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Common-pool resources

Common-pool resources. Gilberto Câmara , Earth System Science Center, INPE. Licence: Creative Commons ̶̶̶̶ By Attribution ̶̶̶̶ Non Commercial ̶̶̶̶ Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/. Acknowledgments for using previous material.

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Common-pool resources

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  1. Common-pool resources Gilberto Câmara, Earth System Science Center, INPE Licence: Creative Commons ̶̶̶̶ By Attribution ̶̶̶̶ Non Commercial ̶̶̶̶ Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/

  2. Acknowledgments for using previous material • Martin Nowak (Harvard University, USA) • Francisco C. Santos (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium) • Craig Callender (Philosophy, Univ California San Diego, USA) • Ana Aguiar (INPE, Brazil) • Tiago Carneiro (Federal University of Ouro Preto, Brazil) • Guy Brasseur (NCAR, USA)

  3. What cooperation can achieve... Those were the days… http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HrjevD2vhk&feature=related

  4. Collective spatial action: volunteered GI Are Brazilians less cooperative? Less tech-savvy? Doesgoogle solve their problems? Are they happy with their public data?

  5. Collective spatial action: pedestrian modelling Notting Hill Carnival (London) Batty, “Agent-Based Pedestrian Modelling”, in: Advanced Spatial Analysis, ESRI Press, 2003.

  6. Collective spatial action: deforestation

  7. 10 8.7 8 Fossil fuel 6 CO2 emissions (PgC y-1) 4 Land use change 1.2 2 1970 1980 2010 2000 1960 1990 Collective spatial action: global change 9.9 PgC 12% of total Le Quéré et al. 2009, Nature-geoscience, 2009

  8. An explicit spatial problem in global change: land change “Land-change science has emerged as a foundational element of global environment change and sustainability science” (Rindfuss et al, “Developing a science of land change”, PNAS, 2004).

  9. source: Global Land Project Science Plan (IGBP)

  10. Impacts of global land change More vulnerable communities are those most at risk

  11. We need spatially explicit models to understand human-environment interactions Nature: Physical equations Describe processes Society: Decisions on how to Use Earth´s resources

  12. Modelling collective spatial actions: the complex systems approach photo: Chico Albuquerque Situated individuals (persons, groups, agents) Interaction rules - communication Decision rules - actions Properties of space

  13. Our spatially explicit models need good social theories to guide them Nature: Physical equations Describe processes Society: Decisions on how to Use Earth´s resources

  14. We need social theories to understand human-environment interactions • Survey Moran, “Environmental Social Science: Human-Environment Interactions and Sustainability” (2010) • Social simulation Schelling, “Micromotives and macrobehavior” (1978). Batty, “Cities and complexity” (2005). • Game theory von Neumann and Morgenstern, “Theory of games and economic behavior” (1944) Nash, "Equilibrium points in n-person games“ (1950). • Evolutionary dynamics Maynard Smith,  ”Evolution and the theory of games” (1982) Axelrod, “Evolution of cooperation” (1988). Novak, “Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life” (2005). • Institutional analysis Ostrom, “Governing the commons” (1990).

  15. Common pool resources (Elinor Ostrom)

  16. The ultimate common pool resource

  17. Governing the commons [Ostrom, Science, 2005]

  18. Governing the commons: Ostrom´s conditions Clearly defined boundaries. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. Collective-choice arrangements. Monitoring and graduated sanctions. Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Minimal recognition of rights to organize. Organized governance activities.

  19. Ostrom on governing the commons “The challenge is how best to limit the use of natural resources so as to ensure their long-term economic viability.” “Neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems.” “Optimal equilibrium with centralized control is based on assumptions concerning accuracy of information, monitoring capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration.”

  20. Conclusion Spatial models of human-environment interactions can support the study of common pool resources

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