International Conference « Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security Environment »

1. International Conference «Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security Environment» VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE DEFENSE ISSUES Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General N.E.MAKAROV Moscow, 2012

2. 1 Russian Core BMD Guidelines Equal and indivisible security as crucial feature of regional and global security Solid linkage between strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems Mutual nuclear deterrence is key to global security and stability

3. 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF ABM TREATY OF 1972 • The Treaty had the USSR and the USA committed: • to limit their Missile Defense systems; • not to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense system; • not to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areas; • not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD systems; • not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles.

4. 3 US SDI PROGRAM BOOST-BASED SURVERLANCE & TRACKING SYSTEM BOOST-PHASE SURVERLANCE & TRAKING SYSTEM SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTOR NEUTRAL PARTICLE BEAM RELAY MIRROR FRONTING MIRROR SPACE-BASED LASER SPACE-BASED SURVERLANCE & TRACKING SYSTEM GRAUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR GRAUND-BASED RADAR HIGH ENDO-ATMOSPHERIC DEFENSE INTERCEPTOR GRAUND-BASED LASER BATTLE MANAGTR The purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike .

5. 4 ABMD AGREEMENTS OF 1990-s Joint US-Russian statement on global protection system (Washington, 17th of June 1992) Joint statement of Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding Agreement on Ballistic Missile Defense (Helsinki, 21st of March 1997) Provision on Standing Consultative Commission (New-York, 26th of September 1997) First agreed statement regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972 (New-York, 26th of September 1997) General understanding to the first agreed statement of 26 September 1997 regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972 Second agreed statement regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972. (New-York, 26th of September 1997) General understanding to the second agreed statement dated 26th of September 1997 regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972. Agreement on confidence-building measures regarding systems for fighting Ballistic Missiles, which are not strategic ballistic missiles (New-York, 25th of September 1997) Memorandum of understandingregarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972. (New-York, 26th of September 1997

6. PLANS OF THE USA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THIRD POSITIONING AREA 5 Possible trajectories of Russian ICBMs Kozelsk Tatistchevo TPA defense zone Radar ‘s range in Czech Republic

7. 6 DECLARED PHASES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF US BMD SYSTEM IN EUROPE (NATO BMD) Phase I(2011) - deployment of MD ships with «Standard-3» 1А interceptors in Aegean, Adriatic and Mediterranean seas. • PhaseII (2011-2015) • deployment of MD base with «Standard-3» interceptors 1BinRomania. • Phase III (2015-2018) • deployment of MD base with «Standard-3» 2А interceptors in Poland. Outfitting deployed MD shooters with «Standard-3»2А interceptors. Phase IV (2018-2020) - outfitting deployed MD shooters in Europe with «Standard-3» 2B interceptors. Protection of South and South-East European States from shorter range missiles Protection of European states from intermediate range missiles Protection of European states from ICBMs Protection of South European States from shorter range missiles

8. RUSSIAN “SECTORAL” APPROACH 7 BM trajectories do not cross NATO BMD area of responsibility NATO area of responsibility (NATO BMD assets only) RUSSIAN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (RUSSIAN BMD assets only) Territoies of European states (NATO members) covered by Russian BMD, where deployment of NATO BMD challenges Russian Strategic Nuclear Force capabilities NATO-RUSSIA JOINT SYSTEM OF COMBAT CONTROL (information exchange and target distribution)

9. 8 COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE

10. RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTIBLE DECISIONS 9 • CRITERIA LIST: • technical performances of BMD components (interceptor’s speed, number of interceptors, radar range, control system capabilities etc.), • deployment sites, • capabilities for interception of various types of BMs at boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight. joint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for the relevant strategic deterrence capabilities development of verification measures to assure security of strategic capabilities legally binding agreementsdefining mutual obligations of the pertinent parties to deploy a European BMD system providing equal security to all participants

11. 10 RETALIATORY MEASURES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDRATION • to increase defense of fixed launching sites, • to ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers, • to increase readiness of deployed BM platforms, • to increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense, • to decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time, • to increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification by Russian AD and BMD assets, • to employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets, • to ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets (interceptors launchers, command & control posts, outer-space detection means). All said measures will be implemented only as retaliatory steps provided a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force from the US and NATO deployed BMD assets appears to be on the rise. Russian response will be adequate, economically well-balanced and effective.