Purpose of Briefing

1. Briefing forPolitical/National LeadersonOptions Available for theUS Space Program Prepared by Michael BrazeltonVersion 4 / July 2009

2. Purpose of Briefing • The statements on the space program by most national leaders have been vague and superficial – indicating that they have only superficial knowledge of the space program. • Articles indicate that they are not fully knowledgeable on the limitations and consequences of NASA’s Constellation Program • Most politicians do not seem to be aware of what options are available to them regarding the future of the US Space Program • They are under the impression that we are committed to the current program and have no other choice

3. Background • 2003: The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia motivated the United States to reevaluate its space exploration and development policy • 2004: President Bush proposed his Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) • Appoints Aldridge Commission to establish guidelines for constructing new civilian space policy • 2005: NASA publishes its Exploration of Space Architecture Study (ESAS)

4. Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) • - Finish the International Space Station • - Develop a new manned space vehicle to take astronauts beyond Earth orbit • - Return to the Moon • - Explore Mars and other parts of the solar system

5. Aldridge Commission • Formed to implement the provisions of the VSE • Imperatives established by Aldridge Commission • Sustainable - over several decades with visible demonstrations of progress and success • Affordable – not requiring large peaks in annual funding or significant decreases in other important space initiatives • Credible – leverages the current infrastructure and workforce whenever possible

6. NASA Authorization Act of 2005 • Complete the International Space Station • Maintain US access to space on a continuous basis • Maximize the use of personnel, capabilities, assets and infrastructure of the Space Shuttle Program in developing a heavy-lift launchvehicle • Return to the Moon NLT 2020

7. NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) • Conducted by NASA to determine architecture for new space program • Initially recommended development of separate crew launch vehicle and heavy lift vehicle - both based on current Space Shuttle architecture • Subsequently decided on development of twocompletely new and different launch systems – NOT Shuttle related • The Ares I to place the CEV in low earth orbit and • The Ares V as a super-heavy-lift cargo rocket to send large amounts of equipment and components to the Moon and beyond

8. Ares V & Ares I Launch Vehicles

9. Crew Exploration Vehicle

10. NASA’s ESAS • Started with a blank page rather than taking advantage of the current Space Shuttle architecture as required by the Aldridge Commission • Two all new launch rockets • All new solid rocket lower stage for Ares I • All new upper stage for Ares I • All new first stage/main tank for Ares V • All new solid rocket boosters (SRBs) for Ares V • All new upper stage for Ares V (EDS) • All new version of J-2 rocket engine for EDS (J-2X) • Substituted RS-68 engines for SSMEs

11. The Advantages of NASA’s ESAS • Super-heavy lift capability • If and when developed • Capable of supporting large, sustained Lunar exploration program • If that is what the national space exploration objective is • Some sources do not want to get bogged down supporting a huge Moon base program when we decide to go to Mars • In the same manner that our plans to return to the Moon have forced us to abandon support for the ISS • Able to send large payloads to Mars

12. The Disadvantages of NASA’s ESAS • The Ares I duplicates CEV lift capability currently available in the Delta IV-Heavy And Atlas V launch rockets • The Ares-I can barely get a stripped-down CEV into LEO • Development time for the Ares I has slipped so much that there is a 5-year (possibility 6 or 7 year) gap between the retirement of the Space Shuttle and earliest manned launch of the Ares I • The combination of the Ares I and the super-heavy-lift Ares V negates the possibility of building a family of rocket vehicles to launch a variety of payloads not necessarily Moon-related • Eventual funding for Ares V is not assured

13. Disadvantages of ESAS (Cont.) • Two separate, dissimilar rocket launchers to design and build • Complete modification of current launch pads • Modification of crawler that is not capable of supporting the weight of the Ares V • Modification of crawler pathway that is not capable of supporting the weight of the Ares V • Major modifications to the Vertical Assembly Building • Decimation of KSC workforce

14. Disadvantages of ESAS (Cont.) • High cost and time associated with design, testing and production of all-new rocket launch hardware • Heavy, expensive modification of rocket launcher support facilities • Loss of economy of scale • Maintenance of dissimilar production lines, facilities and technical force

15. Advertised Options to Close the “Gap” • Add additional Space Shuttle flight(s) • Very costly • Won’t solve the problem • Speed development of CEV and Ares I • - Very costly • - Can only be advanced up to a point • - Still would not provide flexible launch architecture • - Still would not provide heavy lift launch capability

16. Lesser Known Options • Make maximum use of current hardware • Develop Delta IV-Heavy as near-term LEO booster for CEV • Adopt program, such as DIRECT 3.0, for early return to manned space operations – including heavy-lift • Use combination of architecture under development for Constellation Program and current Space Shuttle architecture

17. Delta IV Heavy Launch Vehicle • Advantages • Currently in production • Disadvantages • Not man-rated • Risk factor too high (according to NASA) • Stated that safety margin must be “designed in” and not “added on” to new launcher • - Previous non-man-rated boosters were upgraded as NASA launch platforms - all with 100% success launch rate for manned missions • Redstone (Mercury) • Atlas (Mercury) • Titan (Gemini)

18. Delta-IV Heavy • In production • Capable of placing • 56,800 pounds in LEO at 28.7 degrees • 52,800 pounds to LEO at 51.6 degrees (ISS) • CEV weighs approx. 44,000 pounds • Launch rate success: 100% • Upgrades could increase payloads up to 80%

19. DIRECT 2.0 (Now DIRECT 3.0) • Grass-roots effort to produce a new launcher system based on a true derivative of Space Shuttle components, facilities and KSC work force • Based on early study by NASA that was initially discarded in favor of Ares I and Ares V • Supported by a growing variety of space engineers, scientists, educators, industry leaders, space enthusiasts, astronauts, ex-astronauts and political leaders – as well as many NASA engineers

20. DIRECT 3.0 • Realigns the VSE implementation plan with the VSE policy objectives by adhering to the directives set forth in the 2005 NASA Authorization Act and imperatives for success identified by the Aldridge Commission • Develops one basic, heavy-lift rocket launcher concept • Jupiter 130 rocket • Follow-on extra-heavy-lift rocket launcher for Moon and Mars exploration • Jupiter 24X* rocket • * Multiple heavy-lift configurations

21. DIRECT 3.0 (Cont.) • Utilizes most components of current Space Shuttle architecture • Main tank: Same as Space Shuttle/Currently in production • Launch pads: Same as used by Space Shuttle • Crawler (& crawler pathway): No change • Rocket engine: SSME/Currently in production • 4-segment solid rocket boosters: Same as used by Space Shuttle/Currently in production • KSC technical force: Trained in Space Shuttle operations and currently in place

22. DIRECT 3.0 Concept Ares I 55,000lb to LEO Jupiter 130 102,800lb to LEO

23. Jupiter 130 & Jupiter 24X Launch Vehicles

24. Jupiter 130

25. Jupiter 130

26. Advantages of DIRECT 3.0 • Better • One basic rocket vehicle design • Supports a “family” of payload options • Upgradeable with 2nd stage to extra-heavy-lift configuration • Faster • A true, direct derivative of the Space Shuttle • Most components are currently in production and tested • Cheaper • Majority of development costs have already been paid • Minimal tooling-up costs • Minimal learning curve expenses • Minimal testing required

27. Advantages of DIRECT 2.0/3.0 (Cont.) • Both Jupiter 130 and 24X can be man-rated • Permitting single launch of heavy configurations with crew aboard • Permitting manned missions to Moon orbit with single launch

28. Disadvantages of DIRECT 3.0 • No single super-heavy-lift launch capability • Although launch of two (identical) Jupiter 24X rockets puts more mass in LEO than the launch of (dissimilar) Ares I and Ares V rockets • Ares V-class launch vehicle could be considered as long-range follow-on space transport • NASA claims that the Jupiter 130 offers too much capability for required LEO operations • The Saturn V was designed to launch missions to the moon but it was versatile enough to be adapted to launch SkyLab into LEO – a mission that was not envisioned for it when it was designed • During the next two decades, there will probably be numerous payloads that are not currently contemplated • More LEO docking/assembly operations required with DIRECT 3.0

29. DIRECT 3.0 Lunar Exploration Concept EDS Ares I Ares V EDS Jupiter 24X Jupiter 24X

30. Alternative Missions with DIRECT 3.0 • Lunar rescue • Single Jupiter 24X can launch a manned rescue vehicle to the orbit of the Moon • Manned asteroid mission • L-2 missions • Follow-on manned and unmanned payloads • Winged crew mini-shuttle • New/enhanced space station modules • Large inflatable space structures • Large unmanned space probes • Mars sample return mission • Landers to the surface of Jupiter’s moons • ISS crew service, re-supply and renovation

31. Summary of Space Lift Capability • Launcher LEO TLI • Saturn IB 41,000 lb N/A • Saturn V 260,000 107,300 • Space Shuttle 59,000 N/A • Delta IV-Heavy 56,800 21,000 • Ares I 55,000 N/A • Ares V 410,000 157,000 • Jupiter 130 102,800 N/A • Jupiter 24X 233,000 93,200 • - Lunar Cargo Mission • Two Jupiter 24Xs --- 186,000 • - Manned Lunar Mission

32. Jupiters 130 & 24XCompared to Ares I & V

33. Jupiter 130 & SpacePlane • Jupiter 130 can launch a variety of payloads • that are not yet envisioned but will • come of age during the next two decades • Payloads much • heavier and diverse • than the CEV • Requiring a launcher • with greater capability • than Ares I

34. Payload Gap with Constellation Program 410,000lb to LEO 55,000lb to LEO No Capability to launch payloads greater than 55,000 pounds and less than 400,000 pounds

35. Possible Actions • Use the Delta-IV Heavy as the near-future launch vehicle to return US astronauts to LEO and service the ISS in the shortest possible time (See Note) • Develop the Jupiter 130 as the workhorse of LEO space operations and heavy probes to the Moon and planets • Develop the Jupiter 24X as the initial launch vehicle with which to return to the Moon. • Initiate a long-range program to build a super-heavy-lift rocket launcher such as the Ares V

36. Note on Delta IV-Heavy v: Jupiter 30 • It may take the same amount of time to man-rate the Delta IV-Heavy as it would to build the Jupiter 130 • It would not be cost effective to build two launch systems to do the same job • Modifying a Delta IV-Heavy for man-rated CEV operations would not provide the basis for a future family of heavy space launch vehicles • The US needs only one launch system • The Delta IV-Heavy is available NOW for unmanned re-supply of the ISS

37. Advantages of Revised Space Program • Saves billions of dollars in construction of next generation of space vehicles • Saves billions of dollars of investment already made in Space Shuttle program • Significantly narrows the space gap between end of Space Shuttle operations and a follow-on space program • Speeds the return-to-the-Moon program • Advances the prospect of manned missions to Mars • Permits the US to maintain unsurpassed leadership in space exploration • Informed public opinion would appreciate the DIRECT 3.0 approach over the current NASA plans to build the Ares I and Ares V

38. Consequences of Not Acting • Long “space gap” during which time a few US astronauts will be relegated to using Russian transportation to the ISS – if available • Destruction of existing space program infrastructure – billions of dollars of investments that have already been paid for • Loss of technical expertise at the KSC • Inability to service and support the ISS in any meaningful manner between 2010 and 2015-2020 • And then only minimally since Ares I has small payload capability • No heavy-lift space transport capability for 10+ years • After 50 years, US will have a space program no more advanced or capable than that of the current Chinese space program

39. Resistance to Canceling Major Contracts • NASA senior management • Particularly from NASA Administrator & senior staff • Companies contracted to design/build major Ares I and Ares V components • Lobbyist of concerned parties • Senators and Congressmen from states affected

40. Canceling Major Contracts • Concerned companies will have cancellation clauses that prevent them from losing money • It is very expensive to cancel a contract so it would be beneficial to try to combine the work that has been done so far with any new space launch architecture • Historically, major contracts have been cancelled when necessary (due to unacceptable cost, changing military/political environment or duplication of effort) • X-20 DynaSoar • Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) • Navy AX • Navy version of F-111

41. Ameliorating Major Contractors • Bring them together in consensus-building effort before announcing major changes/cancellations • Replace discontinued contracts with new contracts • Use work accomplished so far in new architecture

42. Utilizing Work Done So Far • Investigate use of new SRBs on Jupiter 130 and/or Jupiter 24X for enhanced performance • Incorporate new J2X engine on Jupiter 24X • Speed development of CEV • With full-up systems necessary for maximum safety and landing-on-land capability (since Jupiter 130 would be capable of handling the additional weight)

43. Public Perception • The US public takes great pride in its leadership position in space exploration • The public regards the Space Shuttle and the ISS as a cornerstone to its manned space program and does not want to see either of them sacrificed or abandoned for a less capable space program • A “gap” in US space operations will become increasingly embarrassing and intolerable as time goes on – especially if the Ares I program slips beyond 5 years, and Russia and China continue making noteworthy progress in space exploration

44. The Real Cost of The Space Program • NASA states that, in the long run, the Constellation Program will be the most affordable • The other costs: • Loss of US prestige as leading nation in space exploration • Loss of access to ISS/Inability to service ISS • No Heavy-lift capability for 10+ years • Possible loss of return-to-the-moon “race” to the Chinese – and even first manned mission to Mars • - A world perception of space leadership issue

45. Recommendations for National Leaders • Announced that you have become “increasingly concerned” about the direction of the US space program – especially the “gap” in time during which the US will have no space lift capability • Add that you are also concerned about accumulating costs and total cost of NASA’s Constellation Program – especially in light of current economic problems • Allow no action to be taken that will destroy the infrastructure of the current Space Shuttle program • Support the formation of an impartial (non-NASA) commission to analyze the options available to the future US Space Program • Advise the selection of the next NASA administrator that you want these options and all others considered impartially for future direction of the US manned space program

46. Personal Observations of Michael Brazelton • NASA is reluctant to admit that it might have made a mistake in deciding on the Constellation architecture • NASA has put on a full court advertising press to convince policy-makers and the public that it is too late to change its current course of action; i.e. to change horses in the middle of the stream. • However, the horse we are on now is the Shuttle architecture. The change is what NASA is proposing • It is not too late to change as long as the infrastructure of the Space Shuttle architecture has not been torn up • NASA over-estimated how much money it would have in its budget to develop the Constellation Program • NASA did not anticipate the development problems that it is currently experiencing with Ares I. Developments problems with Ares V are unknown.

47. Personal Observations (Cont.) • - NASA did not anticipate the dire economic condition of the US economy • The Ares V super-heavy lift capability might be ideal for a mission to Mars but a shuttle-derived space launch capability is more than sufficient for exploring the Moon • - And is capable of mounting an initial manned Mars program • By staying with the basic Space Shuttle architecture, it may be possible to “fly through” the gap with limited Space Shuttle missions until the Jupiter 130 is on line • Regarding the Chinese space program: The Apollo Program took eight years to put a man on the Moon. The Chinese already have an Apollo-class manned spacecraft. According the Mike Griffin, the NASA Administrator, China could conceivably put a man on the Moon by 2017-2018 – two to three years before NASA hopes to return to the Moon

48. End of Briefing • Reference: directlauncher.com

49. Resume of Michael Brazelton • Current as of July 2009 • Resume of MICHAEL L. BRAZELTON • 12313 Cannonball Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030 / Tel: 703-968-9893 / Fax: 703-266-0934 / E-Mail: michaelbrazelton@aol.com • DATE OF BIRTH: 19 March 1942 • PLACE OF BIRTH: Los Angeles, California, USA • MARITAL STATUS: Widowed • CHILDREN: 3 Daughters: Adriana (24), Ashley (22), Allison (18) • MILITARY BACKGROUND • RANK: Colonel, US Air Force • CURRENT STATUS: Retired (as of Nov 1987 • EMPLOYMENT • PREVIOUS: Colonel/Fighter Pilot, US Air Force / 1964 – 1987 • Pilot/Captain, American Airlines / 1989 - 2002 • CURRENT:Licensed Real Estate Agent / Real Estate Investor • EDUCATION • CIVILIAN: BS Aeronautical & Astronautical Engineering • - Northrop Institute of Technology, 1963 • MS Business Administration & Marketing (MBA) • - Auburn University at Montgomery, 1977 • MS Professional Engineering (Astrophysics) • - University of Maryland (2012) • MILITARY: USAF Air Command & Staff College (ACSC), 1977 • Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), 1982 • Defense Language Institute (Spanish), 1982 • Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), 1985 • AVIATION RATINGS: US Air Force Senior Command Pilot • Airline Transport Pilot - Multi-engine/Instrument/Land • Type Ratings: MD-11, B-767, B-757, B-727 • FAA First Class Medical Certificate

50. Resume of Michael Brazelton (Cont.) • MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS: US Air Force Pilot Training (1964) / F-105 Fighter Training (1965) / Combat Pilot in Vietnam - 111 Combat Missions (1966) / Prisoner of War in Vietnam (1966-1973) / USAF Instrument Pilot Instructor School (1973) / USAF Aggressor Pilot, Wing Staff Officer & Maintenance Test Pilot (1973-1977) / USAF Command & Staff College (1978) / F-5 Instructor Pilot & Squadron Operations Officer (1977-1981) / Chief, Military Security Assistance Office, Mexico (1982-1884) / Industrial College of the Armed Forces (1985) / HqUSAF Foreign Military Sales - Chief, Latin American Division (1985-1986) / Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Current Operations - Chief, Western Hemisphere Branch • AIRLINE EXPERIENCE: B-727 FE; 1989-1991; 500hrs+ / B-727 FO; 1991-1993; 1,306hrs / MD-11 FO; 1993-1994; 303hrs / B-757 & B- 767 FO; 1994-1999; 3,824hrs / B-727 CA; 1999-2001; 395hrs • FLYING TIME (Hours): Total Time: 8,654 / Combat: 348 / Multi-engine: 8,049 / Jet: 8,519 / Instructor: 893 / Military Jet Fighter: 2,327 / Civilian Jet Transport: 5,828 / PIC: 3,380 / International: 6,195 / Flight Engineer: 500+ • MILITARY DECORATIONS: Silver Star (4) / Defense Superior Service Medal / Defense Meritorious Service Medal / Legion of Merit / Distinguished Flying Cross / Bronze Star + V (2) / Air Medal (9) / Air Force Commendation Medal / Distinguished Presidential Unit Citation / National Defense Service Medal / Vietnam Service Medal + 8 Bronze Service Stars / Purple Heart (2) / Prisoner of War Medal