Trademarks Class 4. Federal registration and geographic scope International use and domestic rights. Dawn Donut Co. 2. Dawn Donut v. Hart’s Food Stores.
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Federal registration and geographic scope
International use and domestic rights
“[T]he fact that [Hart] employed the mark ‘Dawn,’ without actual knowledge of [Dawn Donut’s] registration, at the retail level in a limited geographical area of New York state before [Dawn] used the mark in that market, does not entitle it either to exclude [Dawn] from using the mark in that area or to use the mark concurrently once [Dawn] licenses the mark or otherwise exploits it in connection with retail sales in the area.” 
“The decisive question then is whether plaintiff’s use of the mark ‘Dawn’ at the retail level is likely to be confined to its current area of use or whether in the normal course of its business, it is likely to expand the retail use of the mark into defendant’s trading area. . . [T]he plaintiff may later, upon a proper showing of an intent to use the mark at the retail level in defendant’s market area, be entitled to enjoin defendant’s use of the mark.” [94-95]
Pure junior user (as in Dawn Donut):
Junior intermediate user:
Senior unregistered user:
“. . . Person’s Co. relies on its use of the mark in Japan in an attempt to support its claim for priority in the United States. Such foreign use has no effect on U.S. commerce and cannot form the basis for a holding that appellant has priority here” 
“Knowledge of a foreign use does not preclude good faith adoption and use in the United States. While there is some case law supporting a finding of bad faith where (1) the foreign mark is famous here or (2) the use is a nominal one made solely to block the prior foreign user’s planned expansion into the United States, as the Board correctly found, neither of these circumstances is present in this case.” [116-17]