slide1
Download
Skip this Video
Download Presentation
Risk assessment: The Safety of Blood Products p resented b y Dr. Thomas R . Kreil Baxter BioScience o n behalf of the

Loading in 2 Seconds...

play fullscreen
1 / 13

Risk assessment: The Safety of Blood Products p resented b y Dr. Thomas R . Kreil Baxter BioScience o n behalf of the - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 109 Views
  • Uploaded on

Risk assessment: The Safety of Blood Products p resented b y Dr. Thomas R . Kreil Baxter BioScience o n behalf of the PPTA Pathogen Safety Steering Committee Technical meeting with FDA April 29, 2003. The safety of blood products. Risk assessment considerations Plasma viremia

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'Risk assessment: The Safety of Blood Products p resented b y Dr. Thomas R . Kreil Baxter BioScience o n behalf of the' - bat


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
slide1
Risk assessment: The Safety of Blood Products

presented by

Dr. Thomas R. Kreil

Baxter BioScience

on behalf of the

PPTA Pathogen Safety Steering Committee

Technical meeting with FDA

April 29, 2003

slide2
The safety of blood products
  • Risk assessment considerations
    • Plasma viremia
    • Infectious virus titer of positive units
    • Prevalence of viremia in the population
    • Resulting plasma manufacturing pool loads
    • Reduction by manufacturing processes
    • Further relevant features
slide3
West Nile Virus - Viremia

Symptomatic Individuals

  • 102– 105 iu/ml: in patients with underlying malignant disease
      • CM Southam & AE Moore, Am J Trop Med Hyg [1951] 31: 724
  • 2.5 x 106 c/ml: 3 days after onset of neurological symptoms
      • C Huang et al., http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no12/02-0532.htm

Otherwise Healthy Donors

  • 1-5 x 103 c/ml: FDA BPAC briefing package, March 13, 2003
  • 2 x 105 c/ml: 1 in 7,107 (out of samples 75% targeted for risk )
      • A Conrad / NGI, BPAC March 13, 2003

 worst case: 2 x 105 PCR copies/ml

slide4
West Nile Virus

Infectious virus titer of positive units

  • Mean PCR detectable amount of virus: 0.00289 pfu/mL (0.001640 – 0.005099 pfu/mL)
      • A Conrad / NGI, BPAC March 13, 2003; CDC WNV panel (Lanciotti)
  • Assuming that already ONE copy is PCR detectable: 1 infectious virus particle per 346 (196-610) genomes
  • Viremia of max. 2x105 PCR detectable genomes, at only 1 infectious particle per 196 genomes:

 worst case: max. 1,020 infectious units per ml

slide5
West Nile Virus

Prevalence of viremia in the population

  •  Modeling approach
    • US average risk: 0.36 per 10,000 donors
    • US maximum risk: 1.55 per 10,000 donors (peak epidemic)
    • Michigan: about 4 per 10,000 donors (during the epidemic)
    • Michigan: about 10 per 10,000 donors (peak epidemic, Sept 1)
    • Detroit: up to 20 per 10,000 donors (peak epidemic, Sept 1)

Dr. Lyle Petersen / CDC: BPAC, March 13, 2003 http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/transcripts/3940t1.htm

slide6
West Nile Virus

Prevalence of viremia in the population

  •  Verification by testing (viremia study)
      • Samples from Cleveland and Detroit: i.e. highest risk areas
      • Obtained during the first three weeks of September 2002: i.e. highest risk period
      • model: estimated risk ~ 8.2 per 10,000 in that population.
      • TaqMan PCR: 6 / 5,761 samples positive, i.e. viremia prevalence:
      • worst case: 10.4 per 10,000

Dr. Sue Stramer / ARC: BPAC, March 13, 2003 http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/transcripts/3940t1.htm

slide7
West Nile Virus

Resulting plasma pool loads

  • Max. viremic donor prevalence: 10.4 per 10,000  i.e. approx. 1 per 1,000
  • Max. viremia levels: 1,020 infectious units / ml
  • Dilution of viremic donations into manufacturing pools: maximum of 1 infectious unit per ml, assuming the
      • highest potential load, and the
      • highest prevalence
  •  WORST CASE (earthquake during a hurricane)
slide8
West Nile Virus

Base case

  • Plasma viremia: 1-5 x 103 c/ml (FDA BPAC info)assume mean of 3,000, statistically
  • Infectious virus titer of positive units: ~10 units/ml1 infectious virus particle per 346 genomes, i.e. mean of determined range
  • Prevalence of viremia in the population: 2/10,000average risk throughout the U.S., during peak epidemic
  • Resulting plasma manufacturing pool loads:  ~0.001 units/ml
  • PLUS: reduction by manufacturing processes !
slide9
West Nile Virus

Resulting plasma pool loads

  • WNV would be below the limit of detection for current virus assays
  • Inconsistent with current practice for HIV, HCV and HBV
slide10
West Nile Virus

Reduction by manufacturing processes

  • ALL dedicated virus inactivation steps which have been investigated so far resulted in
  •  complete inactivation of WNV
  • reduction factors ranging between >5.5 and >8.2
  •  very rapid inactivation kinetics of WNV
  •  verification of the fact that WNV behaves exactly like predicted from model virus (BVDV, TBEV) data !!
slide11
West Nile Virus

Reduction by manufacturing processes ?

  • Besides dedicated virus inactivation steps, other steps contribute to virus reduction during manufacturing process.
    • only dedicated steps considered
  • For manufacturing process, the overall virus reduction capacity is determined by a combination of virus inactivation and virus removal.
    • only inactivation investigated
slide12
West Nile Virus

Further relevant features

  • Acute self-limiting infection: life-long test-based donor deferral is only prudent for chronically-infected persons
  •  No medical benefit to the donor
  •  No public health benefit from WNV testing
slide13
West Nile Virus
  • Conclusions:
  • Donation loads below limit of detection for current test strategies
  • Typical flavivirus characteristics
  • Effective viral reduction by existing processes
ad