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Designing Alternate Electoral Systems

This model presents CA's view of an optimal STV type electoral system for BC, offering a standard for comparison against other alternatives. Voter preference system with proportional representation for parties and room for independents.

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Designing Alternate Electoral Systems

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  1. Designing Alternate Electoral Systems Deliberative Phase: Weekend 3

  2. The STV Type Alternative • This model represents CA’s view of optimum STV type of electoral system for BC • Provides a standard for judging this type of system against other alternatives, or the current Single-member Plurality system • If it emerges as the most desirable system then final discussion can confirm or adjust specifics of the model.

  3. A Voter Preference (STV) Electoral System • Local Representatives chosen from multi-member districts • Proportional Representation for parties with room for independents • Candidate-centred – Voters choose among candidates, from parties or independents

  4. DM: 2-7 Quota Ballot Form Completion Transfer Vacancies Low in rural areas; high in urban Droop Candidates grouped by party and names randomized Voters express as many preferences as they desire All transfers counted for replicability By-elections by AV Characteristics of CA’s Voter Preference (STV) System for BC

  5. The Voter Preference System & Rural Representation • This increases the physical size of existing districts by 2 or 3 times • Districts increase numbers of Representatives – total from region does not change • Boundaries will be drawn by an independent commission taking local community interests into account

  6. Boundary Commissions – a digression • Necessary wherever local or regional electoral boundaries are drawnapplicable to: FPTP STV MMP/M/C • Canadian practice now is for impartial, non-partisan commissions draw boundaries • This process under watchful eye of Courts which apply standards of Charter of Rights and Freedoms [Sect. 3]- “every citizen … the right to vote” has been interpreted to mean that every citizen has the right to ‘effective representation’

  7. Boundary Commissions - legal criteria • Rep by Pop - Population equity: - in practice districts must have populations that are within 25% of provincial average – a comparatively high tolerance- exceptional circumstances possible • Secondary Considerations:- geography and population considerations- accessibility factors- communication and transportation

  8. Boundary Commissions - process • At established intervals* Commission meets to review state of electoral map • Commission prepares plan to correct for any unacceptable variations among districts • Plan published and public hearings held to get input from local communities, citizens and political parties • Final report produced • New boundaries are formally established * In BC it is after every second election

  9. Boundary Commissions - under PR ? • We have no experience or jurisprudence that tells us what courts would say about the meaning of the vote, and hence boundary drawing, when using a PR system • With STV – we should start by assuming they would use the +/- 25% rule (adjusting for pop/DM) • With Mixed systems they would likely to use +/- 25% for local districts; expect some population equity across regions if regional lists used

  10. A Mixed System • Mixed Systems are deceptive- conceptually simple- architecturally complex • Decisions needed about each type in the mix • Decisions needed about how to integrate the different parts into a working mix • Designing such a system involves many individual decisions - but that doesn’t make such systems inherently more complex for voters.

  11. Designing a Mixed System • The Mix Principlea)parallel – MMM as in Japanb)proportional – MMP as in Germanyc) compensatory – MM·Lite(e.g. MMS proposal of Anderson -1635) • The Local – List BalanceEffects proportionality and the size of local districtsTo achieve proportionality probably need 40-50% listC:L = Germany 50:50, NZ ~60:40, Wales 66:33

  12. Designing a Mixed System • Seat-List eligibility of Candidatesa) must run on both listsb) free to run on bothc) must choose one side of system or other • List-Constituency AccessAre there requirements that parties must run local candidates to access the list?If so, how many?

  13. Designing a Mixed System • Number of Votesa) 2 – allows vote splittingb) 1 – asserts primacy of local vote • Constituency Seat Electoral Rulea) Plurality (FPTP) – retains familiar processb) AV – provides some more voter choice; encourages parties to signal partner preferences before vote.

  14. Designing a Mixed System • The List Seats7.1 Seat allocation level –Where is proportionality measured?a) Province-wide (NZ)b) Regional (what regions?) (Wales)7.2 Seat assignment levela) Province-wide (NZ)b) Regional (what regions?) (Germany)This gives three possible combinations:1) Provincial allocation, provincial list assignment (NZ)2) Provincial allocation, regional list assignment (Germany) (Day-1203)3) Regional allocation, regional list assignment (Scotland)

  15. Designing a Mixed System • The List Seats (cont’d.)7.3Provincial or Regional Lista) How complete must a party’s list be? b) If regions, what ones and what size? 7.4 Closed or Open Lista) Closed – Best losers? [would requires 3 a)]b) Open – Form and counting Rules. Forced openness?

  16. Designing a Mixed System • The List Seats (cont’d.) 7.5 Formula for seat allocations Quotas or divisor principles (Farrell 71-8) 7.6 Threshold(s)a) Kind – Individual seat, Vote shareb) LevelNew Zealand is 1 seat OR 5%7.7 Overhang seats ??

  17. Designing a Mixed System • Seat Vacancy provisionsa) Constituency seats b) List seats 9.Recommendations on Ballot form?a) One paper with two sides linkedb) Two separate ballots

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