepares Paragraph
2 (Mission) for the MiTT's OPLAN. He coordinates the restated mission
statement with the MiTT commander. He prepares Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the
MiTT's OPLAN including the MiTT commander’s intent. He prepares Paragraph
5 (Command and Signal) of the MiTT's OPLAN with the assistance of the
MiTT's communications-electronics (CE) staff. He prepares planning documents
and OPLAN annexes. He also schedules MiTT training to support defensive
source operations. He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's
OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN operational training and/or advisory assistance,
as directed. He prepares the MiTT commander’s guidance and the time
event plan for predeployment MiTT training and the rehearsal of mission essential
tasks. As a minimum, the rehearsals of the HN training program of
instruction (IWI) and/or advisory assistance are included. He compiles all prepared
and approved portions of the MiTT's OPLAN into one document IAW FM
101-5. He supervises MiTT OPSEC measures IAW the unit’s SOP, the MiTT
commander’s guidance, and the S2’s recommendations.
57. MiTT Logistics Officer ensures HN S4:
Advises on paragraph 4
Prepares logistic support
Train HN on logistic support
MiTT Electronics Staff (Communications) ensures HN Staff:
Prepares communications estimate
Prepares paragraph 5
Develop military and nonmilitary communications
Develop training on communications equipment Mission Planning Supply Officer The MiTT supply officer (S4) prepares Paragraph 4 (Service Support) of the
MiTT's OPLAN with the assistance of the MiTT S1. He prepares the logistic
support portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission. He
coordinates for all MiTT logistic support by consolidating requests and ensuring
they are routed to the proper supporting agencies. He prepares other estimates and
portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN logistic and/or advisory
assistance, as directed.
Electronics Staff
Communications- The MiTT CE staff prepares the MiTT's communications estimate. The staff
helps the MiTT S3 prepare Paragraph 5 of the MiTT's OPLAN. The staff prepares
the communications portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of
the mission. This portion includes internal MiTT communications; communications
with higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units and agencies for C3I, CS, and
CSS; and the integration of available HN military and nonmilitary communications
into the MiTT's communications plan. The staff requests additional communications
resources and support, as needed, ensuring that requests are routed to
the proper supporting agencies. The staff also prepares other estimates and portions
of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN communications training
and/or advisory assistance, as directed.
Supply Officer The MiTT supply officer (S4) prepares Paragraph 4 (Service Support) of the
MiTT's OPLAN with the assistance of the MiTT S1. He prepares the logistic
support portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission. He
coordinates for all MiTT logistic support by consolidating requests and ensuring
they are routed to the proper supporting agencies. He prepares other estimates and
portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN logistic and/or advisory
assistance, as directed.
Electronics Staff
Communications- The MiTT CE staff prepares the MiTT's communications estimate. The staff
helps the MiTT S3 prepare Paragraph 5 of the MiTT's OPLAN. The staff prepares
the communications portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of
the mission. This portion includes internal MiTT communications; communications
with higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units and agencies for C3I, CS, and
CSS; and the integration of available HN military and nonmilitary communications
into the MiTT's communications plan. The staff requests additional communications
resources and support, as needed, ensuring that requests are routed to
the proper supporting agencies. The staff also prepares other estimates and portions
of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN communications training
and/or advisory assistance, as directed.
58. MiTT Medical staff ensures HN Staff:
- Prepares medical estimate
- Input for paragraph 4
- Prepares the health services portion of the OPLAN
- Develop medical training Mission Planning Medical Staff The MiTT medical staff prepares the MiTT medical estimate. The staff provides
the MiTT S1 (MiTT B XO) input for Paragraph 4 of the MiTT's OPLAN. The
staff prepares the health service portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all
phases of the mission. This portion includes intradetachment support; support to
and from higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units and agencies; and the integration
of available HN military and nonmilitary medical assets into the MiTT's health
services plan. The staff requests additional medical resources and support, as
needed, ensuring requests are routed to the proper supporting agencies. The staff
2-5
FM 31-20-3
prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFODprovided
HN medical training and/or advisory assistance, as directed.
Medical Staff The MiTT medical staff prepares the MiTT medical estimate. The staff provides
the MiTT S1 (MiTT B XO) input for Paragraph 4 of the MiTT's OPLAN. The
staff prepares the health service portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all
phases of the mission. This portion includes intradetachment support; support to
and from higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units and agencies; and the integration
of available HN military and nonmilitary medical assets into the MiTT's health
services plan. The staff requests additional medical resources and support, as
needed, ensuring requests are routed to the proper supporting agencies. The staff
2-5
FM 31-20-3
prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFODprovided
HN medical training and/or advisory assistance, as directed.
59. The MiTT commander
- Advises and assists the HN unit commander
- Recommends improvements or additions
- Helps the HN unit commander understand and executes the partner unit commander’s intent
- Keeps the command communications channels open between HN and partner unit Conduct of Operations -advises and assists the HN unit commander in the C˛ process of tactical COIN operations.
Accompanies the HN unit commander when he receives his mission from higher
headquarters.
-Assists the HN commander in anticipating his next mission.
-Monitors the HN unit commander’s identification and understanding of his commander’s
intent and all specified or implied tasks. He recommends improvements
or additions, as needed.
-Reviews the HN unit commander’s identified operational constraints and restraints
for completeness.
-Reviews the HN unit commander’s time event plan and troop leading procedures
and recommends improvements as necessary.
-Helps the HN unit commander provide C˛ during COIN operations.
-Monitors the tactical situation and recommends changes to the present COA to
exploit changes in the situation.
-The MiTT commander also monitors the flow of information to the HN commander.
-He recommends improvements needed to make continuous use of intelligence
collection assets and to keep subordinates reporting combat information.
-He screens the information given to the HN commander to prevent information
overload. He keeps the command communications channels open for critical
information.
-advises and assists the HN unit commander in the C˛ process of tactical COIN operations.
Accompanies the HN unit commander when he receives his mission from higher
headquarters.
-Assists the HN commander in anticipating his next mission.
-Monitors the HN unit commander’s identification and understanding of his commander’s
intent and all specified or implied tasks. He recommends improvements
or additions, as needed.
-Reviews the HN unit commander’s identified operational constraints and restraints
for completeness.
-Reviews the HN unit commander’s time event plan and troop leading procedures
and recommends improvements as necessary.
-Helps the HN unit commander provide C˛ during COIN operations.
-Monitors the tactical situation and recommends changes to the present COA to
exploit changes in the situation.
-The MiTT commander also monitors the flow of information to the HN commander.
-He recommends improvements needed to make continuous use of intelligence
collection assets and to keep subordinates reporting combat information.
-He screens the information given to the HN commander to prevent information
overload. He keeps the command communications channels open for critical
information.
60. MiTT XO:
- Monitors all HN staff sections
- Helps his counterpart
- Monitors the liaison and coordination with higher HN units
MiTT S1:
- Monitors maintenance
- Monitors processing of wounded
- Monitors the processing of detainees/Records HR violations
- Monitors the HN unit morale
Conduct of Operations MiTT XO:
-Monitors all HN staff sections and recommends changes in organization and
procedures, as necessary, to improve efficiency.
-Helps his counterpart during periods when the counterpart is in command of
the HN force.
-Monitors the liaison and coordination with higher HN headquarters. He recommends
changes, as necessary, to improve efficiency.
MiTT S1:
-Monitors the maintenance of HN unit strength and recommends improvements.
-Monitors the processing of HN wounded and killed in action (KIA) and recommends
improvements.
-Monitors the processing of prisoners of war (PWs) and detainees to ensure
respect for human rights.
-Monitors the HN unit morale and recommends actions to improve it.
MiTT XO:
-Monitors all HN staff sections and recommends changes in organization and
procedures, as necessary, to improve efficiency.
-Helps his counterpart during periods when the counterpart is in command of
the HN force.
-Monitors the liaison and coordination with higher HN headquarters. He recommends
changes, as necessary, to improve efficiency.
MiTT S1:
-Monitors the maintenance of HN unit strength and recommends improvements.
-Monitors the processing of HN wounded and killed in action (KIA) and recommends
improvements.
-Monitors the processing of prisoners of war (PWs) and detainees to ensure
respect for human rights.
-Monitors the HN unit morale and recommends actions to improve it.
61. MiTT S2:
- Monitors OPSEC
- Monitors the updating of the situation map
- Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information
- Assists HN in examining captured insurgent documents, material, and personnel .
- Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports
- Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander
- Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols
- Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance and surveillance, I/O
Conduct of Operations MiTT S2:
- Monitors OPSEC and other procedures used to protect classified and sensitive
material and operations and recommends improvements.
-Monitors the updating of the situation map. He recommends actions to keep
it current based on the available intelligence.
-Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit’s tactical operations
center (TOC) communications SOP to ensure the S2 section receives
situation reports from the S3 and all attached units.
-Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information
on the effects of weather and terrain on operations. He also monitors
their effects on friendly or insurgent COAs.
-Assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material.
-Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports from available
sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets.
-Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander, staff,
higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments. He recommends
improvements in procedures, as necessary.
-Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance
and surveillance activities.
-Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance
and surveillance plans to ensure the complete coverage of the AO.
MiTT S2:
- Monitors OPSEC and other procedures used to protect classified and sensitive
material and operations and recommends improvements.
-Monitors the updating of the situation map. He recommends actions to keep
it current based on the available intelligence.
-Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit’s tactical operations
center (TOC) communications SOP to ensure the S2 section receives
situation reports from the S3 and all attached units.
-Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information
on the effects of weather and terrain on operations. He also monitors
their effects on friendly or insurgent COAs.
-Assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material.
-Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports from available
sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets.
-Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander, staff,
higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments. He recommends
improvements in procedures, as necessary.
-Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance
and surveillance activities.
-Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance
and surveillance plans to ensure the complete coverage of the AO.
MiTT S2:
- Monitors OPSEC and other procedures used to protect classified and sensitive
material and operations and recommends improvements.
-Monitors the updating of the situation map. He recommends actions to keep
it current based on the available intelligence.
-Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit’s tactical operations
center (TOC) communications SOP to ensure the S2 section receives
situation reports from the S3 and all attached units.
-Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information
on the effects of weather and terrain on operations. He also monitors
their effects on friendly or insurgent COAs.
-Assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material.
-Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports from available
sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets.
-Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander, staff,
higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments. He recommends
improvements in procedures, as necessary.
-Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance
and surveillance activities.
-Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance
and surveillance plans to ensure the complete coverage of the AO.
MiTT S2:
- Monitors OPSEC and other procedures used to protect classified and sensitive
material and operations and recommends improvements.
-Monitors the updating of the situation map. He recommends actions to keep
it current based on the available intelligence.
-Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit’s tactical operations
center (TOC) communications SOP to ensure the S2 section receives
situation reports from the S3 and all attached units.
-Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information
on the effects of weather and terrain on operations. He also monitors
their effects on friendly or insurgent COAs.
-Assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material.
-Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports from available
sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets.
-Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander, staff,
higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments. He recommends
improvements in procedures, as necessary.
-Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance
and surveillance activities.
-Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance
and surveillance plans to ensure the complete coverage of the AO.
62. MiTT S3
Assists in preparing tactical plans with the HN S2 using estimates, predictions, and information.
Monitors command and communications net
Assists in supervising training and preparing for operations.
Monitors and makes recommendations
MiTT S4
Monitors the maintenance of equipment readiness,
Monitors the support provided to the HN unit, its subunits, and attachments.
He recommends improvements as necessary.
Assists in supervising the use of transportation assets.
MiTT Fire Direction NCO
Assists the HN unit in planning for, coordinating, requesting, and using fire support.
Recommends using fire support based on firepower restrictions and the principle of minimum-essential force.
Conduct of Operations MiTT S3 Assists in preparing tactical plans with the HN S2 using estimates, predictions,
and information.
Monitors command and communications nets.
Assists in preparing all orders and plans.
Assists in supervising training and preparing for operations.
Monitors and makes recommendations to ensure operations are consistent
with overall IDAD goals.
Assists in coordinating and implementing CA and/or PSYOP tasks assigned
to the HN unit.
MiTT S4 Monitors the maintenance of equipment readiness, recommending improvements
as necessary.
Monitors the support provided to the HN unit, its subunits, and attachments.
He recommends improvements as necessary.
Assists in supervising the use of transportation assets.
MiTT Weapons NCO Assists the HN unit in planning for, coordinating, requesting, and using fire
support.
Recommends using fire support based on firepower restrictions and the
principle of minimum-essential force.
MiTT S3 Assists in preparing tactical plans with the HN S2 using estimates, predictions,
and information.
Monitors command and communications nets.
Assists in preparing all orders and plans.
Assists in supervising training and preparing for operations.
Monitors and makes recommendations to ensure operations are consistent
with overall IDAD goals.
Assists in coordinating and implementing CA and/or PSYOP tasks assigned
to the HN unit.
MiTT S4 Monitors the maintenance of equipment readiness, recommending improvements
as necessary.
Monitors the support provided to the HN unit, its subunits, and attachments.
He recommends improvements as necessary.
Assists in supervising the use of transportation assets.
MiTT Weapons NCO Assists the HN unit in planning for, coordinating, requesting, and using fire
support.
Recommends using fire support based on firepower restrictions and the
principle of minimum-essential force.
63. Terminal Learning Objective Advisors understand the institutional and cultural
differences between HN and American units.
Advisors understan how their actions facilitate the
creation of a successful, professional HN Army.