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Business Continuity /Disaster Recovery Panel STA Annual Conference 2006 A High Level Summary of the Lessons Learned from Hurricane Wilma by Franklin Templeton Investments Wayne Behrens Director Business Continuity Planning Prepared for the Securities Transfer Assocation

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A High Level Summary of the Lessons Learned

from Hurricane Wilma


Franklin Templeton Investments

Wayne Behrens


Business Continuity Planning

Prepared for the

Securities Transfer Assocation

Amelia Island Meeting on Oct 20, 2006


Wilma Agenda

  • Franklin Templeton Investments
  • Who was Wilma
  • Impact of Wilma
  • What Went Right
  • Crisis Management Lessons
  • Business Continuity Lessons
  • Technology Lessons
  • Facility Lessons

Franklin Templeton Investments

  • Parent: Franklin Resources Inc.
  • Approx 500 Billion in Assets Under Management
  • Major Brands
    • Franklin
    • Templeton
    • Mutual Series
    • Fiduciary Trust
    • Darby Overseas
    • Bisset (Canada)
  • Employees: Approx 8,000 in 29 countries. In the Florida Area:
    • St. Petersburg (1,200+)
    • Ft. Lauderdale (466)
    • Nassau (49)
    • Miami (16)

Who the Heck was Wilma?

  • Hurricane Wilma is the lesser known cousin of Katrina. However, Wilma was the most intense hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic basin. It devastated parts of the Yucatán Peninsula as well as southern Florida.
  • There were 62 deaths attributed to Wilma and damage is estimated at $12.2 billion in the U.S., making Wilma the sixth costliest storm in U.S history.
  • When Wilma reached Ft. Lauderdale, she was a category 2 hurricane with sustained winds of 110 mph to 130 MPH.

Impact of Wilma on Franklin

  • Wilma reached Ft. Lauderdale early Monday morning, October 24th. By Monday afternoon, we had received preliminary damage assessments indicating that hundreds of windows primarily on the north west section of the building were blown out.
  • We were unable to occupy the building from October 24 through November 18.
  • No loss of life and no injuries to employees. Some damage to a few employee’s homes. Many employee’s homes were without power for days or weeks.
  • 500 employees were impacted, with over 230 being relocated to other sites: Toronto, St. Petersburg, Miami, New York, Short Hills, San Mateo, and Rancho Cordova.   

What Went Right

  • In general, our Crisis Management, Business Continuity and Technology Disaster Recovery plans worked well.
  • Wilma caused virtually no disruption to our customers.
  • The Ft. Lauderdale Emergency Management Team took charge of the situation in Ft. Lauderdale.
  • All business units were able to follow their business continuity plans and recover their operations.
  • Technology operations were restored to include two critical applications.

Crisis Management Lessons

  • When the local Emergency Management Teams (EMT’s) are in the midst of the incident and working literally in the dark, they do not always have the ability to fully coordinate the recovery of business operations away from the site.
  • Each of the major roles in our crisis management teams need to have a specific checklist.
  • We need to put in place a pre-plan to track and deal immediately with the relocation of employees to other sites.
  • You cannot over communicate. Despite the fact that we tried very hard to be proactive on communicating to our employees, we still heard a number of complaints in this area.

Business Continuity Lessons

  • Over 40 laptops were left in the FTL office when the hurricane hit. There had been so many hurricane threats during the year that many employees did not feel that Wilma would really hit or cause this much damage if it did.
  • The standard for Business Continuity Plans needs to be expanded to address a month long outage:
    • Shifting work to alternate sites for the first 3-5 days without moving employees
    • Plan for an incident to last over a month to include a month end
  • A number of issues arose in regards to employees:
    • Pay during the outage
    • Childcare and school closures
    • Bonus for extraordinary efforts
    • Relocation of children & elders

Technology Lessons Learned

  • We were surprised by the number of business units that still relied upon hard copies of faxed documents to stand alone fax machine. We have worked on a better process and documentation of FAX rerouting requirements.
  • Better written procedures for forwarding 800 numbers.
  • There is a desire from the business for a better disaster recovery solution for email and Blackberry servers.
  • Environmental monitoring of server rooms needs to be tied into a central control point to insure it is remotely accessible.

Facilities Lessons Learned

  • We should have drilled more rigorously on damage assessments. For the first couple of days, the damage assessments were verbal and led us to believe the damage was much more extensive than it was. It turned out only 15% to 20% of the work areas were damaged.
  • Conversely, our repair and re-occupancy time estimates were wildly optimistic.
  • Based on initial reports, we planned for a week long disruption. We were out for almost a month.
  • Need to have working knowledge prior to the incident of what local agencies will require to re-occupy a building.
  • Keep in mind the fire marshal and the building inspectors are not always in sync.

Wilma Closing

In the end it was the knowledge, flexibility and perseverance of our people who really carried the day and made the recovery a success.



Pandemic Agenda

  • Goal of this presentation
  • Likelihood of a Pandemic
  • Basic Business Continuity Strategy
  • Why plan
  • How will a pandemic differ
  • Basic elements of our plan
    • Crisis Management
    • Business Continuity Planning
    • Technology
    • General Services
    • Human Relations
    • Corporate Communications
  • What our plan does not cover

Pandemic Background

1. Goal: To provide an overview of Franklin’s current approach and thinking in regards to planning for a possible Pandemic.

2. Likelihood of a pandemic occurring: The question is more like earthquakes in California. It is not a question of if, but rather when and how bad. Some data points such as the 1918, 1957 & 1968 pandemics and SAR’s. But, no good data on frequency or severity.

3. Strategy: Our basic disaster planning strategy is to shift our operations to other sites for 3 to 5 days, after which we will then need to start to shift people to alternate sites. However, this will not work in a pandemic situation.


Pandemic Background (Continued)

4. Why plan if civilization is going to collapse:

We used a “reasonable worst case scenario”. A scenario which we think is likely to occur. This is not a worst case scenario which anticipates the general breakdown of society and services.

  • 5. How will a pandemic differ from our “normal incidents:
    • - Many sites are likely to be impacted
    • at approximately the same time
    • - Will not be able to shift people
    • between sites
    • Site might be impacted, but not
    • incapacitated
    • - Sites affected for months not hours
    • Affects people directly not facilities or IT.
    • Employees may choose not to come to work.
    • No clear beginning or end.

Pandemic Plan Outline

  • Our pandemic plan is broken down into:
  • 1. Crisis Management:
  • - Framework to address a pandemic
  • - Tabletop exercises
  • 2. Business Continuity Planning:
    • - Guidance to business units on how to review their business continuity strategies and workflows against a
    • pandemic type scenario
  • 3. Technology
    • Steps to reduce the impact of a
    • pandemic on our data centers
    • - Increased remote work capabilities
    • - Reviewing other strategies

Pandemic Plan Outline (Continued)

  • 4. General Services
    • Best practices for employee hygiene program and procedures for facility
    • managers to follow in the event of a pandemic
  • 5. Human Relations
    • Global HR policy framework to provide recommendations to local HR
    • groups to address issues that are likely to arise in a pandemic
  • 6. Corporate Communications
    • Integrated communication plan
  • 7. Plan Does not currently include:
    • PPE such as Masks gloves, Etc.
    • Antiviral Drugs such as Tamiflu
    • Vaccines
all disasters are local regionalizing business continuity

All Disasters are Local:Regionalizing Business Continuity

Securities Transfer Association

2006 Annual Conference

Brian Tishuk

ChicagoFIRST Executive Director

October 20, 2006



Defense Industrial Base




Postal & Shipping

Government Services


Critical Infrastructures










federal financial partnership
Federal Financial Partnership

Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC)

(formed January 2002)

Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FSSCC)

(formed June 2002)





President’s Working Group

on Financial Markets

Treasury - Lead Agency

(PDD 63)

US Treasury

Assistant Secretary for

Financial Institutions


Assistant Secretary for

Financial Institutions


Rhonda MacLean


Financial and Banking Information

Infrastructure Committee


US Treasury Department

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Conference of State Bank Supervisors

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Federal Housing Finance Board

Federal Reserve Board of Governors

Homeland Security Council

National Association of Insurance


National Credit Union Administration

New York Federal Reserve Bank

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight

Office of Thrift Supervision

Securities and Exchange Commission

Financial Services Sector Coordinating



Financial Services Trade Associations

& Institutes

New York Stock Exchange

The Clearinghouse


Securities Industry Automation Corporation

The Options Clearing Corporation





The Role for Regional

Public/Private Partnerships

the missing piece
The Missing Piece

To increase the resilience of financial services in the event of a regional disaster in collaboration with the city, state, and federal agencies.

all disasters are local
All Disasters are Local
  • How will that jurisdiction prevent, prepare for, and respond to incidents?
  • Do your business continuity plans incorporate government response plans?
  • How can coordination be fostered among jurisdictions?
  • Regional partnerships can strengthen the business continuity plans of participating firms
regional partnerships formed and forming
Regional Partnerships:Formed and Forming
  • Miami (FloridaFIRST)
  • San Francisco (BARC FIRST; Bay Area Response Coalition)
  • Los Angeles (SoCal FIRC; Financial Institutions Recovery Coalition)
  • Minneapolis (MN-ISAC; MN Security Board)
  • Tampa Bay Region of FloridaFIRST
  • HoustonFIRST
  • PhiladelphiaFIRST
  • ColumbusFIRST
  • Alabama Recovery Coalition for the Financial Sector
  • Chicago (ChicagoFIRST)
  • Washington, DC
  • Detroit
  • Alaska
  • Seattle
  • Jacksonville
  • Las Vegas
  • New Orleans (still thinking about it)
rpc first
  • Fostering Collaboration among Partnerships
  • ChicagoFIRST leading the formation of a Council
      • Council would share best practices
      • Council would help one another with administrative questions
      • Council can plug into FSSCC
  • RPC = Regional Partnership Council
  • FIRST = Financial Industry Resilience, Security, and Teamwork
  • Formed in early 2006
The ChicagoFIRST Approach

(formed May 2003)

chicagofirst s primary objectives
ChicagoFIRST’s Primary Objectives
  • Obtain a seat at Chicago's 911 Center in the event of a crisis that affects Chicago's financial community
      • LaSalle Bank/ABN AMRO
  • Create permits/passes for essential personnel to safely access business facilities in the event of a general evacuation of the city (credentialing)
      • Northern Trust Bank
  • Develop and communicate standard evacuation procedures for industry personnel to exit city limits in the event of a disaster
      • JP Morgan Chase
ABN AMRO / LaSalle Bank

Allstate Insurance Company



Ariel Capital Management

Bank of America

Chicago Board Options Exchange

Chicago Board of Trade

Chicago Federal Home Loan Bank

Chicago Mercantile Exchange

Chicago Stock Exchange

Fidelity National Financial

Global Electronic Trading Company

Harris Bank

JP Morgan Chase

Man Financial

Mesirow Financial

Mizuho Securities USA

Northern Trust

The Options Clearing Corporation

PrivateBank and Trust


Washington Mutual

William Blair & Company

strategic partners pg 1 of 2
Strategic Partners (pg. 1 of 2)
  • Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications
  • Chicago Police Department
  • Commodity Futures Trading Commission
  • FBI / InfraGard
  • Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
  • Federal Emergency Management Agency
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
  • Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee
  • Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center
  • Financial Services Roundtable / BITS
  • Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council
  • Futures Industry Association
strategic partners pg 2 of 2
Strategic Partners (pg. 2 of 2)
  • Great Lakes Partnership
  • Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation
  • Illinois Emergency Management Agency
  • Illinois State Police
  • Illinois Terrorism Task Force
  • National Futures Association
  • Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
  • Securities and Exchange Commission
  • Securities Industry Association
  • United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois
  • United States Department of Homeland Security
  • United States Department of the Treasury
  • United States Secret Service
formal 911 center seat
Formal 911 Center Seat
  • Obtained seat at 911 Center in fall 2003
      • Primarily for government agencies
      • May use seat when Center is activated
  • Enhancements to seat at emergency operations center
      • Set of individuals to staff the seat (with Chicago Fed help)
      • Handbook with protocols for using the seat, activating our crisis communicator, and contact information
      • Private component of web site created and configured to provide a message board for posting and recording critical information
      • Information about the membership, including critical locations and essential employees, on the computer at the seat
informal information sharing
Informal Information Sharing
  • Seat at 911 Center will be used rarely
  • But the relationships with the city and state are invaluable
      • Spring 2004 information about leaning transmission tower
      • August 1, 2004 threats against financial institutions
      • LaSalle Bank fire, December 2004
credentialing and evacuations
Credentialing and Evacuations
  • Credentialing
      • Discovered city and state each seeking credentialing systems, but not coordinating
      • City adopted credentialing pilot in which ChicagoFIRST participates
  • Evacuations
      • Illinois Department of Transportation tabletops in 2004, 2005, and 2006
      • September 7, 2006 evacuation drill in the Loop
working groups
Working Groups
  • Security Working Group
      • Coordinating training needs and opportunities
      • Coordinating physical security and options
      • Piloted NC4 Situation Awareness Service
  • Power Working Group
      • Understanding electricity in multi-tenant buildings
      • Sharing ComEd information among members
working groups41
Working Groups
  • Telecommunications Working Group
      • Educating membership
        • GETS
        • TSP
        • SBC call forwarding
      • Surviving a central office failure
        • TeleContinuity
        • LEMKO
        • Sprint IP network
working groups42
Working Groups
  • Pandemic Planning Working Group
      • Free exchange of HR, legal, & BCP information, without NDAs
      • Coordinating with state and local health departments
      • Coordinating with sector-wide efforts
      • Evaluating hiring a public health advisor for ChicagoFIRST
      • Tabletop scheduled for November 2, 2006
working groups43
Working Groups
  • Public Relations Working Group
      • Single point of contact for the media
      • Firms leverage membership with press
      • ChicagoFIRST increases media understanding
  • Crisis Communications Working Group
      • Quarterly tests of the 911 Center procedures
      • Quarterly tests of Dialogic (notification data)
      • Quarterly tests of TeleContinuity and GETS
2004 milestones
2004 Milestones
  • Testified before House Financial Services Committee on ChicagoFIRST as a partnership
  • 9/11 Commission legislation identifies ChicagoFIRST as a model
  • GAO Report on Financial Market Preparedness praises ChicagoFIRST
  • Treasury handbook identifies ChicagoFIRST as model
  • Tabletop on city’s response to Chicago financial community
2005 milestones
2005 Milestones
  • Tabletop focused on futures and options markets
  • Public television features ChicagoFIRST
  • Fund Illinois Terrorism Task Force (ITTF) video for the citizens of Illinois
  • Co-chair Private Sector Committee of the ITTF
2006 activities
2006 Activities
  • Mutual aid among the members
  • Credentialing critical supplies like cash
  • Evacuation drill
  • City of Chicago camera program
  • Provided testimony on pandemic preparedness to the House Financial Services Committee
chicagofirst model works
ChicagoFIRST Model Works
  • The model is the partnership approach, not the goals or organization of ChicagoFIRST
      • FloridaFIRST covers the entire state, with several regions
      • BARC FIRST and SoCal FIRC split California
      • MN-ISAC has Target, Best Buy, 3M as members
  • Leverage partnership to encourage public sector information sharing and improvements
      • Seats in EOCs
      • Credentialing
      • Access protocols for critical supplies
the value proposition
The Value Proposition
  • LaSalle Bank fire
  • Mizuho futures
  • Cooperation vs. competition on employee safety and business continuity (mutual aid established after the fire)
  • Government appreciates single point of contact
  • NC4 and TeleContinuity
contact information
Brian Tishuk

Executive Director



Contact Information