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Ordnance Safety. DO NOT TOUCH! DO NOT MOVE! Note/record location Call 911 or local law enforcement. Technical Project Planning (TPP) Meeting 7. Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS), Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS)

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ordnance safety
Ordnance Safety
  • DO NOT TOUCH!DO NOT MOVE!
  • Note/record location
  • Call 911 or local law enforcement
technical project planning tpp meeting 7
Technical ProjectPlanning (TPP) Meeting 7

Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS), Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS)

Kirtland AFB Precision Bombing Ranges (N-1, N-2, N-3, N-4 and “New” Demolition Area)

(A.K.A. West Mesa)

FUDS ID K06NM044501

agenda
Agenda

Pre-meeting Coffee (optional) – 8:30-9:00

  • Introductions and Agenda Review
  • Review results of the follow-up MRS boundary meeting
  • Explain MRS N-2/NDA split from rest of MRSs
  • Summary of the RI Report
  • Summary of the FS Report
  • Summary of Regulator Comment Resolution
  • Present MEC HA Results

Break -10:00-10:15

  • Introduction to the RD/RA
  • USACE Goal
  • Presentation of Conceptual Site Model
  • Discussion of Stakeholder values
  • Development of DQOs
agenda continued
Agenda (continued)

Lunch - 11:45-1:00

  • Presentation of Recommended RA Alternative

Break – 2:30 – 2:45

  • Presentation of EM61 and MetalMapper Technologies
  • Presentation of Alternative Geophysical Survey and RA Design Approaches
    • UXO Estimator
    • VSP
    • Probabilistic Approach
  • Discussion and Selection Design Approach for the RD/RA
  • Presentation of Hazard Assessment Approach
  • Final Discussions

Meeting End – 5:00

mrs n 2 nda addressed first
MRS N-2/NDA Addressed First
  • The RI and FS reports address MRSs N-2 and NDA only.
  • The primary reason this RI/FS report is focused on N-2 and NDA is because there is a more urgent need to reduce potential hazards at these sites than at the other MRSs.
  • The City of Albuquerque intends to develop this land within the next five years.
  • Separating these “high priority” sites from the other six MRSs will allow USACE to expedite progress to select a remedial alternative for these two MRSs, and thus mitigate the majority of hazards that would be potentially encountered during future planned land development activities.
  • A result of the RI and Technical Project Planning (TPP) discussions is that MRSs N-2 and NDA were combined into one MRS.
  • These areas are henceforth designated as MRS N-2/NDA.
mrs n 2 nda boundary
MRS N-2/NDA Boundary
  • Primary Purpose - Develop a systematic defensible approach for defining the West Mesa MRS boundaries.
  • DOD and EPA have no formal approach to defining MRS boundaries.
  • Julie Jacobs (NMED) spoke with a representative of UXOPro.com, who suggested using a specified distance beyond the furthest MD item to help define the MRS boundary.
  • AR 750-10, Range Regulations for Firing Ammunition in Time of Peace, May 1939 – January 1944; AAF Manual 85-0-1, Army Air Forces Gunnery and Bombardment Ranges, June 1945; Army Air Corps Studies and Reports on Bombing Analysis and Bombing Accuracy, 1942. In reference to 100-lb AN-M30 General Purpose bombs this research states:
  • From studies completed in WWII, “99 percent of the bombs should be found within 3,000 feet for bombers flying at 25,000 feet or below and at speeds up to 250 mph. The same study implied a 2,000-foot radius should include 95 percent of the bombs under the same conditions.”
approach for determining west mesa mrs boundaries
Approach for Determining West Mesa MRS Boundaries
  • First, establish the 3000-ft radius boundary from each target feature center.
  • Use dig results from the EE/CA, TCRA and WAA to determine where anomalies identified as MD fall outside or within 250 ft of the 3000-ft boundary.
  • Draw boundary to include the MD item plus a buffer of 250-ft beyond the item.
  • If there is an MD item further away, but within 250 ft of the MD, move the boundary 250 ft beyond that item.
  • If an MD item is discovered outside of the 250-ft buffer this MD item shall be considered an isolated incidence and not be included in the MRS boundary.
  • In an instance where a MEC is discovered within the 250-ft buffer or outside of the MRS boundary the boundary will be moved to include the location of the MEC item plus the 250-ft buffer.
  • All agreed that if during subsequent phases of investigation or remedial action, if MEC and MD items are found adjacent to a boundary, the boundary will be refined.
mrs n 2 nda boundary continued
MRS N-2/NDA Boundary (continued)
  • Figures display:
    • proposed MRS boundaries 3,000 ft from target centers,
    • anomaly density contours,
    • colorized anomaly concentrations from heli-mag surveys,
    • anomalies identified by the EE/CA,
    • likelihood 2 anomalies identified by the WAA,
    • dig results from the WAA and EE/CA that were MD items greater than three lbs,
    • and TCRA dig results for MD greater than three lbs.
slide12

The result of applying these criteria is that Former MRSs N-2 and NDA are combined into one MRS designated as MRS N-2/NDA. This approach:

  • Serves to encompass all high-density anomaly areas delineated through statistical spatial analysis and indicative of specific impact areas
  • Provides supporting documentation for boundary selection in the form of DoD studies specific to the munitions used at the site
  • Provides built-in contingences that allow refinement of the MRS boundary if MD meeting a specified criteria are discovered, outside of the initial MRS boundary in the future; and
  • It makes the conservative assumption that the two target areas should be treated similarly, and assumes the higher risk of HE bombs cannot be ruled out, given a 100-lb HE bomb was found elsewhere outside the NDA target in 1996.
goals of the ri
Goals of the RI
  • Determine nature and extent of MC contamination at each MRS,
  • Verify the type of MEC items within each MRS,
  • Determine the density and distribution of MEC items within each MRS,
  • Redefine the boundaries of each identified MRS,
  • Redefine the boundary of the West Mesa MRA, if necessary
  • Determine the presence or absence and distribution of 100-lb HE bombs within MRSs N-2 and New Demolition Area,
  • Assess MEC Hazard with MEC HA, and
  • Develop a FS to identify and evaluate munitions response alternatives for each MRS.
mrss n 2 nda mc sampling
MRSs N-2/NDA MC Sampling

8 random SUs and 4 biased SUs performed at N-2 target area

No HE MC detected

8 random SUs and 5 biased SUs performed at NDA target area

No HE MC detected

intrusive mec investigation
Intrusive MEC Investigation

Excavation Results

intrusive mec investigation2
Intrusive MEC Investigation

Reacquisition of 100 Anomaly Locations

EM 61 Anomaly Location Verification

intrusive mec investigation3
Intrusive MEC Investigation

HE - Bomb Fragmentation

M38 Sand-filled Practice Bomb

slide30

Ranking - ■ High ability to meet criteria ◘ Moderate ability to meet the criteria □ Does not meet criteria

<< - Low cost to implement compared to other criteria

TBD - to be determined. These criteria will be further evaluated following the comment period for the RI/FS report.

summary of ri fs regulator comment resolution
Summary of RI /FS Regulator Comment Resolution

New Mexico Environment Department

  • NMED does nor concur with the RI/FS
  • Clear definitions / consistency of terminology
  • Corrections to MRSPP and MEC HA scoring sheets
  • Horizontal Anomaly Density not explained clearly
  • “High-Density” Area not mentioned in the RI, but discussed in the evaluation of alternatives

EPA

  • Is a 0-4” surface sample sufficient if craters have aeolian deposits in them?
  • 5-year review clock starts when construction of the remedy starts
  • 5 -year review cost of $5k is low
  • Schedule for Proposed Plan
revised conceptual site models1
Revised Conceptual Site Models

CSMs visually represent 5 site profiles

Facility Profile

Physical Profile

Release Profile

Land Use and Exposure Profile

Ecological Profile

CSMs incorporate site profiles to provide a visual representation of site hazards and exposure pathways for assessment of remedial alternatives

csm pathway analysis
CSM Pathway Analysis
  • The pathway analysis determines if there is a complete pathway for either human or environmental exposure to HTRW or MEC
  • Pathway analyses is depicted in a 3D model the draft final RI/FS report
mec hazard assessment1
MEC Hazard Assessment
  • MEC Hazard Assessments (MEC HA) according to guidance provided by EPA Munitions and Explosives of Concern Hazard Assessment Methodology Interim 2008.
  • A MEC HA was produced for MRS N-2/NDA
  • The MEC HA produces a qualitative hazard level number value based on weighted scoring of:
  • Physical site conditions,
  • Site land use,
  • Former DoD site usage, and
  • Data collected during the RI and previous investigations
  • MEC HA hazard levels range from 4 (low) to 1 (very high)
  • MEC HA may be utilized to determine projected future hazard levels as well as current hazard levels
usace goal for mrs n 2 nda
USACE Goal for MRS N-2/NDA
  • RD/RA work will result in sufficient site clearance to support a decision for no further RA (i.e. MEC removal) with LUCs)
background
Background
  • Historical investigations of the MRS that comprises NDA/N2 and surrounding area have characterized the density of anomalies and established that extensive debris from 100# practice bombs is present throughout the area, while less extensive fragments from 100# HE bombs is restricted to an area around the NDA.
  • No MEC has been found in this area despite extensive efforts to investigate anomalies that were considered the most likely to represent MEC.
  • A single 100# HE bomb was encountered E or SE of the NDA during construction of roadside drainage ditches in 1996.
conceptual site model csm and key assumptions
Conceptual Site Model (CSM)and Key Assumptions
  • Intact spotting charges can separate at a very low frequency, conservatively, probably less than 5% of practice bombs dropped.
    • None have been observed at the site to date after thousands of excavations and surface MD observations.
    • Separation would occur on impact with the ground; bouncing might occur
    • Likely to remain on the surface
conceptual site model csm and key assumptions1
Conceptual Site Model (CSM)and Key Assumptions
  • Primary future land use in the MRS is industrial (e.g., airport expansion)
  • Exposure scenarios might include:
    • Construction workers including backhoe and bulldozer operators
    • Industrial (airport) workers
  • Consequences of encounter
    • 100 # HE – death or serious injury
    • 100# Practice bomb w/intact spotting charge or separated spotting charge– injury, possible death for unprotected personnel handling (much smaller radius of impact)
factors to take into account in design
Factors to take into account in design
  • Anomaly density
  • Pattern of observed craters
  • Flight path
  • Wind Direction
  • Soil characteristics (caliche impact on penetration depth)
  • Practice bombing might have similar but less precise pattern of “misses” as HE bombing
  • Larger number of practice bombs dropped
additional design factors
Additional Design Factors
  • Evidence suggests that the number of HE bombs can be fairly accurately determined from the air photo evidence for the following reasons.
    • RI intrusive investigation results suggest a low number of bombs based on the scarcity of frag observed on the surface and found in the subsurface at the center of the site.
    • WAA helimag survey data support low amounts of frag at the site.
    • A conclusion in the WAA report suggested that the target was either cleaned up at some point or was used sparingly.
    • Helimag data for other HE bomb targets that were used more and the helimag data showed significantly more anomalies, more like what we see at N-2.
data quality objectives
Data Quality Objectives
  • Identify the Goals of the Remedial Action
    • For the Target Centers/high anomaly density areas:
      • Perform a surface clearance of all metallic debris on the surface found through visual observations assisted by a hand held magnetometer.
      • Determine the location, and intrusively investigate, all subsurface anomalies that are suspected of being targets of Interest (TOI).
      • Remove and destroy any MEC.
      • Confirm that the probability of MEC remaining below the surface is adequately low to conclude no further remedial action is needed, beyond continued land use controls.
slide58

Data Quality Objectives

  • Identify the Goals of the Study
    • For the medium anomaly density areas:
      • Perform a surface clearance of all metallic debris on the surface found through visual observations assisted by a hand held magnetometer.
      • Confirm that the probability of MEC remaining below the surface is adequately low to conclude no further remedial action beyond continued land use controls is needed.
data quality objectives1
Data Quality Objectives
  • Identify the Goals of the Study
    • For the low anomaly density portions of the MRS:
      • Confirm that the probability of MEC remaining below the surface is adequately low to conclude no further remedial action beyond continued land use controls is needed.
information and data needs
Information and Data Needs
  • Historical data including location of craters, anomalies, digs
  • Target Center:
    • Results of surface clearance efforts
    • Results of 100% EM-61 survey of the target center/high anomaly density areas.
      • Locations of all TOI (anomalies that could be reflective of MEC) and should be further characterized
      • Results of MetalMapper characterization of the TOI identified using EM-61
      • Results of intrusive investigations of all TOI that the MetalMapper identifies as having characteristics consistent with MEC
  • TOI includes 100# practice bombs w/associated spotting charge, ~3# separated spotting charge, and 100# HE bombs
information and data needs1
Information and Data Needs
  • Medium anomaly density/crater area
    • Results of surface clearance efforts
    • Results of EM-61 investigation of transects taken to adequately represent the area
      • Locations of all anomalies that should be further characterized with MetalMapper
      • Results of MetalMapper characterization
      • Results of intrusive investigations of all TOI that the MetalMapper identifies as having characteristics consistent with MEC
information and data needs2
Information and Data Needs
  • Low anomaly density areas
    • Results of EM-61 investigation of transects taken to adequately represent the area
      • Locations of all anomalies that should be further characterized with MetalMapper
      • Results of MetalMapper characterization
      • Results of intrusive investigations of all TOI that the MetalMapper identifies as having characteristics consistent with MEC.
boundaries
Boundaries
  • Geographic boundaries of the 20 acres surrounding the NDA target center and 40 acres surrounding the N2 target center
  • Geographic boundaries of the area containing anomaly densities greater than background (medium density, 25-100 anomalies per acre) and areas where craters were observed in historical aerial photographs outside the target centers.
    • Based on spatial statistical contours developed using the historical geophysical surveys.
  • MRS boundaries developed from the RI based on a 3000 ft radius area surrounding target centers, and incorporating all anomaly density contours greater than background and the majority of debris identified as MD.
    • 4 acre (127 m2) (or other size) grid over the area, width of transect and max length of a transect
  • The subsurface area of interest includes the top 4 feet of soil.
analytic approach vsp option
Analytic Approach (VSP Option)
  • If after completing an adequate survey and investigating all anomalies of interest no MEC has been found in the investigation area, conclude that no further remedial action is required in the area.
    • Notes:
      • “Investigation” involve reacquiring the EM-61 anomaly and characterization using MetalMapper, and subsequent intrusive investigation of all anomalies having characteristics consistent with MEC
      • “Adequate” survey involves investigating the random number and location of transects required by VSP to achieve a desired confidence level.
    • Adaptive approach: If MEC is uncovered in any 4 acre cell investigated, resurvey this cell to determine if the cell is now MEC free.
performance criteria
Performance Criteria
  • For the target center/high anomaly density areas, establish using the proposed technology that the area is free of MEC.
  • For the medium and low anomaly density areas, determine with 99% confidence that 99.375% of all transects within the area are free of MEC.
    • NOTE:
      • Assumes the geophysical detectors reliably detect and locate all MEC. QC requirements for the proposed system will be established and tested during the study.
      • Careful attention needs to be paid to the inputs to understand what % of the transects would yield a comparable requirement as UXO estimator (e.g., .1 per acre).
notion of probabilistic risk based sampling design
Notion of Probabilistic Risk-Based Sampling Design
  • Suppose that you can afford to sample exactly X acres, which sample design will lead to the greatest confidence that no MEC is there (if you find none)?
    • Sampling X acres where you think there’s a low chance of MEC
    • Random sampling of X acres
    • Sampling X acres where you think there’s a high chance of MEC
probabilistic risk based sampling design
Probabilistic Risk-Based Sampling Design
  • Prioritize locations that have highest risk
  • Risk depends on potentially many factors
    • Density (i.e. prevalence rate) of MEC
    • Accessibility (e.g. depth, public access)
    • MEC stability (e.g. sensitivity, degradation)
    • Individual behavior of finder (difficult to model)
      • Typically considered identical across a site, but could vary with respect to different MEC
    • MEC danger (i.e., result of explosion)
evidence of mec density
Evidence of MEC Density
  • Historical use indicates decreasing density moving away from target areas
  • Crater record shows evidence of target hit/miss behavior of HE bombs
  • Previous sampling efforts show location of high densities of anomalies
    • Evidence of behavior of combination of HE and practice bombs
transects vs grids
Transects vs Grids
  • Transects
    • Can get small amount of information about a large number of areas
    • Effort (cost) associated with locating the transects
    • Large number of edge effects
  • Grids
    • Limited number of locations can be examined
    • Effort of locating grids low
    • Fewer edge effects
  • Cost-Benefit?
probabilistic risk based sample designs
Probabilistic, Risk-Based Sample Designs
  • Utilize crater information only
    • Focuses on 100-lb HE bombs
  • Utilize anomaly density only
    • More emphasis on 100-lb practice bombs and associated spotting charges, but includes HE frag
  • Utilize both
    • Apply risk considerations to decide on balance between
  • Transect and grid designs
example designs
Example Designs
  • VSP
  • Probabilistic allocation
  • UXO Estimator
uxo estimator
UXO Estimator
  • Ordnance is assumed to occur homogeneously within the AOI.
    • “This does not mean the ordnance is uniformly distributed; it only means the occurrence of ordnance items follows a Poisson statistical distribution.”
    • “Therefore, there may be certain areas of high density and low density ordnance, as long as it is not “clustered.” (defined as non-clustered poison distribution)”
    • We interpret this to mean that MEC could show up anywhere but will not be clustered to the point of failing Poisson distribution assumptions
uxo estimator1
UXO Estimator
  • Does not provide a map – assumes random placement of transects or grids w/in sample area
  • Requires you to specify the acceptable number per acre you might leave behind
  • Requires a separate software package to develop maps of transect/grid placement
  • Does acknowledge and deal directly with what to do if an item is found
accessibility based risk
Accessibility-Based Risk
  • Highly accessible locations
    • If MEC present, increased likelihood of public encounter
    • If highly accessible in the past, likely to have already been found if there
  • Less accessible locations
    • The reverse
  • For West Mesa, primary accessibility difference across the site may be depth – presence of gullies/depressions where high deposition is likely
mec stability
MEC stability
  • If MEC is present, why?
    • Complete dud (degraded explosive material, low danger)
    • Failed firing mechanism (danger if can be triggered another way)
    • Landed unusually (still fully armed?)
  • Some MEC more likely than others to be set off upon encounter
  • Some MEC degrades in environment more quickly than others
  • MEC danger – consequence of explosion much higher for HE bomb than spotting charge
slide82

Two Fold DGM Survey

    • Geonics EM 61 MK2 Towed Array and Man Portable Surveys
    • Metal Mapper Surveys (MM)
classification objective
Classification Objective

Targets of Interest (TOI)

  • 100-lb practice bombs with M1A1 spotting charges,
  • 100-lb HE bombs,
  • Separate M1A1 spotting charges

To identify those anomalies that are definitely clutter (they cannot possibly be UXO) at the site

slide84

Pre DGM work

    • Surveying
    • Surface Clearance,
    • Vegetation Removal
    • Instrument Verification Strip (IVS)
    • Create MM Calibration/Library Pit
    • 10 acre test site in high density area
em61 mk2 towed array
EM61 MK2 Towed Array
  • DGM Survey Coverage
    • High density N-2 / NDA - 100% mapping of targets
    • Medium and low density areas – sampling approach to be determined
  • Process EM61 data and select targets
slide88

Testing MM over TOI in Test Pit for Target Library

  • Reacquire EM61 targets with Metal Mapper (MM)
  • Collect Static data set over EM61 targets
slide89

MetalMapper

  • 3 orthogonal transmitters & 7 three-axis receivers
    • Park over location estimated by previous survey
    • Fire transmitter 1, record on all 21 receivers
    • Fire transmitter 2, record on all receivers
    • Fire transmitter 3, record on all receivers
slide90

Amplitude

MM: Horizontal UXO

Transmit x

Transmit y

Transmit z

Time

Receive x

Receive y

Receive z

Metal Mapper Channel 1 – Horizontal 81 mm

slide91

Amplitude

MM: Horizontal UXO

Transmit x

Transmit y

Transmit z

Time

Receive x

Receive y

Receive z

Metal Mapper Channel 20 – Horizontal 81 mm

slide92

MM: Horizontal UXO

Amplitude

Transmit x

Transmit y

Transmit z

Time

Receive x

Receive y

Receive z

Metal Mapper Channel 40 – Horizontal 81 mm

slide93

Process MM Data

    • Invert data using UXO_Analyze (Geosoft)
    • Inversion compared to TOI Library
  • Dig or no Dig decision on each EM-61 targets
  • Create prioritized dig list
  • MM targets dug by UXO teams
prioritized dig list the classification product
Prioritized Dig ListThe Classification Product
  • Rank based on the probability that the anomaly is clutter
  • Once prioritized, establishing the dig threshold is critical
summary
Summary

Classify TOI for digging

Using Metal Mapper, project costs are reduced by identifying those anomalies that are definitely clutter (they cannot possibly be UXO) at the site

ordnance safety1
Ordnance Safety
  • DO NOT TOUCH!DO NOT MOVE!
  • Note/record location
  • Call 911 or local law enforcement